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Introduction  
Lars Calmfors1 and Jesper Roine2 
 
 
In recent years income distribution issues have received increased attention in most 
economically advanced countries both in the public debate and in academic circles. 
This reflects an international trend towards increased income inequality, a trend 
which has also affected the Nordic countries long associated with far-reaching 
egalitarian ambitions. As the inequality increases in the Nordics have been among the 
largest in the OECD area over the past decades, developments here have received 
particular attention internationally (see, e.g., OECD 2011, OECD 2015 and Morelli et 
al. 2015). This, in turn, has led to an on-going debate between those who see the rising 
income disparities as a threat to the Nordic welfare model and those who emphasise 
that inequality has increased from historically low levels and that the Nordics still 
remain among the countries with the most even income distribution. 
The inequality debate is sometimes difficult to follow for a very simple reason: it is 
not always specified what kind of inequality is referred to. Typically it is even less clear 
exactly which mechanisms that are thought to be at work when statements about 
negative (or positive) consequences of inequality are made. Inequality is a genuinely 
complex and multidimensional concept. There is no one obvious measure that would 
capture the “true inequality” in society.  
Should we, for example, care more about inequality in income or in wealth or in 
consumption, or perhaps in some other dimension? Should we consider inequality 
between households or individuals or perhaps some other division of the population? 
Does it matter if inequality is driven by the poor falling behind or the rich becoming 
even richer? Should we measure income inequality at a fixed point in time or consider 
lifetime incomes? To further complicate matters, consequences of income inequality                                                                  
1 Research Institute of Industrial Economics and Institute for International Economics, Stockholm University. 
2 Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, Stockholm School of Economics. 
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take on many forms, over different time spans and, importantly, they also interact 
with how society is organised. In particular, depending on the role of government in 
providing different goods and services, the link between disposable income and well-
being may be very different.  
This issue of the Nordic Economic Policy Review brings together a number of 
contributions dealing with various aspects of inequality in the four countries of 
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. Throughout, the articles focus on cross-
sectional yearly data on income inequality between individuals. The income concept, 
however, varies both between and within the different papers. The analysis 
sometimes focuses on earnings or total market incomes before taxes and transfers, 
sometimes on equivalised disposable incomes (incomes after taxes and transfers 
taking household size into account) and sometimes even on extended income also 
considering public in-kind transfers. Recurring themes in the papers are how 
inequality may differ across these dimensions, how such differences may give 
important information about what causes changes in inequality, but also – somewhat 
paradoxically – how trends in inequality often look similar regardless of what 
measures are used: individual top income shares before taxes and transfers, Gini 
coefficients for (conventional or extended) equivalised disposable incomes or relative 
poverty rates using the same income measures. Another finding is that, while there 
are many similarities in general inequality trends as well as in levels among the Nordic 
countries, there are also often important differences, highlighting the importance of 
individual country studies. 
The articles in the volume 
The volume contains five papers with associated comments which were originally 
delivered at a conference in Copenhagen on 26 October 2017.  
The Nordics in an international perspective 
The first article by Jon Pareliussen, Mikkel Hermansen, Christophe André and 
Orsetta Causa gives an international perspective on the inequality developments 
in the Nordic countries. The authors show how inequality, as measured by 
equivalised disposable incomes, has indeed increased substantially in the Nordic 
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countries since the early 1990s, especially in Sweden and Finland. But it is also 
pointed out that inequality levels were historically very low in the 1980s and that 
the levels remain below the OECD average.  
The paper emphasises that inequality increases have been driven by other factors 
in the Nordic countries than in the U.S. and other Anglo-Saxon countries. There, large 
increases in the dispersion of earnings and market incomes have taken place, 
probably caused to a large extent by skill-biased technological change and 
globalisation. This has not been the case in the Nordics. Tendencies towards increased 
wage dispersion have been relatively weak. This can be explained by strong trade 
unions and collective bargaining institutions, and education systems which have 
expanded the supply of skilled labour. Large increases in employment have also 
helped counteract tendencies towards increased dispersion of market incomes (see, 
e.g., Barth and Moene 2013).  
Pareliussen and his coauthors instead stress weakened redistribution as a major 
cause of the increased dispersion of disposable incomes (especially in the lower end of 
the income distribution). Such weaker redistribution is partly an automatic 
consequence of the strong employment rise since the early 1990s (in Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden), but the reduction in redistribution is larger than can be 
explained by this mechanical effect. It is mainly associated with reductions in 
redistributive cash transfers, in particular unemployment and sickness benefits. These 
reductions may, however, have contributed to the favourable employment 
developments through strengthening of work incentives. 
In addition, higher, and more unevenly distributed capital incomes, have been of 
large importance, especially for the widening of the income distribution at the top. 
Finally, demographic factors have contributed to the increase in measured income 
inequality in all the four Nordic countries studied.  
Top-income shares  
One of the reasons for the increased inequality identified by Pareliussen and his 
coauthors, the increased income share going to top earners, is the topic of the paper 
by Jacob Søgaard. The development of top incomes has received a lot of interest in 
recent years, especially after the publication of Thomas Piketty’s (2014) Capital in the 
Twenty-First Century. Søgaard surveys the strand of research – the so called top-
income literature – that underlies much of this debate. This literature focuses on 
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taxable income, which makes it possible to construct long time series for incomes of 
high-income earners, since tax records for them are often available since the 
beginning of the twentieth century. 
Historically, it appears that overall disposable income inequality and top-income 
shares have usually moved in the same direction. This is also the case in the Nordic 
countries where both the Gini coefficients (for disposable incomes) and the shares of 
(taxable) income going to the top one percent of the income distribution have both 
increased since the 1980s. The increases in the top income share have been smaller 
than in the U.S. and other Anglo-Saxon countries, but they still account for 2–3 
percentage points of the increase in the Gini, which is a substantial contribution. 
Søgaard shows that higher capital incomes for the top one per cent are an 
important reason for the increase in the share of total incomes going to this group in 
Finland and Sweden, whereas this is not the case in Denmark and Norway. An important 
point made in the paper is that a change in the composition of capital incomes for top 
income earners may also have been important for the rises in top income shares. 
Søgaard documents how the share of dividends in capital income has increased in the 
Nordics at the expense of interest income. Since dividends are much more concentrated 
to the top one per cent group than interest income, this has increased the group´s share 
of total incomes. The article finds support for this hypothesis especially for Finland and 
Norway, but also for Sweden for the period after 1995. 
Gender inequality 
Anne Boschini and Kristin Gunnarsson study another dimension of inequality that has 
also received much attention in recent years: that between men and women. This is 
an aspect where the Nordic countries are also often seen as global leaders, typically 
coming out on top in various rankings. Conventional analysis of income distribution 
assumes that incomes are split equally among the members of a household. However, 
to the extent that this is not true (and consumption levels of individual household 
members are instead linked to who earned the income), it is also relevant to measure 
inequality at the individual instead of at the household level. 
Boschini and Gunnarsson discuss the relationship between aspects of the Nordic 
welfare state and gender, and then study how this dimension of inequality has 
developed over the period when overall inequality has increased. They find that, while 
overall gender inequality has decreased, there still remains inequality between men 
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and women at all levels of the income distribution. Labour income differences 
between men and women follow a U-pattern with the largest differences at the 
bottom and the top of the distribution. In terms of disposable incomes, the 
differences are largest at the top. The authors also document that inequality in 
disposable income is smaller among women than among men in all the four studied 
Nordic countries.  
The article also decomposes the changes in the overall income distribution into a 
within-gender and a between-genders effect. For labour income the between-genders 
effect tends to reduce overall inequality, whereas the within-gender effect tends to 
reduce it in the four Nordic countries studied. The between-genders effect also works 
in the direction of reduced disposable income inequality in the four countries, whereas 
the within-gender effect varies among them. 
Finally, Boschini and Gunnarsson note that the representation of women in the 
very top income groups has increased over time, but remains far from equal. 
Interestingly, they point to the fact that in an international comparison the Nordic 
countries have fewer women in the very top of the income distribution than countries 
that we typically consider less gender equal. This points to the possibility that some 
aspects of the Nordic model may contribute negatively to women’s possibilities to 
reach the economic elite.   
Demographic changes  
The study of gender and the potential changes in inequality that may result from 
differences in how men and women sort into different households illustrates a more 
general point: the composition of the population matters for income distribution. 
There are many dimensions of this: how large a share of the population belongs to 
different age groups, how many are students, how many are immigrants, etc. The 
impact of such compositional changes on measures of inequality is the topic of the 
contribution by Jon Pareliussen and Per Olof Robling.  
By trying to answer the counterfactual question “What would be the level of 
inequality if the structure of the population was unchanged (at the level of the starting 
year) but everything else was as today?” the authors analyse the contribution of such 
compositional changes to the rise of inequality. The finding is that a significant part of 
the increased inequality in the Nordic countries is a result of changes in the population 
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structure. In general, an older population and more single households are the most 
important factors, but there are also important differences across countries.  
Interestingly, the contribution from immigration is relatively modest according to 
the analysis. It should be emphasised, however, that data do not cover the most 
recent immigration wave and also that the method used does not directly take into 
account heterogeneity in the immigrant group (with an increasing share of low-
educated non-European immigrants over time). When trying to consider this, the 
impact is larger (especially in Norway and Sweden), although still surprisingly small. 
This raises methodological questions for future research. 
Public consumption 
An important feature (some would say the most important feature) of the Nordic 
welfare model is the generous provision of welfare services at low or zero cost to the 
individual. This obviously has an impact on the link between individual disposable 
income and individual well-being. How does the picture of inequality and poverty 
change if we include (the value of) these government-provided services in the 
measures used? This is the question posed in the article by Rolf Aaberge, Audun 
Langørgen and Petter Lindgren.  
Relying om methods previously developed by the authors themselves they add 
the value of public services (such as child care services, education and health care) 
according to how these services are used depending on household characteristics and 
age, and recalculate measures of inequality and poverty across OECD countries using 
this extended income measure. Inequality and relative poverty levels are substantially 
reduced when adding these services. The effects are broadly similar among the OECD 
countries studied, implying that the inequality rankings remain more or less the same. 
However, when looking at the impact for different groups the importance of this 
perspective becomes very clear. Standard measures of inequality, using unadjusted 
equivalised disposable income, underestimate the relative living standards for some 
groups while overestimating them for others. Relative poverty rates are not much 
affected among childless single adults by taking the provision of welfare services into 
account, whereas there are substantial reductions among single adults with children 
and elderly households. The results highlight the importance of this kind of analysis 
before singling out certain groups as particularly disadvantaged. 
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Possible policy conclusions 
The authors in the volume are cautious regarding policy conclusions. The focus is 
mainly on documenting and explaining how inequality has developed rather than on 
prescribing various policy measures to influence the income distribution. This is 
understandable given the importance that subjective value judgements must play 
when assessing inequality and the various goal conflicts involved in any policy to 
affect it. These problems are likely to be much more important for income distribution 
policy than for other policies such as stabilisation, employment or growth policies, 
although they exist there as well.  
No recommendations regarding income distribution policies can be given in the 
context of the Nordic countries without taking a stand on the degree of inequality in 
the 1980s. It is not necessarily the case that the increase in equality since then should 
be regarded as a problem. One could have the opinion that the level of income 
equalisation was then excessive in the Nordics, giving too weak incentives for 
employment, effort, growth, etc. Or one could have the view that it is instead the 
increase in inequality over the last three decades that is excessive. The conclusion 
depends on political preferences. We do not take a stand on these issues. Instead, we 
give some conditional policy recommendations. If one wants to counteract the 
increase in income inequality that has occurred in the Nordic countries and 
counterbalance further developments in this direction, what conclusions can be drawn 
on the basis of the analyses in this volume?  
We draw six such policy conclusions: 
 
1. Less redistribution has been an important cause of more relative poverty in the 
Nordics. This has been a consequence mainly of a reduction in redistributive cash 
transfers following from a slow up-rating of such benefits in line with wages. 
Reductions in unemployment benefit and sickness benefit replacement rates have 
strengthened the incentives for employment, but the overall effects are likely to 
have increased inequality. If one wants to prioritise equity objectives, it is 
important to prevent further downward slides in benefit replacement ratios. This 
could involve difficult trade-offs with efficiency objectives. Such trade-offs are, of 
course, less severe with general cash transfers not directly linked to non-activity, 
such as child or housing allowances. Although lack of indexation of various social 
benefits to wages may be advantageous from the point of view of long-run fiscal 
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sustainability, it may be problematic for income distribution developments (see, 
e.g., Swedish Fiscal Policy Council 2011). 
2. Public in-kind transfers through the provision of government welfare services at 
low or zero costs have been shown to decrease income inequality substantially. At 
the same time, there is an ongoing discussion on the long-run sustainability of 
public finances against the background of an ageing population and (likely) 
increased demand for welfare services as incomes grow (the Wagner effect; see, 
e.g. Bergh 2016 and Ekonomiska vårpropositionen 2017). It is often argued that this 
will put public finances under increased strain and that more welfare services 
must therefore in the future be financed through user charges. According to the 
analysis in the volume, such changes are likely to have large inequality-increasing 
effects. They should be avoided if one places a large weight on income 
distribution objectives. 
3. Pensions are generally lower than incomes from work. An ageing population will 
therefore tend to increase income inequality as measured by the distribution of 
yearly incomes. It is not obvious that this should be seen as a problem as lower 
pensions relative to work incomes do not change the distribution of lifetime 
incomes. At the same time, we know, at least from Sweden, that income 
inequality is larger among pensioners than in the rest of the population (see 
Ekonomiska vårpropositionen 2017). Indexation of the retirement age to longevity 
might be a way of mitigating problems with very low pensions, although, of 
course, other trade-offs will be involved. In addition, for pensioners the generous 
provision of public in-kind transfers makes an important contribution to reducing 
negative welfare consequences from having low cash income, as discussed above. 
Maintaining the level and quality of these in-kind transfers may be at least as 
important as reducing income inequality for this group. 
4. Increased top-income shares have made significant contributions to the overall 
increase in income inequality in the Nordic countries. The cause has been a larger 
importance of capital incomes, which are more unevenly distributed than labour 
incomes, and a widened distribution of capital incomes. If one wants to 
counteract the increase in the top-income share, this would seem to require 
changes in the taxation of capital income and wealth. The tax reforms in the 
1990s in the Nordics involved the introduction of dual income tax systems with 
lower (nominal) tax rates for capital income than for labour income. Effective tax 
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rates on real (inflation-adjusted) capital incomes have subsequently fallen 
through lower inflation. Corporate tax rates have been decreased. Inheritance and 
wealth taxes have been abolished or reduced. Current real estate taxes are low in 
all the Nordic countries. It follows that changes in these various taxes should be 
contemplated if one wants to counteract the increases in top income shares. This 
may indeed be quite important if one wants to promote social mobility, as 
inherited wealth may lower such mobility. In addition, the introduction of the dual 
tax system (and other related tax rules) have created incentives to convert labour 
income into capital income (see, e.g., Pirttilä and Selin 2011, and Alstadsæter and 
Jacob 2016). Restricting the possibilities to do this would likely contribute to a 
more even income distribution.  
       When contemplating changes in wealth taxation, and especially real estate 
taxation, it is, important to consider the “cash-flow restriction” of households. The 
increases in asset values (in particular real estate values) imply that many 
households have substantial wealth, whereas their income flow consists mainly of 
labour income (often taxed at a high marginal rate). Taxing assets more heavily, 
including in particular housing, may therefore force sales of assets in a disruptive 
way. If the balance is shifted from taxation of labour income to taxation of capital, 
these risks need to be addressed.  
5. Education and training efforts (including for adults) may be crucial for the 
integration of immigrants in the labour market and this way help alleviate poverty 
among this group. Successful education efforts have the advantage that they can 
alleviate potential equity-efficiency trade-offs by contributing both to growth 
through investment in human capital and to decreased inequality (to the extent 
that they target weak groups and are efficient). Education policy is not, however, 
likely to have much effect on top-income shares, since they are not strongly 
related to differences in education (see, e.g. Björklund et al. 2013). 
6. Finally, the analysis of gender aspects of income distribution in the volume 
suggests that policies reducing gender differences are likely also to contribute to 
reductions in overall income inequality. The analysis also points to the possibility 
that some features common to the Nordic welfare states may have adverse 
effects on the possibilities for women to reach the top of the distribution. 
Research shows that much of remaining gender differences relate to women 
having children (see, e.g., Angelov and Karimi 2012, and Kleven et al. 2018). 
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Policies that reduce these “child penalties” for women are likely to reduce the 
gender gap. Such policies could, for example, include making parental leave less 
generous (thereby lowering employers’ expectations of career disruptions) or 
equalising (expected) parental leave between men and women by dividing these 
rights more equally between the parents.  
        
The above items do not necessarily represent policy recommendations as income 
distribution goals must be weighed against other objectives relating to, for example, 
incentives for innovation, entrepreneurship and (human and real) capital investment, 
employment and fiscal sustainability. But the options should be considered if one 
wants to put more emphasis on equity goals than has been the case recently. 
References 
Angelov, N. and Karimi, A. (2012). Mothers’ Income Recovery after Childbearing. IFAU Working 
Paper 2012:20. 
Alstadsæter, A. and Jacob, M. (2016), Dividend Taxes and Income Shifting. Scandinavian Journal 
of Economics, 118, 693–717. doi:10.1111/sjoe.12148 
Barth, E. and Moene, K. (2013), Why Do Small Open Economies Have Such Small Wage 
Differentials?, Nordic Economic Policy Review, 139–171. 
Bergh, A. (2016), The Future of Welfare Services: How Worried Should We Be About Baumol, 
Wagner and Ageing? Nordic Economic Policy Review, 197–218.  
Björklund, A., Roine, J. and Waldenström. D. (2012), Intergenerational Top Income Mobility in 
Sweden: Capitalist Dynasties in the Land of Equal Opportunity?, Journal of Public Economics, 
96(5–6), 474–484. 
Ekonomiska vårpropositionen 2017, Regeringens proposition 2016/17:100, Sveriges Riksdag, 
Stockholm. 
Kleven, H., Landais, C. and Søgaard, J.E. (2018), Children and Gender Inequality: Evidence from 
Denmark, NBER Working Paper No. 24219. 
Morelli, S., Smeeding, T. and Thompson, J. (2015), Post-1970 Trends in Within-Country 
Inequality and Poverty: Rich and Middle-Income Countries, in Atkinson, A. and Bourguignon, 
F. (eds.) Handbook of Income Distribution, Vol. 2, North-Holland. 
OECD (2011), Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising, OECD Publishing, Paris, 
http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1787/9789264119536-en 
OECD (2015), In It Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All, OECD Publishing, Paris, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264235120-en 
Piketty, T. (2014), Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Harvard University Press. 
 
 
16 Increasing Income Inequality in the Nordics 
 
Pirttilä, J. and Selin, H. (2011), Income Shifting within a Dual Income Tax System: Evidence from 
the Finnish Tax Reform of 1993, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 113(1), 120–144. 
Swedish Fiscal Policy Council (2011), Swedish Fiscal Policy, Stockholm. 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Nordic Economic Policy Review 17 
 
Income Inequality in the Nordics 
from an OECD Perspective 
Jon Kristian Pareliussen, Mikkel Hermansen, Christophe André and Orsetta Causa1 
Abstract 
We provide an overview of inequality developments in the Nordics compared to other 
OECD countries, starting from the early 1990s. Some of the largest inequality 
increases in the OECD have taken place in Sweden, Finland and Denmark, but from 
very low initial levels. A coherent set of institutions underpin high employment and 
have likely dampened the inequality-increasing forces from skill-biased technological 
change and globalisation. Demographic trends have increased inequality in the 
Nordics, but the main mechanisms vary between countries. Redistribution has 
weakened considerably, mainly driven by weaker insurance transfers to working-age 
individuals, but these reforms have contributed to including more people in the labour 
market. 
 
Keywords: Inequality, technological change, demographic trends, redistribution. 
JEL classification: D63, J11, H33, O15, O33. 
   
                                                                 
1 All authors work in the OECD Economics Department. The authors are grateful for valuable comments from the editors, 
John Hassler, Jørgen Elmeskov, two anonymous referees and participants at the 2018 NEPR conference in Copenhagen. 
This article draws on previous OECD work in the OECD Economic Survey of Sweden (2017) and Causa and Hermansen 
(2017). 
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Introduction 
Even though labour market developments, demographic forces and redistribution 
have affected income distribution differently across the Nordic countries, it is no 
coincidence that this group of countries displays among the lowest levels of 
income inequality in the OECD. A number of key institutions, notably collective 
bargaining, activation policies and wide access to high-quality education, 
reinforce each other, allowing a compressed wage distribution and extensive 
redistribution to co-exist with the high employment necessary to fund the 
extensive public services and transfers. In addition to fostering inclusiveness and 
social cohesion, these policies increase the acceptance of economic adjustments 
imposed by globalisation and technological change, thus promoting market 
flexibility and openness underpinning productivity, innovation and 
competitiveness. Seen from this perspective, the similarities between the Nordics 
outweigh their differences.  
Figure 1 provides a snapshot of the performance of OECD countries in the 
employment and inequality dimensions. The Anglo-Saxon countries achieve relatively 
high employment rates, but combined with relatively high income inequality. Austria, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland come closer to the Nordics, even though 
they still display significantly higher inequality. Mediterranean countries tend to 
combine low employment rates and high inequality, while Eastern European countries 
tend to display both low employment and low inequality. 
From the 1990s to present, Nordic policies and institutions have been able to 
largely counter pressures from globalisation, technological change and job 
polarisation towards increasing inequality of wages. They have also dampened 
inequality increases resulting from demographic trends. Nevertheless, income 
inequality has trended upwards, except in Iceland. Redistribution from taxes and 
transfers has decreased more in the Nordics than in most other OECD countries. 
However, this should be seen in the context of very high initial redistribution and thus 
a likely binding trade-off with economic efficiency. Education, employment 
regulations and wage bargaining have also seen significant changes since the 1990s, 
and there are no doubt further challenges and need for reforms looming. However, 
the Nordics have so far been able to adjust their policies in such a way that equality, 
opportunity and economic efficiency co-exist relatively well compared to the rest of 
the OECD. 
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Figure 1: The Nordics combine low income inequality and high employment rates 
 
Note: All OECD countries included except Chile, Mexico and Turkey. Data refer to 2012 for Japan; 2015 
for Finland, Israel, Korea, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States; and 2014 for 
the rest. 
Source: OECD Income Distribution Database; OECD Labour Force Statistics. 
 
This article is structured as follows: The second section outlines inequality 
developments since around 1990. The third section discusses how market forces, 
demographic trends and redistribution have affected inequality trends. The fourth 
section summarises and discusses some challenges going forward. 
Income inequality in the Nordics in a comparative perspective 
Income inequality has risen in most OECD countries since the mid-1980s (OECD 
2015a). Some of the largest increases in inequality, as measured by the Gini 
coefficient, have taken place in Nordic countries. At the same time, both the overall 
trend and the timing of inequality increases differ substantially between the Nordics. 
Figure 2 shows trends in the Gini coefficient for household disposable income, which 
increased since the early 1990s by almost eight points in Sweden, five points in 
Finland and four points in Denmark. This widening in inequality is well above the 
average increase of around two Gini points across the OECD, notwithstanding 
substantial increases in countries like Germany (three points) and the United States 
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(five points).2 Still, the three Nordic countries started from very low levels of 
inequality and remain among the most equal OECD countries. By contrast, inequality 
in Norway was at a comparatively higher level in 1995 and remains about the same 
level in 2014, interrupted by a temporary increase in the mid-2000s, to a large extent 
driven by extraordinarily high dividends in response to a capital taxation reform in 
2006 (NOU 2009).3 Lastly, a substantial decline in inequality since the crisis broke out 
in 2008 has shifted Iceland from near the OECD average to the most equal OECD 
country in 2014. 
The widespread increases in inequality across OECD countries mostly took place 
in the 1990s and early-2000s. This was also the case for Finland, while Denmark and 
Sweden have experienced more persistent upward trends in inequality. Focusing on 
the more recent period, inequality has been rather stable since around 2010 in the 
Nordics, with the exception of Sweden. This is in line with developments in most 
OECD countries in the initial phase of the great recession, when high incomes were hit 
by the financial crisis, while automatic stabilisers and discretionary measures 
mitigated income losses for low-income households. During the prolonged recovery 
period, average inequality in the OECD displayed little change, but this hides much 
heterogeneity across countries (OECD 2017a).  
Rising inequality can reflect different patterns of income growth across the 
distribution. This calls for a broader analysis of the inclusiveness of the growth process 
(Hermansen et al. 2016, OECD 2017a). Strong household income growth in the 
Nordics has lifted incomes from the bottom to the top of the distribution from the 
mid-1990s to 2014 (Figure 3). This contrast with developments in Germany and the 
United States, were stagnating incomes at the bottom of the income distribution 
imply that material living standards have improved very little relative to the mid-
1990s. In fact, income growth rates for the bottom 20% in Finland, Norway and 
Sweden have been close to or exceeded average income growth rates in a number of 
large OECD countries as well as the OECD average.4                                                                  
2 Among countries for which comparable data are available from the mid-1990s. 
3 The development for Norway should be taken as a rough indication given the limited number of observations prior to 
2008. National sources report an increase around four Gini points from 1990 to 2014 (Statistics Norway), but the applied 
household income definition is not fully comparable with the one used for OECD figures (see Causa et al. 2016 for a 
comparison of inequality figures between different sources in the case of Denmark). 
4 Such cross-country comparisons should be taken with caution given differences in the cyclical position in initial and 
terminal years. In particular, weak economic conditions in the mid-1990s as a result of the Nordic banking crisis and 
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Figure 2: Inequality developments have been diverse in the Nordics 
 
Note: OECD16 is a simple average across 16 OECD countries (Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States) with available information since mid-1990s. A 
change in the income definition implies a break in the series around 2011 for some countries and 
estimated series correcting for the break have been used. As a result the value for the latest year 
may differ from that in Figure 1. 
Source: OECD Income Distribution Database. 
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Figure 3: Inequality has increased in the Nordics, but incomes have risen across the distribution 
 
Note: Based on equivalised household disposable incomes, deflated by consumer price indices. OECD17 
is a simple average across 17 OECD countries (see note to Figure 2 and adding Japan). Data refer to 
1994–2014 for the United Kingdom; 1995–2015 for Finland, the Netherlands and the United States; 
1996–2014 for France; and 1995–2014 for the rest. Divergences between the evolution of GDP per 
capita and household incomes, as observed here, may occur for a number of reasons (for details, 
see e.g. OECD 2016a and Noland et al. forthcoming). 
Source: OECD Income Distribution Database. 
 
Rapidly growing incomes in the top of the distribution have been an important driver 
of rising inequality in a number of OECD countries, particularly the United States 
(Morelli et al. 2015). Top incomes are also an important source of rising inequality in 
the Nordics (see below), but far from the only reason, as can be seen from the growth 
incidence curves in Figure 4.5, 6 The slope of these curves show in what way the 
income distribution has evolved. In Denmark, Finland and Sweden average income                                                                  
5 Household income statistics tend to suffer from underreporting of top incomes. This is also the case for the figures 
presented in this paper based on the OECD Income Distribution Database. Yet, this is much less of a problem for the Nordic 
countries for which income statistics are mostly register-based. For most other countries with survey-based statistics, the 
development at the top should however be taken with care. 
6 Cross-country comparable household income data are only available by deciles. Ideally the growth incidence curve should 
be presented at a further disaggregated level, e.g. by percentiles. 
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has grown at a significantly higher rate in the top decile than in all other deciles from 
the mid-1990s to 2014. Still, the curves are upward sloping at almost any point from 
the first to the tenth decile, indicating increasing dispersion across the entire 
distribution.  
An important caveat to this approach, and the assessment of inequality based on 
a single year in general, is that the growth incidence curve is anonymous – it relates 
average households incomes in a given decile to the same decile in a previous year, 
irrespective of their composition, thus ignoring that individuals’ relative position in the 
income distribution may shift over time. Yet, from a welfare perspective income 
mobility also matters, in particular whether the same households are stuck at the 
bottom of the distribution for several years or the low-income state tends to be 
temporary. However, cross-country comparable data for assessing inequality in a 
dynamic or lifetime perspective are still relatively scarce, ruling out further analysis in 
this direction for the purpose of this article.7  
A closer look at the bottom of the income distribution shows that relative poverty, 
here measured as the share of households with incomes below 50% of the median, is 
low in the Nordics compared to most OECD countries (Figure 5, Panel A). 
Nevertheless, the average gap between those living in relative poverty and median 
household income, the depth of relative poverty, is close to or above the OECD 
average in Denmark, Iceland and Norway. But developments have differed 
substantially between the Nordic countries, notably between Denmark and Sweden, 
since the mid-1990s: in Sweden the share of low-income households rose more than 
five percentage points, but at the same time the mean income gap declined by a 
similar amount. In contrast, the share of low-income households changed little in 
Denmark, while average income within the low-income group fell behind the median 
by almost ten percentage points. However, part of this may reflect an increasing 
number of students in Denmark as they tend to receive income from public transfers 
only and concentrate at the bottom of the income distribution (Danish Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and the Interior 2017, and Pareliussen and Robling 2018). 
                                                                 
7 See Danish Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Interior (2017), NOU (2009) and Statistics Sweden (2016) for evidence for 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden, respectively. 
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Figure 4: Higher inequality reflects greater dispersion across the distribution, but particularly strong 
increases in top incomes 
 
Note: The (anonymous) growth incidence curve reports the average annual growth rate of average 
household disposable incomes by deciles. The slope of the curve illustrates in what way the income 
distribution has become more or less equal between the two years. The curve is anonymous in the 
sense that the same household need not be in the same decile in the initial and terminal year. See 
note to Figure 3 for country-year coverage. 
Source: OECD Income Distribution Database. 
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Figure 5: Relative poverty is low in the Nordics, but its depth varies 
 
Note: The relative poverty rate is defined as the share of individuals with incomes below 50% of median 
equivalised household disposable income. The mean poverty gap is the mean difference between 
poor households and the relative poverty threshold, expressed in percentage of the threshold. 
Source: OECD Income Distribution Database. 
Market, structural and policy drivers of inequality  
Changes in the income distribution may come from multiple sources. Demographic 
trends, such as the age structure of the population, immigration, educational 
attainment and household structure can significantly impact inequality (Robling and 
Pareliussen 2017, Danish Economic Council 2016 and NOU 2009). Market trends 
influencing the distribution of wages and capital income, such as skill-biased 
technological change and globalisation offer an additional perspective (Danish 
Economic Council 2016 and Piketty 2014). Common to the two categories is that they 
are not primarily policy driven, even though policies influence both the trends and the 
extent to which they affect inequality. Redistribution through taxes and transfers 
directly alters the distribution of disposable income, but may also indirectly influence 
market incomes by affecting people’s incentives to work and save (Bargain and Callan 
2010). All the factors above are interrelated. As an example, ageing will normally 
increase income inequality, as pensions are generally lower than earnings and 
earnings dispersion is generally higher in older cohorts, but the final effect depends 
critically on the tax and transfer system, pension savings and individual retirement 
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decisions. Given this multitude of interrelated factors, any analysis of driving forces 
behind inequality trends is necessarily only partial and gives a particular perspective 
on inequality.  
Income inequality should be seen in light of all these factors and how they 
interact. The Nordics are characterised by a compressed earnings distribution 
combined with high employment. And this high employment, together with a 
relatively high tax take, finances public transfers and services. Key institutions 
underpinning this “Nordic model”, notably public education, collective bargaining and 
the social safety net dampen pressures towards higher inequality coming from current 
market and demographic trends. 
Trends in the market income distribution  
Higher wage dispersion and rising capital incomes at the top of the income 
distribution have been the main forces behind rising market income inequality in 
many OECD countries (OECD 2011, 2015a and Björklund and Jäntti 2011). This has 
also been the case in the Nordics as can be seen from the rise in pre-tax income shares 
going to the top 1% (Figure 6). Nevertheless, top 1% income shares in the Nordics 
remain among the lowest across all OECD countries for which data are available. 
Isolating the impact of capital incomes in a cross-country perspective requires careful 
attention to the data quality and potential influence of tax reforms, which is beyond 
the scope of this paper. Søgaard (2018), which is part of this volume, provides 
evidence of the role of capital incomes for the top 1% in the Nordics and the 
respective influence of interest and dividends, and we offer some thoughts about 
taxation of wealth and inheritance in in the concluding section of this article. 
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Figure 6: Pre-tax top income shares have risen in most OECD countries 
 
Note: Based on pre-tax national income for individuals; see WID.world for details. Data for 1990 refer to 
1989 for Finland, Germany, Portugal and Switzerland; 1992 for Hungary and Poland. Data for 2014 
refer to 2005 for Portugal; 2008 for Hungary; 2009 for Finland, Ireland and Italy; 2010 for Canada, 
Denmark, Japan and Switzerland; 2011 for Germany and Norway; 2012 for the Netherlands and 
Spain; 2013 for Sweden; and 2015 for Poland. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Income and Wealth Database (WID.world). 
 
Rising wage dispersion, notably for men, is identified as a strong common inequality 
driver across OECD countries (OECD 2011). A non-exhaustive list of explanations to 
this phenomenon includes skill- and task-biased technological change coupled with 
globalisation, the weakening of workers’ bargaining power, rising non-standard 
work, the changing nature of work and weakening unemployment insurance and 
employment protection legislation. Wage inequality has also risen somewhat in the 
Nordics, especially in Norway and Sweden, when measured in full-time equivalent 
wages, but is still at an extremely low level compared to other OECD countries 
(Figure 7). However, inequality from the labour market depends not only on the 
distribution of earnings, but also on the distribution of employment. The increasing 
wage differentials from the mid-1990s to 2014 are found to be mitigated by rising 
employment in Sweden and Denmark (Swedish Ministry of Finance 2016 and Danish 
Ministry of Taxation 2017), leaving a neutral effect on overall household income 
inequality for Sweden and reduced inequality for Denmark. 
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Figure 7: Earnings inequality has risen in most OECD countries, including the Nordics 
 
Note: Based on gross earnings of full-time dependent employees. For some countries and years series 
have been spliced and some data points interpolated. The OECD average is a simple average across 
Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. 
Source: OECD staff calculations based on the OECD Earnings Database. 
Skill-biased technological change and globalisation 
Skill-biased technological change where job growth is concentrated in high- and low-
skill occupations is perhaps better understood as task- or (routine-) biased 
technological change. Routine jobs are often concentrated in the middle part of the 
skill- and wage distribution, for example in manufacturing, and are more easily 
replaced by machines than non-routine jobs. At the same time high-skilled individuals 
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are complementary to new technologies, boosting their productivity. This trend has 
been identified as one of the most important drivers of rising wage dispersion and 
thus income inequality over the past few decades (see for example Autor and Dorn 
2009, Goldin and Katz 2008, Goos et al. 2009 and Goos et al. 2014). Technological 
advances increase the wage premium for skilled individuals in non-routine jobs, and 
may reduce demand for workers with low- and middle-skill routine tasks, who are 
relatively easily replaced by machines. Trade, outsourcing and financial globalisation 
can have relatively similar effects on the income distribution. Furthermore, 
technology facilitates globalisation, and globalisation speeds up technology’s 
dissemination. Tasks involving social interaction (for example within healthcare or 
sales) are less easily outsourced or replaced by technology, even when they require 
fairly low skills. Empirical studies generally find less pronounced effects from 
globalisation than from technological change, but globalisation can have persistent 
negative effects in affected regions and communities (Förster and Tóth 2015, 
Eurofound 2017 and OECD 2017b).  
A polarisation pattern, where middle-paying occupations lose employment shares 
to low- and high-paying occupations is relatively well documented in the United 
States (Wright and Dwyer 2003, and Autor and Dorn 2013) and the United Kingdom 
(Goos and Manning 2007). A much more diverse picture can be found in European 
countries, with polarisation in some countries (e.g. the Netherlands, France and 
Germany), and upgrading in others, with growth mainly in high-paying occupations 
(e.g. Italy, Portugal and Luxembourg) up until 2007. During the recession years from 
2008 to 2013, polarisation was more widespread across European countries 
(Eurofound 2017).  
The employment share of middle-paying occupations declined in all the Nordic 
countries from 1993 to 2006. This development was accompanied by increasing 
employment shares in high-paying occupations in Sweden and Denmark, and by 
growth in low-paying non-routine service sector occupations in Finland and Norway 
(Goos et al. 2009). More recently, job losses in Finland were more concentrated in 
permanent employment in low- and middle-paying sectors. Denmark, and Sweden 
even more, continued to see strong employment growth in high-paying occupations 
(Eurofound 2017).  
Whether or not the observed polarisation contributes to rising wage inequality 
depends on the importance of inequality within and between declining versus growing 
occupations. OECD (2017c) finds that for the OECD as a whole, polarisation has first 
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and foremost come from increasing wage differentials within occupations, which 
explains two-thirds of observed polarisation. Changes in the occupational structure 
explain the remaining third. Widening wage differentials within sectors are a likely 
reflection of rising productivity dispersion between “frontier firms” and the rest in 
each sector, and most of this dispersion is reflected in wage dispersion between firms 
(Andrews et al. 2016 and Song et al. 2016).  
There are however some indications that the impact of technology and 
globalisation on wage dispersion and inequality has affected the Nordics differently 
than other OECD countries, which is consistent with coordinated wage bargaining and 
flexible labour markets (see below). Eurofound (2017) finds that wage differentials 
between sectors partly reflect the human capital of those who choose a particular 
sector in most countries, but only to a quite limited extent in Sweden. In Finland wage 
differentials within sectors even narrowed over time, contributing to overall declining 
wage inequality between 2005 and 2014.  
Recently the impact of rising trade with China on regional employment has 
attracted much attention, especially in the United States (Autor et al. 2013). For the 
Nordics, a number of studies point to weaker effects of Chinese trade on employment 
and no or limited impacts on wages, which may be attributed to the influence of 
coordinated bargaining and high labour market mobility (Ashournia et al. 2017, 
Balsvik and 2015, Hakkala and Huttunen 2016). To the extent that the Nordics differ 
from other advanced economies, this can be because productivity is more evenly 
dispersed between companies and between sectors, because of a weaker link 
between productivity and wages, or a combination of the two. Kristoffersen et al. 
(2017) show that productivity growth in Denmark has been fairly evenly spread across 
firms with no gap to domestic frontier firms.  
Unions and collective bargaining  
Collective bargaining can reduce inequality by narrowing the wage distribution and by 
securing a larger share of value added for workers due to increased bargaining power. 
The effect of collective bargaining on economic performance and inequality depends 
on the specific features of the system of each country, how they interact with other 
labour market institutions, such as employment protection, unemployment insurance 
and minimum wage legislation (OECD 2017c). However, the equalising effect on 
earnings from coordinated wage bargaining does not automatically reduce income 
inequality, notably because wage bargaining can entail negative employment effects. 
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Empirical analyses find negative, positive or inconclusive effects depending on 
methodology and country coverage (Förster and Tóth 2015). The Nordics seem, 
however, to have found an equilibrium combining wage compression from 
coordinated bargaining with high employment, aided by public education and 
activation policies, as discussed below. 
High degrees of unionisation and coverage of collective bargaining tend to have 
an equalising effect on earnings, as unions strive for wage standardisation, promote 
social expenditures and create shared norms of fairness. Highly coordinated 
bargaining further broadens norms of distributive justice. Bargaining in the Nordics is 
more inclusive than in the average OECD country, with high shares of organised 
workers (Figure 8) and firms, and high coverage of collective agreements (OECD 
2017c). This also contributes to trust, together with long-standing cooperation, peace 
clauses, effective mediation and a high level of firm-level worker representation. 
Unionisation has steadily declined in the OECD since the 1980s. This is also the case in 
the Nordics (except for Iceland), but membership is still very high compared to other 
countries. 
Figure 8: Union density remains high in the Nordics despite declines 
 
Note: Percentage of employees. OECD is the weighted average of the 35 OECD member countries. 
Source: OECD Employment Outlook (2017). 
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known as the Calmfors-Driffill hypothesis, following Calmfors and Driffill’s (1988) 
highly influential paper. Equalisation of wages within and across sectors can lead to 
convergence of productivity, as companies with low productivity are forced to invest 
or scale down, and investments in human and physical capital and the transition of 
workers from ailing to growing companies and industries are incentivised (OECD 
2017c). The Nordics are generally classified among the most coordinated wage 
bargaining systems in the OECD. In Norway, Sweden and Denmark, the tradables 
sector (manufacturing) determines a norm for wage increases which is then followed 
by other sectors (pattern bargaining). Coordination follows similar principles in 
Iceland, but has tended to break down, especially during upturns (OECD 2017d and 
Swedish Labour Policy Council 2017). Wage growth has traditionally been set in tri-
partite negotiations with the social partners and the government in Finland, and 
outcomes have been binding to most workers by legal extension, although the 2017–
2018 wage bargaining round will, if successful, likely move Finland towards pattern 
bargaining as the main wage bargaining model (OECD 2017c).  
Notwithstanding strong coordination, sectoral and firm level agreements play an 
important role, opening up for flexible solutions adapted to local or individual 
circumstances and thus contributing to economic efficiency. Such organised 
decentralisation is quite common in those OECD countries with sectoral or central 
level bargaining (except Greece and Spain). However, the social dialogue on all three 
levels is relatively unrestricted in scope in the Nordics. It encompasses for example 
sectoral minimum wages and firm-level working-time arrangements. In many other 
OECD countries the scope of lower-level negotiations is more restricted by, and 
subordinate to, higher-level agreements and detailed labour laws (OECD 2017c). 
Furthermore, in Sweden, Denmark and Norway, the industry level agreements often 
give great flexibility to the local union and the firm on how to distribute the agreed 
total wage increase among employees. A trend towards more decentralisation has 
been found to contribute to higher wage dispersion in Denmark (Dahl et al. 2013). 
Education and skills 
As collective bargaining compresses the wage structure, skill premiums are relatively 
low in the Nordics, but the levels of education and skills remain powerful determinants 
of employment (Figure 9, OECD 2015b). Educational attainments have increased 
substantially across OECD countries over the past decades. In the Nordics, the vast 
majority of the 25–34 year olds reached upper secondary education already in the 
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1980s and 1990s (OECD 2017e), whereas the more recent educational expansion has 
taken place at the tertiary level (Figure 10). The impact of rising educational 
attainment on inequality is ambiguous in theory due to the interplay between 
compositional and rate of return (wage) effects (Knight and Sabot 1983). Advanced 
economies have typically lowered inequality by reducing the number of people with 
only basic education. An increase in the share with higher education can increase 
inequality at first, before eventually dampening it when a majority obtains higher 
levels of education (the composition effect). An increasing supply of high-skilled 
workers will also reduce the wage premium (the wage effect). Goldin and Katz (2008) 
describe a “race between education and technology”, where technological change 
increases demand for workers with tertiary education (see the earlier discussion about 
skill-biased technological change), and the wage premium of skilled workers increases 
if the growth of their supply does not keep up with technological change. Increasing 
human capital is therefore an important bulwark against the dis-equalising effects of 
skill-biased technological change.  
The overall effect of expanding higher education on inequality is thus an empirical 
question, and most studies including OECD countries find an ambiguous or equalising 
effect from higher educational attainments (Förster and Tóth 2015, OECD 2011, 
Fournier and Koske 2012 and OECD 2017a). Contrary to this general finding, Kjeldsen 
(2016) finds that the compositional effect of higher educational attainment in 
Denmark has contributed substantially to increasing inequality. For Sweden, Robling 
and Pareliussen (2017) find that the compositional contribution to Gini inequality is 
negligible, but higher educational levels have increased the median income, pushing 
up the relative poverty threshold and thus increasing poverty. Even though it is 
possible that the compositional effect of rising educational attainments in the Nordics 
is to increase income inequality somewhat, the wage effect is likely to pull in the 
opposite direction. It should be noted, however, that this analysis does not take 
effects of lifetime income inequality and the importance of education for 
intergenerational mobility into account (OECD 2016b).  
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Figure 9: High-skilled individuals are more likely to be employed, but the wage premium is modest in 
the Nordics 
 
How to read this figure: The Nordics show high employment rates for middle- and high-skilled individuals, but 
low employment for the low-skilled (Level 1 and below). At the same time wages are high for those low-skilled 
individuals who are employed and wages increase less with skills than for the PIAAC average, indicating that 
due to wage compression the returns to skills are mainly manifested in higher likelihood of employment rather 
than higher wages. 
Note: “Literacy skills” refer to the literacy score in the OECD Survey of Adult Skills (2012), part of the 
OECD Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC). Literacy 
scores are translated into functional skill levels (“PIAAC levels”). The four data points in each graph 
refer to PIAAC level 1 and below (Low literacy skills), level 2, Level 3 (Middle skills) and level 4 and 5 
(High literacy skills). The hourly wage is calculated as the % difference to level 3. The PIAAC 
average is the unweighted average for Australia, Austria, Belgium (Flanders), Canada, Estonia, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, the United Kingdom 
(England and Northern Ireland) and the United States. 
Source: OECD Survey of Adult Skills (2012). 
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Figure 10: In the Nordics educational attainment has mainly increased at the tertiary level across 
generations 
 
Note: Countries are sorted according to maximum difference between two age groups. 
Source: OECD Education at a Glance Database. 
Employment 
Employment is high in the Nordics, even in Finland, which lags behind the other 
Nordic countries in this respect (Figure 1). The favourable employment outcomes are 
often attributed to a combination of high and relatively equally distributed skills, 
constructive labour relations and well-designed packages of active and passive 
support for unemployed rendering labour markets relatively flexible and dynamic.  
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Impressive employment rates aside, looking at male employment only, the 
Nordics are less exceptional. It is clear that high female employment in absolute 
terms, and the low employment gap to men are what truly separate the Nordics from 
the majority of OECD countries. Indeed, the gaps in employment between men and 
women are among the lowest in the OECD in all the Nordics, and close to zero in 
Finland (OECD 2015a). 
Empirical studies generally find that a more gender-equal labour market reduces 
inequality. Women’s increasing employment, work hours and an increasing share of 
women working in skilled jobs taken together have held back inequality by almost one 
Gini point on average in a subset of OECD countries, not including the Nordics (OECD 
2011). The impact was high in countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and 
the United Kingdom, where the share of working-age households with female workers 
increased greatly. Compared to other OECD countries, the male-female employment 
gap was low already in the early 1990s in the Nordics, and has therefore not changed 
much over the past few decades (OECD 2015a, Figure 11). Increasing work intensity, 
more women in skilled jobs and reduced wage gaps may have helped hold back 
inequality growth in the Nordics countries in recent decades, but the effect has likely 
been smaller than elsewhere.  
Figure 11: Women's employment has changed little in the Nordics, but started at high levels 
 
Note: Employment to population ratios among 20–64 year olds. 
Source: OECD Labour Force Statistics. 
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Structural changes in the age and socioeconomic composition of households  
OECD countries have seen significant demographic changes over the past few 
decades, and the Nordics are no exception. Ageing, changing family structures, 
assortative mating, increasing educational attainment (see previous section) and 
immigration have affected the distribution of incomes, but with considerable variation 
in the timing and strength of these trends. Furthermore, these trends interact with 
market forces, institutions and redistribution so that the resulting inequality from 
comparable demographic trends is not uniform across countries, even in the Nordics. 
Pareliussen and Robling (2018) find that changing household composition, ageing, 
assortative mating and increasing student- and immigrant shares combined have 
increased disposable income inequality by approximately 1.4 Gini points in Norway, 
1.1 in Denmark, 0.9 in Finland, and 0.6 in Sweden from 1995 to 2013. For Denmark, 
Kjeldsen (2016) find that 25% of the inequality increase from 1994 to 2014 can be 
attributed to ageing, immigration and education, with the largest contribution coming 
from rising education levels. 
Household structure 
The number of single-adult households has grown substantially in most OECD 
countries (Figure 12). This tends to increase inequality, since such households often 
have relatively low incomes and because it reduces overall income sharing among 
household members. In the Nordics, the shares of single-adult households and couple 
households without children have risen from high initial levels since the early 1990s, 
especially in Sweden and Finland. Changing household composition has been shown 
to contribute significantly to inequality in individual studies for the United States, 
Germany and Canada (Förster and Tóth 2015), and has also increased inequality 
substantially in the Nordics from 1995 to 2013, with the largest impact being found in 
Norway (Pareliussen and Robling 2018). This conclusion is consistent with NOU 
(2009), which found that almost 20% of the inequality increase from 1986 to 2006 was 
accounted for by changing household structure, and Robling and Pareliussen (2017), 
which found that changed household composition accounted for 16% of the overall 
disposable income inequality increase in Sweden from 1987 to 2013. These findings 
are also qualitatively in line with OECD (2011). 
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Figure 12: The incidence of single-adult households has increased 
 
Note: Single-headed households include households with and without children. Data for early 1990s refer 
to 1989 for the United States; 1991 for Italy and Sweden; 1992 for Czech Republic; 1994 for Greece; 
1995 for Japan and Norway; 1996 for France; and 1990 for the rest. Data for 2014 refer to 2012 for 
Japan; 2015 for Finland, Israel, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States; and 
2014 for the rest. 
Source: OECD Income Distribution Database. 
 
In couple households a trend towards greater similarity of spouses’ education and 
earnings levels (so-called “assortative mating”) has also been observed in many 
countries (OECD 2011), which may contribute to inequality. However, rising education 
levels, especially among women, mechanically increase the share of households in 
which both spouses have higher education. Defining and measuring the impact of 
assortative mating on inequality is therefore not an easy task, and cross-country 
evidence is rare (Förster and Tóth 2015). A recent study by Eika et al. (2017) measures 
assortative mating as a higher propensity to enter homogeneous marriages in terms 
of education level relative to random assignment. They find a general positive effect 
on income inequality, but barely any change over time since the 1980s across five 
OECD countries (Denmark, Germany, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United 
States).8 This is shown to result from a decline in assortative mating for highly                                                                  
8 For Denmark, Breen and Andersen (2012) also find that assortative mating has not contributed significantly to rising 
inequality, while changing composition of education has. 
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educated and an increase among low educated individuals. Limited contributions to 
the trend increase in inequality were found in OECD (2011). Pareliussen and Robling 
(2018) also find very limited contributions from assortative mating, measured as 
relative individual income rankings within couples in the gender-specific income 
distributions.  
Ageing 
The age structure of the population can have a significant impact on inequality via 
different channels. For example, earnings dispersion increases during working life, 
while pensions are generally lower and more uniform than earnings. Shifting age 
structures have also induced shifts in the retirement age, and may alter government 
policies as the age of the electorate moves upwards (Förster and Tóth, 2015). Ageing 
has been relatively benign in the Nordics compared to the OECD average (Figure 13). 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden experienced a temporary peak in the old-age 
dependency ratio in 1990 and only since the mid-2000s has it started to increase. 
Finland stands out with considerable ageing since 1990, and this has increased 
inequality of disposable income by approximately a half Gini point, while ageing only 
had limited effects in the other Nordics from 1995 to 2013 (Pareliussen and Robling 
2018). Such results reflect different timing and strength of ageing trends, and the 
choice of time period under study therefore matters. As an illustration, a study of 
Sweden showed that changing age composition from 1987 to 2013 can explain 11% of 
the increase in inequality in Sweden (Robling and Pareliussen 2017). Furthermore, the 
Nordics have implemented significant reforms of pension systems to address ageing. 
Simulations show that indexation of the retirement age to longevity in Denmark may 
curb the upward ageing effect on inequality (Danish Ministry for Economic Affairs and 
the Interior 2017). 
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Figure 13: Ageing has been relatively modest in the Nordics, except for Finland 
 
Note: Projections after 2015. OECD is the simple average across 35 OECD countries. 
Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. 
Immigration  
The effect of immigration on inequality depends on a number of factors, notably the 
skills of immigrants and natives, the speed and quality of integration, and the 
differences in household composition between migrants and natives. The effect is 
thus dependent on country and context. However, immigration to the Nordics 
shows some distinct characteristics, shared by some other countries, such as Austria 
and the Netherlands. These countries have received a large share of refugee 
immigrants (Figure 14), which poses challenges, especially in the context of a 
compressed wage distribution and a scarcity of low-skilled jobs (Swedish Labour 
Policy Council 2016, 2017 and OECD 2017f). 
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Figure 14: The Nordics have experienced a high inflow of asylum seekers 
 
Note: Total population for 2015 applied. Data only available since 1991 for Poland; 1992 for Slovak Republic; 
1996 for Greece; 1997 for Korea; 1998 for Estonia and Slovenia; 1999 for Iceland and Israel. 
Source: International Migration Database; United Nations, World Population Prospect: The 2017 Revision. 
 
Inflows of refugee migrants are determined by a number of factors (geopolitical, 
domestic and EU/Schengen policies toward migration). Compressed wage structures 
and generous social safety nets in the Nordics can make these countries attractive to 
immigrants with relatively low skills, even though this effect is disputed (Borjas 1987, 
Grogger and Hanson 2011 and Pareliussen 2017).  
Table 1 shows the estimated impact of immigrant background on literacy skills, as 
measured by the literacy module of the OECD Survey of Adult Skills (2012), as well as 
employment, earnings and the incidence of being over-qualified. The table shows that 
an increased supply of low skills in countries where the labour markets are centred on 
high skills creates a challenge. A relatively large share of immigrants from non-
Western countries are not in employment in the Nordics. This is largely related to the 
combination of non-Western immigrants’ (not from North America or Western 
Europe) lower education and lower language- and processing (literacy) skills at each 
education attainment level compared to natives. A statistically significant 
employment penalty remains for non-Western, non-European immigrants 
(“immigrants from the rest of the world” in Table 1) in the pooled Nordic sample and 
in Denmark when controlling for education and literacy. Migrants in employment are 
also prone to earn less than natives and work in jobs with requirements below their 
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actual qualifications. This over-qualification is lower for immigrants who have 
acquired their qualifications in the country of residence, and does not seem to be 
related to literacy skills. Labour market outcomes of non-Western immigrants to the 
Nordics are consistently inferior to the OECD Programme for the International 
Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) average, even when controlling for 
education, literacy and socio-economic background. 
Immigration from 2000 to 2013 has increased the Gini coefficient by almost a half 
Gini point and the poverty rate by 0.8 percentage points in Norway, and increased 
inequality by around 0.2 Gini points in Denmark and Sweden (Pareliussen and Robling 
2018). A relatively modest increase in inequality as a consequence of immigration for 
Denmark is also reported in Kjeldsen (2016). However, the decomposition 
methodologies applied in these two papers only capture the effect from a changing 
population share of immigrants. Pareliussen and Robling (2018) show that also taking 
into account the changing composition of immigrants leads to a static effect from 
immigration two to three times greater than the original estimates. The impact in 
Norway is higher than in the other countries across specifications, which is consistent 
with findings by Statistics Norway (2017), and needs to be seen in light of weak 
attachment to the labour market, high benefit dependency, low intra-generational 
income mobility and relatively large single-earner families among immigrants from 
non-western countries. The refugee immigration wave in 2014 and 2015 is not 
reflected in any of the studies mentioned above, but should be expected to amplify 
income inequality. 
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Table 1: Literacy proficiency and labour market outcomes of immigrants, difference to natives 
  PIAAC1 Nordic2 Denmark Norway Sweden 
Literacy score (OLS regression)3 
Immigrants from North America and Western Europe -0.09 -0.14 -0.11 -0.02 -0.21 
Immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe -0.48** -0.95** -0.90** -0.99** -0.95** 
Immigrants from the rest of the world -0.61** -1.12** -0.93** -1.09** -1.20** 
      
Employment log odds (Logit regression)4 
Immigrants from North America and Western Europe 0.05 0.03 -0.26 0.11 0.15 
Immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe 0.02 -0.07 -0.28 0.23 -0.03 
Immigrants from the rest of the world 0.38** -0.40** -0.70** -0.45 -0.15 
      
Over-qualification log odds (Logit regression)4 
Immigrants from North America and Western Europe 0.03 0.76** 0.67* 0.86* 0.79* 
Immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe 0.63** 1.32** 1.93** 1.14** 1.22** 
Immigrants from the rest of the world 0.19 1.64** 1.67** 1.35** 1.74** 
      
Log hourly earnings (OLS regression)4 
Immigrants from North America and Western Europe 0.08 -0.03 -0.11 -0.04 0.02 
Immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe -0.10* -0.12** -0.10* -0.03 -0.19** 
Immigrants from the rest of the world -0.04 -0.15** -0.18** -0.16** -0.13** 
 
Note: The table shows the impact of immigrant dummies in four separate regressions on literacy skills, as 
measured by the literacy module of the OECD Survey of Adult Skills (2012), as well as employment, 
earnings and the incidence of being over-qualified. Immigrant dummies have the following country 
coverage: Central and Eastern Europe: Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Turkey, former Yugoslavia. Western Europe and Northern 
America: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Faroe Islands, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Greenland, Ireland, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, San Marino, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. 1. Due to data limitations, only the following ten countries are included in 
the PIAAC average: Austria, Belgium (Flanders), Canada, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain, the United Kingdom (England and Northern Ireland) and the United States. 2. An average of 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden. 3. Literacy scores are scaled by the standard deviation for ease of 
interpretation. Results are obtained controlling for education, demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics. Country fixed effects are included in the pooled regressions (see Bussi and 
Pareliussen, 2017 for details). 4. Controlling for literacy, education, demographic and socio-
economic characteristics. Country fixed effects are included in the pooled regressions (see Bussi 
and Pareliussen, 2017 for details). 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the OECD Survey of Adult Skills (2012), following the methodology 
in Bussi and Pareliussen (2017). 
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The role of tax and transfer reforms  
High income taxation and generous cash transfers remain distinguishing features of 
the Nordic societies. The inequality-reducing effect of personal income taxes and 
social cash transfers is usually quantified as the difference between the Gini 
coefficient for household market incomes (i.e. inequality before taxes and transfers) 
and disposable incomes (i.e. inequality after taxes and transfers) and expressed in 
percent of market income inequality (Reynolds and Smolensky 1977). This provides a 
simple and tractable metric for analysing redistribution across countries and over 
time, but an important limitation is that it does not allow for separating the 
mechanical effect of tax and transfer schemes on household incomes from the effect 
induced by behavioural responses to policy changes.9 
Declining redistribution has been relatively widespread across OECD countries for 
which comparable data are available since the mid-1990s (Causa and Hermansen 
2017). Denmark, Finland and Sweden have experienced some of the largest declines in 
the level of redistribution, bringing them relatively close to the OECD average in 2014 
(Figure 15, Panel A). This decline has been a critical driver of the overall rise in 
disposable income inequality in these countries.10 In the case of the Nordics, part of 
the decline in redistribution reflects the business cycle recovery and reductions in 
structural unemployment since the crisis and recession in the mid-1990s. However, a 
simple cross-country comparison between changes in redistribution and changes in 
employment rates over the period indicates that redistribution has declined 
substantially more in the three Nordic countries than can be explained by the 
mechanical effect from changes in labour market status among the working-age 
population (Figure 15, Panel B).  
In addition, within the group of Nordics, redistribution has converged following a 
strong increase in Iceland after the crisis and a minor increase in Norway. 
Nevertheless, this assessment cannot capture the full redistributive effect of tax and 
transfer systems since the data do not allow for including the impact of social                                                                  
9 See Section 3.4 in Causa and Hermansen (2017) for a thorough discussion of the approach and its limitations. 
10 Redistribution figures are reported for the working-age population (age 18-65) to avoid some major problems inherent in 
comparing incomes between people who are at very different stages of their lives. This also improves cross-country 
comparisons of redistribution since differences in the institutional settings governing the funding of pension systems, 
depending on the recording of income flows in capitalisation compared to pay-as-you-go systems, risk hampering 
redistributive analysis covering the elderly (see Causa and Hermansen, 2017). 
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transfers in-kind (e.g. healthcare and education) and consumption taxes among 
others. This is an important limitation from a Nordic perspective since the provision of 
extensive public services is an essential part of redistribution in the Nordic societies.11 
Aaberge et al. (2018) show that the ranking of countries according to the Gini 
coefficient is relatively insensitive to the inclusion of public services. However, public 
in-kind transfers generally reduce inequality considerably, and reduce poverty among 
the elderly and families with children markedly in the Nordics. 
The weakening redistribution in Nordic countries is likely to partly reflect a series 
of reforms aimed at spurring work incentives and raising employment (see below). 
Behavioural responses can have dampened the inequality impact before taxes and 
transfers as a result of moving workless people with little market income into 
employment. Figure 16 suggests that this has to some extent been achieved: market 
income inequality in Finland has declined from the mid-1990s to 2014, while Denmark 
and Sweden experienced relatively minor increases.  
Small or no change in market income inequality in parallel with strong increases in 
disposable income inequality makes Finland and Sweden stand out in comparison 
with the rest of the OECD. One interpretation is that since the Nordics may have long 
been close to the best policy frontier along several dimensions, the scope for reforms 
boosting both growth and equity has been limited. Facing a trade-off between 
redistribution and efficiency, the Nordics chose to unwind parts of the welfare state 
expansion that had taken place up to the 1980s (Domeij and Flodén 2010, Andersen 
and Maibom 2016 and OECD). Recent examples of such reforms to the Finnish 
unemployment insurance are thoroughly analysed in Kyyrä et al. (2017) and Kyyrä and 
Pesola (2017). Another example is the earned income tax credit introduced in Sweden 
in 2007, later increased in four additional steps. The reform is estimated to have 
increased employment significantly, but also to have increased income dispersion in 
the bottom of the distribution (Fiscal Policy Council 2014). 
 
                                                                 
11 See Causa and Hermansen (2017) for a discussion and references to evidence on the distributive effect of in-kind transfers 
and consumption taxes. Hermansen (2017) provides tentative evidence on the impact of social transfers in-kind on 
inequality trends across different country groups, including the Nordics. 
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Figure 15: The redistributive effect of taxes and transfers has declined substantially in Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden 
 
Note: Redistribution is measured by the difference between the Gini coefficient before personal income 
taxes and transfers (market incomes) and the Gini coefficient after taxes and transfers (for 
disposable incomes) in per cent of the Gini coefficient before taxes and transfers. The working-age 
population include all individuals aged 18–65. OECD15 is a simple average across 15 OECD 
countries (Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States) with 
available information since mid-1990s, applying closest year for some countries and years. A 
change in the income definition implies a break in the series around 2011 for some countries and an 
estimated series correcting for the break have been used. For Panel B data refer to 1994–2015 for 
the United Kingdom; 1995–2012 for Japan; 1995–2015 for Finland, Israel, the Netherlands and the 
United States; 1996–2014 for Czech Republic and France; and 1995–2014 for the rest. 
Source: OECD Income Distribution Database; OECD Labour Force Statistics. 
A. Trends in redistribution for Nordic countries, working-age population (age 18-65)
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In all OECD countries, including the Nordics, the majority of the inequality-
reducing effect of redistribution comes from cash transfers, although income taxes 
also play an important role, especially in Iceland (Causa and Hermansen 2017).12 
Transfers account for most of the widespread decline in redistribution across OECD 
countries since the mid-1990s, including in Denmark, Finland and Sweden (Figure 
17).13 On average across OECD countries, this resulted mainly from a reduction in 
redistributive insurance transfers, like unemployment and sickness benefits, which 
was only partly compensated by rising assistance transfers, often means-tested and 
thus more targeted towards low-income households (Causa and Hermansen 2017). 
Figure 16: The Nordics experienced stability in inequality before taxes and transfers but increases in 
inequality after taxes and transfers 
 
Note: The 45-degree line represents a hypothetical scenario in which there is no change in redistribution 
and, as a result, changes in pre-tax and transfer inequality correspond perfectly to changes in post-tax 
and transfer inequality. Positions above the 45-degree indicate a larger rise in disposable income 
inequality relative to market income inequality, implying less redistribution, and vice versa below the 
45-degree line. 
Source: OECD Income Distribution Database.                                                                  
12 Such assessment and comparison across countries should be taken with some caution due to the interaction of taxes and 
transfers. For instance, cash transfers are usually taxed at a relatively high rate in the Nordics. See Causa and Hermansen 
(2017) for further discussion and details on the computations. 
13 The decomposition in Figure 17 is based on computations from the Luxembourg Income Study. Unfortunately, data is 
only available for the period 1995-2005 for Sweden. Note also that the overall change in redistribution may differ slightly 
from the one reported in Figure 15 as a result of different data sources. 
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The reduction in redistribution through transfers is the outcome of changes to 
policy settings, economic conditions and a number of structural factors. While the 
empirical framework applied in Causa and Hermansen (2017) does not allow for 
isolating the precise contribution of discretionary policy changes, more direct 
policy indicators allow for tracking some important drivers of declining 
redistribution in the Nordics.  
 
Figure 17: The decline in redistribution is mainly driven by less redistributive cash transfers 
 
Note: Sweden only available for 1995–2005 and social security contributions not available for France. See 
Causa and Hermansen (forthcoming) for the approach to assess the redistributive impact of 
individual parts of the tax and transfer systems. The total change in redistribution may differ from 
the one reported in Figure 15 since different data sources have been applied. Data refer to 1993–
2013 for the Netherlands; 1994–2010 for Canada and France; 1994–2013 for Germany, the United 
Kingdom and the United States; 1995–2005 for Sweden; 1995–2010 for Australia; 1995–2013 for 
Denmark, Finland and Norway; 1996–2013 for Czech Republic; and 1997–2012 for Israel. 
Source: OECD staff calculations based on the Luxembourg Income Study. 
 
Reforms to improve work incentives are reflected in markedly reduced generosity of 
unemployment insurance systems in most of the Nordic countries, but in different 
ways, and from very high initial levels. In Sweden, the net unemployment benefit 
replacement rate for a newly unemployed has dropped from around 65% in 2001 to 
close to 40% in 2015 for a worker with average earnings (Figure 18, Panel A). This 
reflects benefit cuts and unsystematic uprating of benefits relative to wages from the 
1990s until now and the implementation of the earned income tax credit (OECD 
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2017f). The maximum duration of unemployment benefits has been reduced 
substantially in Denmark and Norway, which led to the average net replacement rate 
over five years of unemployment (for a worker with 67% of average earnings) 
dropping spectacularly (Figure 18, Panel B). Nevertheless, Denmark is still among the 
OECD countries with highest average net replacement rates over 5 years.  
Even though the reforms described are likely to have contributed significantly to 
reduce redistribution, means-tested benefits have kept the ability of the social safety 
net to secure minimum living standards more or less intact, as can be seen from the 
corresponding net replacement rate including social assistance and housing 
allowances (Figure 18, Panel C). Less redistributive transfers are also likely to reflect 
significant tightening of sickness and disability schemes observed in many OECD 
countries, including the Nordics (OECD 2010). 
Turning to income taxation, indicators demonstrate that the Nordics have 
implemented significant reforms over the past decades. The average rate of personal 
income tax and employee’s social security contributions has declined by almost nine and 
six percentage points in Sweden and Denmark, respectively, from 2000 to 2016 
(Figure 19, Panel A).14 This reflects a series of reforms to strengthen work incentives, 
among others the introduction of earned income tax credits in Denmark and Sweden in 
the mid-2000s and more generally by shifting taxation away from labour income to 
other sources (Danish Ministry of Taxation 2017 and Swedish Ministry of Finance 2010).  
Such reductions in average tax rates reduce the redistributive effect of income 
taxation, but this may be counteracted by increasing the progressivity of the tax system. 
In Sweden, this seems to have been the case: the tax reduction is larger at 67% of 
average earnings than at 167% of average earnings (Figure 19, Panel B), at least partly as 
a consequence of the sizeable earned income tax credit implemented in 2006. By 
contrast, progressivity has declined in Denmark and Iceland according to this simple 
comparison. More comprehensive analysis of progressivity across the distribution points 
to a general rise in progressivity in the lower part of the income distribution and little or 
no change in the upper part on average across OECD countries (OECD 2014a). Reforms 
in this area include cuts to labour taxes and social security contributions targeted 
towards low-income workers, but also expansions of in-work benefits, tax credits and 
child-related tax reliefs.                                                                  
14 Results are qualitatively unchanged for the average tax wedge, i.e. including all labour compensation costs. 
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Figure 18: Unemployment insurance systems have become less generous in the Nordics 
 
Note: Panel A: single, 100% of average earnings, no children. Panel B: single, 67% of average earnings, no 
children, assumed not to qualify for social assistance and housing allowances (no top-ups). Panel C: 
single, 67% of average earnings, no children, assumed to qualify for social assistance and housing 
allowances (top-ups). Reforms implemented after 2015, such as a raised unemployment insurance 
ceiling in Sweden, shortened unemployment insurance duration in Finland and extended 
unemployment benefit duration in Denmark are not included. 
Source: OECD Tax-Benefit Models. 
A. Initial net UI replacement rate
B. Average net UI replacement rate over five years
C. Average net UI replacement rate plus social assistance and housing allowances over five years
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Figure 19: Personal income taxation is high but has been reduced in the Nordics 
 
Note: Taxes include personal income taxes and employees’ social security contributions. All series 
illustrated are for singles with no children. Panel A applies to average earnings. 
Source: OECD Taxing Wages. 
Summary and challenges ahead  
If anything, it may seem like a paradox that the Nordics, which are very open economies, 
heavily integrated in global value chains and frontrunners in the use of new technologies 
(OECD 2013, 2014b), have not seen even more widening distributions of market incomes. 
However, the extent to which skill-biased structural change and other forces widening the 
earnings distribution of workers will actually drive up inequality depends on a number of 
A. Average net income tax rate
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factors, and key policies and institutions in the Nordics play a dampening role. First, 
institutions such as unions and collective bargaining, employment protection legislation 
and minimum wages dampen the direct effect of market trends on earnings. Second, 
higher demand for skills can be met by increasing the supply of skilled workers, thus 
holding back skills premiums. Third, increasing employment can mitigate the inequality-
increasing effect from a widening earnings distribution among workers.  
With a relatively modest impact of market forces, explanations for increasing 
inequality must be sought elsewhere. Demographics have been a relatively strong driver 
of inequality in the Nordics. Household structure, with more single-headed households has 
widened income dispersion in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. Ageing has 
increased inequality significantly in Finland, and a similar increase can be expected in 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden, as ageing intensifies going forward. Yet, indexation of the 
retirement age to life expectancy may dampen the inequality effects of ageing in the 
future. Redistribution has weakened significantly in Denmark, Finland and Sweden, 
notably with weaker insurance transfers only partially offset by means-tested transfers. 
Income tax rates have also been reduced, while progressivity increased in Sweden and 
decreased in Denmark and Iceland. 
Technological and demographic pressures are set to continue going forward, and 
these challenges need to be embraced and met by continued flexibility and 
constructiveness of the social dialogue. Continued improvements to education are 
essential to seize opportunities from technological change and avoid a widening wage 
distribution. Making social insurance and welfare transfers more flexible and agile would 
improve workers’ protection in a rapidly changing world of work. Removing incentive 
traps, notably in Denmark and Finland, and linking benefits to real-time income registries 
are important steps to this end (OECD 2018). Adequate incentives should always be 
weighed against the role redistribution has in sharing risk and compensating losers, a 
necessity to muster broad support in embracing technological change and globalisation.  
The Nordics may have faced a binding equity-efficiency trade-off previously, but seen 
in the light of high employment, a long period of weakening redistribution and the central 
role of the social safety net in the overall functioning of the Nordic model, this is not 
necessarily the case anymore for all the Nordics. The uprating rules for social benefits play 
an important role in inequality development over the long term. Most benefits in Sweden 
are linked to the consumer price index or not indexed at all. Because of this system, 
redistribution is now at the OECD average level, after having weakened considerably since 
the 1990s (OECD 2017f). 
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This paper has focused on inequality in household disposable incomes, measured in a 
single year only, for which comparable cross-country data are relatively abundant. Yet, 
concerns about rising inequality usually reflect concerns for declining equality of 
opportunities. A thorough assessment of inequality trends should thus also focus on 
developments in lifetime incomes, intergenerational mobility and the distribution of 
wealth. The importance of wealth can be illustrated by the fact that national inequality 
data applying a broader capital income concept than the one applied by the OECD tend to 
show even stronger rises in income inequality in the Nordics than reported here (Danish 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Interior 2017, Swedish Ministry of Finance 2016 and 
Statistics Norway 2017).15  
Policies to redistribute wealth have weakened considerably in the Nordics over the 
past few decades, partly as a response to globalisation, and encouraged by organised 
interests from the business community. The Nordic dual income tax reforms of the early 
1990s led to lower ratios of statutory corporate to wage taxes than in most OECD 
countries, and lighter taxation of capital than labour. Statutory capital income tax rates 
have since been reduced further in the Nordics as part of a global trend. Top income 
earners in the Nordic countries mainly derive their income from capital. Wealth and 
inheritance taxation has also been reduced considerably, with Norway and Sweden 
abolishing inheritance taxes altogether (Schjelderup 2015). Lighter taxation of capital 
income, wealth and inheritance taken together raises concerns about intergenerational 
income mobility. As an example, in the top 0.1% of the Swedish income distribution 
fathers’ relative incomes determine 90% of sons’ incomes, largely because of capital 
income. Furthermore, mobility from the bottom 75% to the top 0.1% is close to non-
existent (Björklund et al. 2012a and 2012b). 
However, cross-country comparable data are much scarcer in the areas of capital 
income and wealth, and even though the Nordics tend to be among the frontrunners, 
more needs to be done to correctly measure, compare and understand the distribution of 
wealth. The role of taxation should also be reconsidered, notably inheritance and owner-
occupied housing taxes, which in addition to redistribute wealth, are known to be among 
the most efficient ways to raise public revenue. Strengthening Nordic cooperation to avoid 
regional pressure towards ever lower capital income taxes could also be considered.                                                                  
15 Foremost the inclusion of realised (windfall) capital incomes, which is usually not included in a standard household 
income concept (UNECE, 2011), but also the income value of owner-occupied housing services (imputed rents). 
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Comment on J.K Pareliussen, M. Hermansen, C. André and  
O. Causa: Income Inequality in the Nordic Countries from an OECD 
Perspective  
Jørgen Elmeskov16 
 
 
This is a very rich paper. It presents a lot of evidence on the development of 
income distribution and potential drivers thereof in an international, comparative 
setting. Many of the findings seem convincing. Against that background, these 
comments mainly go a bit beyond the analysis in the paper to consider, in turn, 
three different questions. 
What aspects of income distribution should be the focus for analysis? 
The paper does not really address this issue. However, depending on the concern 
driving the interest in distribution, different aspects of income distribution are 
relevant. For example, an ethical concern with poverty, or a related Rawlsian 
approach to progress, might imply a focus on the bottom part of the income 
distribution. That could also be the case if the concern is with economic growth and 
the risk that poverty can sap human capital investment and, hence, the potential for 
intergenerational advance. In that case, however, focus might be to a large extent 
on absolute instead of relative levels of income at the bottom. The concern with the 
means to invest in childrens’ education naturally leads to a focus on (equivalised) 
family income, but there could be legitimate concerns also with individual income. 
This could be the case, for example, to the extent that status in society is associated 
with the ability to secure a certain level of income and the concern driving the 
analysis relates to individuals’ sense of status and self-esteem.  
The paper takes its point of departure in household income and, although indicators 
of poverty are shown and discussed, seems to put the main emphasis on the overall 
income distribution. This does not fit so well with the concerns discussed above but 
could reflect an interest for social cohesion. Arguably, tendencies for “decoupling” at                                                                  
16 Statistics Denmark. 
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either end of the distribution could raise such concerns. But, then, if the concern is with 
the extremes, perhaps the Gini coefficient is not such an obvious indicator to study. 
An aside in this context is that if the extremes are the main point of interest, then 
the level of aggregation may matter for the conclusions. Two papers in this volume 
present curves on income growth incidence for Denmark. Given the need to cover 
many countries, the present paper show these by deciles, and although there is some 
tendency for income growth to be higher (lower) at the top (bottom) of the 
distribution, the difference does not look dramatic. By contrast, the paper by Søgaard 
presents the curves by percentiles, which gives the impression of a much more 
substantial “decoupling” at the very top end (Søgaard 2018). 
All of this is a long song and dance to make the point, that the main concern 
motivating the analysis should also colour the choice of exactly what is studied. The 
present paper leaves the reader somewhat in the dark on that point even though the 
indicators studied in the paper implicitly must reflect some particular preoccupation. 
What do the explanatory variables actually explain? 
It is in the nature of empirical economic and social indicators that few of them can be 
considered truly exogenous. This goes also for indicators describing aspects of policy 
to the extent political economy mechanisms are at work – which they obviously are. 
The authors are clearly aware of the problems associated with drawing causal 
inferences. They provide the example that, in an accounting sense, less progressive 
redistribution policies have led to a widening of income distribution, but they may also 
have sharpened incentives and led to better employment outcomes, possibly making 
for a less dispersed distribution of market income. Hence, focusing only on the 
redistribution part can be misleading. 
One can think of a number of similar cases, which might have implications for 
some of the arguments in the paper. For example, a rise in the share of single-earner 
households may have contributed to a wider dispersion of disposable income in some 
of the Nordic countries, as argued in the paper. However, the rise in the share of 
single-earners may reflect increased affordability of living alone which in some sense 
may be seen as an equalising development. 
A very similar argument is that if ageing has led to a widening of income 
distribution in some of the Nordic countries, this may reflect that retirement incomes 
at the bottom have become more generous and, hence, allowed retirement from 
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work. Again, a measure which seems equalising in nature gets recorded as a rise in 
inequality. 
A number of arguments along these lines could be made. They do not question 
the empirical accuracy of the observations made in the paper. But they do suggest 
that sometimes causal links can be more complicated than it appears from bivariate 
comparisons of endogenous variables. 
What additional explanatory factors could be considered? 
The paper is so rich in its coverage of potential explanatory factors, that it seems 
almost cruel to suggest further things to consider. Moreover, the authors deserve 
praise for their focus on factors that can be quantified empirically, whereas some of 
the suggestions below are hard to quantify. But, at least it may be useful to remind 
oneself about factors not covered in the paper. 
Something which is almost impossible to quantify is the role of societal norms. 
They are likely to have substantial impacts perhaps particularly in those labour market 
segments that seem at some distance from the notion of a competitive market. This 
links to another factor which is the degree of competition and scope for rent sharing. 
The policy stance on competition and regulation in product and financial markets 
together with market developments in these areas are likely to have spillovers to 
income distribution. 
Finally, the development of pension arrangements may have a significant impact. 
In Denmark, the build-up of funded occupational pensions has probably sapped 
recorded disposable income growth in the low and middle-income ranges, but it has 
also led to a build-up of assets that will generate retirement income (although for 
many this is subject to sizeable marginal effective tax rates). This points to a more 
general point, also touched on in the paper, which is the need to consider the 
intertemporal aspects of income distribution. For example, low incomes among 
students who can look forward to high incomes subsequent to graduation may not be 
as much of a concern as low income among people who remain at the bottom end of 
the distribution. There is also an intergenerational aspect to consider, with inheritance 
affecting the distribution of wealth and consumption possibilities. 
Summing up, the present paper has provided a rich basis for discussion on income 
distribution and its drivers but has far from exhausted the topic. 
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Comment on J.K. Pareliussen, M. Hermansen, C. André and O. 
Causa: Income Inequality in the Nordic Countries from an OECD 
Perspective  
John Hassler1 
 
 
There has recently been an increase in the attention to developments of income 
inequality among researchers and policy makers. Of course, income inequality has 
always been at the center of the political discussion in the Nordic countries, but also 
here, I believe the consensus is strengthening that too much inequality may be 
detrimental to societal sustainability. In light of this, it is not surprising that the finding 
that Sweden has had the largest increase in the Gini coefficient of all OECD countries 
has gained a lot of attention. “Sweden, who would believe this about Sweden?” to 
paraphrase the current U.S. president. 
However, income inequality is a multidimensional phenomenon that does not let 
itself be captured by a single statistic. A fruitful discussion about inequality must 
therefore dig much deeper than simply looking at the Gini. The paper by Pareliussen 
et al. is a very valuable contribution to such deep-digging.  
A key conclusion in the paper is that the usual international suspect of increased 
inequality, globalization, is not very important in the Nordic countries. The authors 
note that it may even be “seen as a paradox” that the very open Nordic countries have 
not had much of a widening in market income distribution. The Nordics have been 
able to embrace openness that exploits the fruits of globalization without suffering 
from the negative consequences that in other countries are regarded as a threat to 
openness and even democracy. Writing down the formula for this achievement so it 
can be used elsewhere is a task of first-order importance for researchers in the field of 
inequality. 
Openness and globalization have been central for the transformation of the 
Nordic countries from poor agrarian countries to rich welfare states. The Pareliussen 
et al. paper focuses on a relatively recent history from the early 1990s and onwards. It 
may also be important to adopt a longer time perspective, although data limitations                                                                  
1 Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University. 
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can obviously be a problem. To illustrate this point, I use the World Wealth and 
Income Database that covers a time period starting in 1970. The database contains 
data for average taxable income before taxes and transfers for the top one and top 
ten percent as well as for the remaining 90 percent. Figure 1 shows the development 
of accumulated real income changes for these three groups in Sweden and the U.S. It 
can be seen that the incomes of the top groups have increased much faster than for 
the rest in both countries. In fact, the increases in top incomes are very similar in the 
two countries.  
Figure 1: Accumulated real income changes in the U.S. and Sweden, 1991–2015 
 
Source: The World Wealth and Income Database. 
 
However, the picture looks very different if the sample period is extended backwards 
to 1970 as shown in Figure 2. Then the U.S. and Sweden look very different. Income 
inequality in the U.S. has increased continuously over the four and a half decades and 
the increase has been very large. In Sweden, the development has not been 
monotonic – the increase in inequality in the latter half of the period is largely 
balanced by a compression in the earlier. Interestingly, the compression coincides 
with a period of sluggish Swedish growth, while the increase occurred during a time 
period when Swedish growth came back to previous levels. This coincidence could be 
given at least two quite different interpretations. One is that the welfare state 
manages to distribute aggregate and long-term income risk to arguably more risk-
tolerant high income-earners. The other, less beneficial, interpretation is that higher 
inequality caused higher growth, indicating perhaps that egalitarian policies went too 
far in Sweden during the 1970s and 1980s.  
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Figure 2: Accumulated real income changes in the U.S. and Sweden, 1970–2015 
 
Source: The World Wealth and Income Database. 
 
Another remarkable achievement of the Nordic countries is that they have achieved 
low levels of inequality and high levels of intergenerational mobility. The “American 
dream” is perhaps a dream in the U.S. but more real in the Nordic countries.  
Previous work by Hassler, Rodríguez Mora and Zeira (2007) constructed a model 
showing that if cross-country differences in equality are driven by differences in the 
labor market, e.g., the intensity of skill-biased technical change, the cross-country 
correlation between inequality and intergenerational mobility should be positive. If, 
on the other hand, the correlation is negative, this points in the direction of 
differences in access to good education. At the time, we had little empirical evidence, 
but since then the evidence point to a largely negative correlation. The tendency of 
increasing educational segregation in Sweden, in particular, is worrisome in this 
perspective.  
Lower intergenerational mobility is arguably bad in itself. Hassler and Rodríguez-
Mora (2000) also argued that lower intergenerational mobility and lower growth 
interact in a detrimental feed-back loop. Low mobility leads to a less efficient 
allocation of innate talent. This in turn reduces growth and makes the society more 
static. In such a society, family background and social networks become relatively 
more important for job-opportunities, thus feeding back into lower mobility. 
Pareliussen et al. provide new and interesting evidence on the development of 
inequality in the Nordic countries. A great additional value is that the paper should 
stimulate further work on these very important questions. 
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Top Incomes in Scandinavia –  
Recent Developments and the Role 
of Capital Income 
Jakob Egholt Søgaard1 
Abstract 
This paper deals with the development of top incomes in Scandinavia. I first explain 
why academia over the past two decades has focused on the income share of top 
groups, in particular the one percent of the population with the highest incomes. 
Furthermore, I examine some of the main drivers of inequality that have been 
considered in the literature and present new suggestive evidence on the role of capital 
income and, in particular, the shift from interest income to dividends that has 
occurred over the past decades. 
 
Keywords: Scandinavia, income inequality, top incomes. 
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Introduction 
Over the past decades, we have witnessed a substantial increase in the focus on 
income inequality both among academics and in the public in general. Among 
academics, the focus has been particularly on top income shares starting with the 
papers by Piketty (2001) and Saez and Piketty (2003). They use tabulated data on 
the income distribution in France and the US to compute top income shares over 
the past century. Together with the studies that followed in the slipstream, these 
papers have been successful in “putting distribution back at the center of 
economics” (Piketty 2015). 
Here I focus on the top income shares in the Scandinavian countries. They are 
known for their relatively low levels of income inequality and high social mobility, 
while at the same time being among the most prosperous nations in the world. In my 
analysis I stand on the shoulders of numerous scholars who have worked to create top 
income series for a large number of countries stretching back over the last century. I 
also stand on the shoulders of the many authors who survey the literature from an 
international perspective and, in particular, the surveys by Atkinson et al. (2011) and 
Roine and Waldenström (2015). 
I furthermore contribute to the literature by more closely examining the 
relationship between changes in dividends paid to households and top income shares. 
Here I build on the original work by Piketty (2001) and the more recent work of 
Bengtsson and Waldenström (forthcoming), but probe into the effect of the 
composition of capital income instead of just considering the overall level of capital 
income. I find that changes in dividends relative to total household income correlate 
strongly with changes in top income shares in Finland and Norway, but less so in 
Denmark and Sweden.  
However, at the same time I caution that any causal identification of underlying 
drivers of inequality has so far been limited by the fact that we measure inequality at 
the national level. This leaves us with a small number of observations that are hit by a 
myriad of different events over time, thus making it difficult to separate the effects of 
each individual event.   
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Why top income shares? 
The particular focus on top income shares might seem narrow. Why only focus on the 
top of the income distribution, when we have standard measures, such as the Gini 
coefficient, that capture changes in the entire income distribution? For many 
economists – not least in Scandinavia – the Gini coefficient has long been the 
inequality measure of choice. 
There are at least a couple of reasons for the focus on top income shares. In the 
public debate one likely reason is that inequality driven by the top (and bottom) of the 
income distribution is a very salient form of inequality, which e.g. fosters public 
discussions of compensation of CEOs even if they constitute a relatively small number 
of individuals.  
In the recent academic literature, the focus on top incomes stems from additional 
reasons which are discussed below (see also Atkinson, Piketty and Saez 2011). 
Long run trends in income shares 
First, precise calculations of the Gini coefficient require information about the incomes 
of individuals or families in all parts of the income distribution. For most countries such 
detailed data have only become available in recent decades with the increased use of 
register data and – before that – household surveys. Calculations of the Gini coefficient 
are, therefore, typically infeasible or associated with large uncertainty going further 
back in time. In contrast, calculations of top income shares only require information 
about incomes in the top of the income distribution combined with information on total 
income in a given country and total population.  
Information on top incomes became available in many countries with the 
introduction of modern income taxation in the beginning of the 20th century. The 
information typically came in the form of tabulations of the number of taxpayers by 
income bracket along with their average or total income. However, as the early income 
tax systems contained a relatively high personal allowance, only a minor portion of the 
population actually paid income tax and was included in the tabulations.  
Regarding information on the total population and total income, two data sources 
are typically employed: contemporary population censuses and national accounts (and 
their predecessors). In both cases, a number of corrections are typically required, as 
described in the individual country studies underlying the available top income series. 
 
 
Nordic Economic Policy Review 69 
 
The information discussed often stretch much further back in time than the 
(micro) data currently used to construct inequality measures. With top income shares, 
the data therefore allow for the construction of longer time series, often going back 
more than a century.  
Figure 1 shows the shares of total income that accrue to the one percent of the 
population with the highest incomes, i.e. the top one percent income share in the 
Scandinavian countries, France, and in the USA. These reveal a marked change in 
inequality over the past century. In the 1900s–1920s the (unweighted) average top 
income share across these countries was just under 20 percent. Around 60 years later 
in the 1970s the average was more than halved to nine percent. 
Figure 1: Top one percent income share in the Scandinavian countries, USA and France 1900–2015 
 
Note: Top income shares are defined as the share of total income that accrues to the one percent of the 
populations with the highest income. Income is defined excluding capital gains. The top one 
percent income share for Denmark is computed as in Atkinson and Søgaard (2016) with the 
addition of dividends after 1990. This implies a slight increase in the shares in recent years. This 
might also result in a slight exaggeration of the increase in recent decades, as the reporting of 
dividends to the tax authorities has improved. 
Source: The individual country series is based on separate studies. References are listed in the reference 
section. For Sweden, the data are drawn directly from the underlying (updated) source. For 
Denmark, the series have been updated and extended to 2015 by the author using register data 
from Statistics Denmark. For Finland, the series has been extended based on the (updated) gross 
income series from Jäntti et al. (2010). For Norway, the series have been drawn from the World 
Income and Wealth Database. 
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Underlying this overall trend, we find differences across countries in both the level of 
inequality and in the year-to-year changes. For instance, Sweden and Denmark had a 
sharp increase in inequality around the First World War, when the top income shares 
averaged 28 percent, the highest income shares ever recorded for the six selected 
countries. Nevertheless, the overall trend of declining top income shares stands out. 
Since the 1970s we see a gradual reversal of the downward trend in inequality. 
The top income share first started to increase in the USA (along with other Anglo-
Saxon countries). Ten years later, in the 1980s, the top income share started to 
increase in France, while the top income shares in the Scandinavian countries hovered 
at around five percent until they started increasing in the early 1990s. 
Currently, the USA has more or less returned to the same high top income 
shares that they experienced at the beginning of the 20th century. The income 
shares for the Scandinavian countries are approaching ten percent from below, 
while France is approaching this level from above. Looking over the past 100 years 
or more, the top income shares appear to have followed a somewhat U-shaped 
path, especially for the USA. 
The second reason for focusing on top income shares stems from the fact that 
changes in trends have been much stronger at the top of the income distribution than 
for the incomes just below. To see this, consider the two panels of Figure 2. They show 
the income shares of the population between the 95th and 99th as well as the 90th 
and 95th income percentiles. The contrast to the top one percent income share is 
striking. While the income shares of the population in the 95th–99th income 
percentiles exhibit some resemblance to the U-shape path of the top income shares, 
the income shares of the population in the 90th–95th income percentiles have been 
relatively flat over the past more than 100 years. This also implies that treating the top 
10 percent earners as a homogenous group is potentially very misleading. 
The fact that movements in the top one percent income shares are particularly 
strong is in itself a reason to focus on top incomes instead of just broad inequality 
measures such as the Gini coefficient. This holds true especially in countries that rely 
on household surveys, as household surveys often have difficulty capturing the top of 
the income distribution – either due to nonresponses among high-income earners or 
due to top coding. In this case, the effects of changes in top income shares are less 
likely to be captured by the Gini coefficient.  
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Figure 2: The income shares of P90–95 and P95–P99 in the Scandinavian countries, the USA and France 
1900–2015 
 
Note: Income shares of the population in the 90th–95th and the 95th–99th income percentiles. Income is 
defined excluding capital gains. 
Source: See Figure 1. 
 
At first glance, this is less of an issue in the Scandinavian countries where the income 
statistics have long been based on information from the tax authorities. That said, it 
was not until 2016 that the Gini coefficient for Sweden was based entirely on register 
data (Statistics Sweden 2016). In Norway the changeover was completed in 2005. In 
Denmark register-based Gini coefficients appeared in the mid-1990s. 
Income and population definitions 
In the literature on top income shares it has been an explicit goal to produce top 
income series that are as comparable over time and across countries as possible 
(Atkinson 2007 and Piketty 2007). 
The Gini coefficient is typically calculated for equivalised disposable income for 
the entire population. This measure ideally incorporates all sources of income – both 
positive and negative (such as interest expenditure) and whether the income is 
monetary or in kind (such as the rental value of owner-occupied housing). This post-
transfer, post-tax income is added up for the whole household and divided by an 
equivalence scale. The equivalence scale is a function of the number of people in the 
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household that takes into account economics of scale, i.e. that the marginal “need” 
for certain goods (such as housing space, electricity etc.) is decreasing in household 
size. Equivalised disposable income thus aims at measuring the real consumption 
possibilities per person (for unchanged net worth). 
In contrast to the Gini coefficient, top income shares (in particular for earlier time 
periods) start from the data available in the historical tabulation of taxpayers and their 
income. This income information was collected for tax purposes and the precise 
definition is therefore often determined by the legal definition of taxable income. 
There is some evidence that the Western countries drew inspiration from each 
other when drafting their original tax laws at the beginning of the 20th century. The 
taxable income definition that forms the basis for the computation of top income 
shares is therefore in most cases a comprehensive income concept, which includes 
both labour income and net capital income.2 
The use of taxable income as the primary income definition does, however, create 
some differences across countries. One example is the inclusion of social security and 
transfers, where tax treatment differs from country to country. In some countries, 
some or all transfers are tax exempt and thus not included in taxable income, while 
the opposite is the case in other countries.  
For the Scandinavian countries, the large transfer programmes (such as public 
pensions and unemployment-related benefits) are, in general, included in the income 
definition. Only minor transfers, such as housing and heating subsidies etc., are 
typically exempt. In some cases, transfers were originally tax exempt, but made 
taxable at a later stage. In this case, the data breaks have typically been corrected for. 
The income definition used for the top income shares in the Scandinavian countries is, 
therefore, close to non-equivalised post-transfer, pre-tax income. 
Ideally, capital gains should be included in the income definition if we wish to 
measure income in a theoretically (Haig-Simons) consistent manner, where an 
individual’s income is given by the highest possible consumption expenditure that 
leaves the individual’s net worth unchanged. For tax purposes, the inclusion of capital 
gains is, however, less consistent. First of all, capital gains are typically only taxed 
when they are realized. This means that the capital gains that show up in the income 
                                                                 
2 The original Danish tax law of 1903 was inspired by the Prussian income tax law from 1891 (see Johansen 2007). 
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statistics often are accumulated over a number of years and attributing the entire 
amount to a single year therefore overestimates the income in that year. 
There is perhaps an even bigger problem in the case of capital losses. Studies 
show that capital gains only constitute a significant income component at the top of 
the income distribution (see e.g. Roine and Waldenström 2010). However, if an 
individual who typically lies in the top one percent of the income distribution 
experiences a large capital loss in a single year, he is likely to fall out of the top one 
percent in that year. Hence, capital gains are likely to be attributed to the top of the 
income distribution, while capital losses are not, even if it is the same individuals who 
experience the gains and losses.3 
Also, not all capital gains are taxable. In many countries capital gains on owner 
occupied houses are not taxed, which may also be the case for other assets. In 
Denmark for example, capital gains on stocks owned for more than three years were, 
in many cases, tax exempt prior to 2005.  
Finally, there may be larger reporting problems for capital gains. They are 
calculated as the difference between the sale and the purchase price of a given asset. 
It may be particularly difficult for the tax authorities to check the capital gains 
reported by tax payers without third-party information on both purchases and sales. 
Taken together, this implies, that capital gains on smaller portfolios are likely to be 
underestimated in data.  
For the above reasons the top income series in this paper are measured excluding 
capital gains. This is, however, a choice that has been discussed considerably in the 
top income literature (see, for example, Piketty and Saez 2003). 
The legal unit in the tax law typically also determines the population that is included 
in the calculations of the top income shares. Denmark and Sweden initially had joint 
taxation of married couples. Therefore, the top income shares earlier reflected the 
inequality among households. Joint taxation was maintained in Sweden and Denmark 
until the start of the 1970s, when individual taxation was introduced. After these points 
in time, the top income shares instead measure inequality among individuals.  
In Finland, the change from joint to individual taxation happened already in 1935, 
only to be reversed in 1943. Individual taxation was restored in 1975. In Norway,                                                                  
3 There is also a more general discussion about measures of inequality within a single year or over longer periods (inequality 
in lifetime income). This discussion is outside the scope of the paper, but the inclusion of capital gains is likely to be 
particularly problematic for single year measures of inequality.  
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individuals could for a long period choose between joint and individual taxation and 
the changeover therefore came gradually over the 20th century. 
The fact that we are historically bound to the definition of taxable income when 
computing top income shares is somewhat problematic. In particular, we need to be 
aware that (minor) year-to-year changes can be due to changes in the definition of 
taxable income and/or the population included in the calculations. 
Furthermore, it is not clear that we should be interested in the development of 
non-equivalised post-transfer, pre-tax income (Burkhauser and Larrimore 2014). We 
are usually interested in either inequality of consumption possibilities, in which case 
we would prefer equivalised post-transfer, post-tax income, or inequality of market 
outcomes, in which case we would use non-equivalised pre-transfer, pre-tax income 
for the part of the population active in the labour market. 
When we use the non-equivalised post-transfer, pre-tax top income shares, we 
are stuck in the middle. This means that, in general, we would prefer to use other 
more well-defined measures of income when they are available and when they cover 
the entire income distribution, including the top and the bottom. This is likely the case 
in all Scandinavia countries today. 
At the same time it is important to recognize that any inequality measure has 
strengths and drawbacks. For example, while equivalised post-transfer, post-tax 
income might be a good measure of inequality of consumption possibilities, it is also a 
highly complex measure that depends both on the relative size of different income 
sources and on the composition of the population.  
With this measure, inequality is not only affected by the wage dispersion, but also 
by changes in the interest rate level – which affects interest expenditure and the 
imputed rental value of owner-occupied housing through changes in house prices – 
and changes in the family structures, where, e.g., more single households and higher 
life expectancy might increase inequality. It can, therefore, be very difficult to identify 
the underlying causes of an observed change in inequality (in particular, with respect 
to compositional changes). 
Moving to a simpler income measure such as, e.g., earned income, we avoid some 
of the difficulties in attributing changes in inequality to changes in different income 
sources. However, we instead risk even larger compositional effects, as single sources 
of income might be limited to specific parts of the population. 
To see these trade-offs, consider Figure 3 showing the Gini coefficients in Denmark for 
disposable and earned income for the entire population and for selected subgroups. 
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Figure 3: Gini coefficients in Denmark for the entire population and selected subgroups 
 
Note: Disposable income corresponds to the definition of equivalised disposable income (post-transfer, 
post-taxes) computed by Statistics Denmark. These numbers differ to a small extent from the 
official Gini coefficient from the Danish Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Interior. Earned 
income includes wages and business income. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Statistics Denmark’s register data. 
 
For the Gini coefficients of disposable income, the three groups broadly follow the 
same trend over the period 1980–2015. First, a drop of around four percentage 
points from 1980 to 1985 and subsequently an increase of around eight percentage 
points until 2015. 
Initially, the Gini coefficient for the entire population is two percentage points 
higher than for the two subgroups, but over the period the Gini coefficient for the 
population excluding individuals above age 65 increased slightly faster, so that it now 
is at the same level as the Gini coefficient for the entire population. 
When we instead consider the Gini coefficients of earned income, the use of 
different subgroups significantly affects both the level – and most importantly – the 
trend over the period 1980–2015. The Gini coefficient for the population excluding 
individuals above age 65 is around eight percentage points lower than for the entire 
population, but follows the same upward trend over the period. Excluding also the age 
groups below age 30, the initial level of the Gini coefficient is (slightly) lower, but here 
the Gini coefficient has been on a downward trend over the period. 
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Comparison of top income shares and overall measures of inequality 
Even though it is not a law of nature, evidence points to a relatively stable historical 
correlation between top income shares and overall inequality (see also Roine and 
Waldenström 2015). Bearing in mind the differences in income definitions discussed 
above, this is, e.g., visible in Figure 4 showing the changes in the top income shares 
along with the changes in the Gini coefficients from the mid-1980s to the mid-2010s. 
In five out of six countries the change in the top income share is also reflected in 
the change in the Gini coefficient. The only exception is France, where the change in 
the Gini coefficient has been out of sync with the top income share. Atkinson and 
Søgaard (2016) show that the correlation is also stable in Denmark when considering 
inequality trends back to the beginning of the 20th century. 
Figure 4: Changes in top one percent income shares versus changes in the Gini coefficients from the 
mid-1980s to the mid-2010s 
 
Source: Top one percent income shares are from the same sources as in Figure 1. The Gini coefficients are 
from Atkinson et al. (2017). The underlying sources are typically national statistical bureaus. For 
Denmark the Gini coefficient is defined as in Figure 3. 
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The mechanical effect of a change in the top income share on the overall inequality 
measured by the Gini coefficient can be assessed by the following approximation (see 
for example Alvaredo 2011). Assuming that S is the income share of the very top of 
the income distribution (a very small proportion of the population), the Gini 
coefficient (G) can be approximated as:  
 
 G ≈ S + (1 – S)G99 = G99 +(1 – G99)S, (1) 
 
where G99 is the Gini coefficient measured among the rest of the population (i.e. the 
bottom 99 percent) and S is the top income share. Using this formula, the mechanical 
contribution of a one percentage point increase in the top income share to the Gini 
coefficient is given by (1 – G99). 
From this we see that the increase in the top income share in the USA can explain 
6.6 out of a 7.7 percentage point increase in the Gini coefficient (see also Atkinson et 
al. 2011). At face value, the increase in inequality in the USA over the past 30 years 
thus appears to be largely driven by the top of the income distribution, which 
motivates the focus on top income shares.4 
Table 1: Mechanical contribution to the Gini coefficient of the change in the top one percent income 
share 
Country Period Change in top income share Contribution to the Gini  Actual change in the Gini 
Denmark 1985–2015 3.4 2.9 7.6 
Finland 1981–2014 3.2 2.6 4.3 
France 1984–2014 3.2 2.5 –0.4 
Norway 1986–2011 3.4 2.8 3.7 
Sweden 1980–2013 3.2 2.6 10.9 
USA 1980–2014 9.5 6.6 7.7 
 
Note: The contribution to the Gini coefficient (G) of the change in the top one percent income share is 
calculated using the approximation G = S +(1-S)G99, where S is the top income share and G99 is the 
Gini coefficient excluding the top one percent. G99 is computed by inverting the formula in the 
base year. 
Source: See Figure 4. 
 
                                                                 
4 The extent to which the Gini coefficients for France and the USA are affected by top coding issues is uncertain. 
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In Sweden and Denmark, the Gini coefficients increased to the same extent (more in 
the case of Sweden) as in the USA, while the contributions from increasing top income 
shares are around two fifths of that in the USA. As a result, the increases in top 
income shares explain a much smaller portion of the overall increases in inequality in 
Sweden and Denmark.  
In Norway and Finland, the increases in the Gini coefficients since the mid-1980s 
have been smaller than in Sweden and Denmark, while the increases in the top 
income shares are relatively similar. Thus, the latter mechanically explain a larger 
portion of the increases in overall inequality for Norway and Finland.  
Another way to illustrate that there is more going on in the income distributions 
than just changes in the top is to look at the so-called growth incidence curve. This 
curve shows the income growth in different parts of the income distribution over a 
given time period. The growth incidence curve for Denmark for 1985–2015 is shown in 
Figure 5. The income developments of the top income earners stand out compared to 
the rest of the income distribution. The average real income grew considerably faster 
at the very top of the income distribution (almost five percent per year) than for, e.g., 
the 50th income percentile (around two percent per year). The faster income growth 
at the top implies that it has contributed to the increase in the Gini coefficient. 
Figure 5: Growth incidence curve for Denmark, 1985–2015 
 
Note: The growth incidence curve for Denmark shows the average yearly growth in real equivalised 
disposable income across income percentiles. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Statistics Denmark’s register data. 
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The diagram also shows that changes in the income distribution below the top one 
percent also contributed to the increase in the Gini coefficient as the curve is 
increasing monotonically. This implies that the higher income percentiles had a higher 
average growth rate in real income.  
Explaining the changes in top income shares 
I now turn to some of the potential drivers of top income shares. Of these, three stand 
out in the literature: effects of geopolitical crises (most notably the two world wars), 
taxation and the role of capital and labour shares. 
Clear identification of the effect of any one driver of top incomes shares is 
difficult. This is because we are restricted to cross-country analyses. As a result we 
only have a very limited number of observations that over time are hit by a myriad of 
shocks. It is therefore difficult to isolate the effect of each individual one with the 
exception of the most salient shocks (Atkinson et al. 2011).  
Some of the most salient shocks are major financial or geopolitical crises. One 
example is the effect of wars, which has been considered an important cause of the 
decrease in inequality in the past (see e.g. Piketty 2003). Wars may affect inequality by 
changing the concentration of capital, either directly, because of physical damage 
from war actions, or (more often) indirectly through high inflation or bankruptcies due 
to dramatic changes in demand and/or the availability of foreign imports.  
However, the effect of wars is not universal, since it is likely to depend on the 
institutions in the different countries. An example is the evolution of top income 
shares in Denmark and Sweden around World Wars I and II. Both countries were 
largely unaffected by direct war actions, although Denmark was occupied during 
World War II, but in terms of income inequality the experiences are very difference. 
During World War II, the top income shares in both countries decreased as in most 
other Western countries. In contrast, the top income shares of Denmark and Sweden 
spiked to record levels during World War I (Atkinson and Søgaard 2016).5  
                                                                 
5 See also Piketty and Zucman (2014) for a more comprehensive analysis of the development in capital stock over the 20th 
century. 
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The role of taxation 
From the beginning of the top income literature, the role of taxation has also been 
considered a driver of the changes in inequality observed over the past century.6  
It is easy to see why taxation appears to be a driver of top income shares by 
comparing Figures 1 and 6. The top marginal tax rates for the Scandinavian countries 
increased dramatically from the beginning of the 20th century and first reached a 
peak for Denmark and Sweden in the 1980s. For Norway and Finland a peak was 
reached a few decades earlier (disregarding the spike in marginal tax rates in Finland 
following the World War II). After these peaks, top marginal tax rates were gradually 
lowered, thus creating a hump-shaped pattern that mirrors the shape of the top 
income shares over the past century. 
Figure 6 may even underestimate the reduction in top marginal tax rates in the 
Scandinavian countries after the 1980s since all four countries implemented a dual tax 
system between 1987 and 1993. In a dual tax system, capital income is typically taxed 
at a lower and often flat rate, thus potentially creating a gap in the marginal tax rates 
between labour and capital income (Pirttilä and Selin 2011). As top income earners 
often earn a significant portion of their income from capital, their effective marginal 
tax is likely to have decreased more than shown in Figure 6. 
The relationship between top marginal tax rates and top income shares is formally 
analysed by Rubolino and Waldenström (2017). They regress the (log) top income 
share on (log) one minus the top marginal tax rate for different sub-samples of 
countries and time periods. According to the study there are significant differences in 
top income elasticities over time and across countries. The baseline elasticity 
estimates range from 0.1 to 0.3.  
One interpretation of these elasticities is that the changes in top income shares 
are the result of labour supply responses to changes in marginal tax rates. However, 
there are certain caveats to this interpretation.  
 
                                                                 
6 See e.g. Piketty (2003) regarding the French experience, Piketty and Saez (2003) regarding the USA experience and Saez 
and Veall (2005) regarding the Canadian experience. Likewise most of the individual country studies for the Scandinavian 
countries examine the role of taxation in driving the development of the top income shares over the 20th century. 
 
 
Nordic Economic Policy Review 81 
 
Figure 6: Marginal tax rates on labour income for the top one percent 
 
Note: The data break for Denmark refers to the removal of the deductibility of paid personal taxes in 1967. Prior 
to this year taxes paid in one year were deducted from the tax base of the following year, which created 
an effective tax rate that was lower than the statutory one. The actual difference depended on each tax 
payer’s income path, but under the assumption of a constant income, the effective tax rate is given by 
t/(1+t), where t is the statutory tax rate. 
Source: Data series for Finland, Norway and Sweden are from Rubolino and Waldenström (2017). The series 
for Denmark is from Atkinson and Søgaard (2016) extended to 2015. 
 
Most importantly, marginal tax rates not only increased for the top one percent of 
income earners, but also for the rest of the population over the last century. Labour 
supply effects should, therefore, not be restricted to the top income earners. However 
considering, e.g., the 90th–95th percentile group, we see that their income share 
remained almost flat over the past century, even though marginal tax rates also 
increased substantially for this group. 
Using the above insight, Atkinson and Søgaard (2016) argue that, if the changes in 
top income shares (in Denmark) are interpreted as being driven by labour supply 
responses, one must either assume that labour supply elasticities are increasing 
rapidly from the 90th–95th percentile group to the top one percent, or that there are 
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very high overall elasticities. This makes it unlikely that labour supply responses are 
the (entire) explanation of the changes in top income shares.7  
Another taxation-based explanation, which has not received much attention in 
the Scandinavian country studies, goes back to the study of top income shares in 
France by Piketty (2003). He argues that the historical effect of taxes primarily 
worked through their effect on the ability of high-income families to accumulate 
wealth. In this argument, the average tax rate is more important than the marginal 
tax rate, as the average rate determines the level of after-tax income available for 
consumption or saving.  
It is also more likely that there are larger differences in average tax rates across 
income groups than in marginal tax rates, as the average tax rate for, e.g., the 90th–
95th percentile group is kept down by the lower tax rates in a progressive income tax 
system. For the top income groups, on the other hand, a larger share of their income 
is taxed at the high marginal tax rate, which pulls up the average tax rate. 
The role of capital income 
Capital income can both be considered an independent driver of inequality and an 
intermediate factor that transmits fundamental changes to top income shares or 
inequality measured more broadly. 
As mentioned above, the erosion of capital following World Wars I and II likely 
contributed to the historical decline in top income shares. In support of this point, 
Piketty (2003) and Piketty and Saez (2003) show that top incomes in France and the 
USA at the beginning of the century primarily consisted of capital income, and that 
the decline in this income category explains the decline in top income shares in the 
middle of the last century. 
In the recent decades, the role of capital income appears less clear. In the USA, 
wage income appears to be an important driver of the large increases in the top 
income share, which has motivated the conclusion that the “working rich have 
replaced the rentiers at the top of the income distribution” (Piketty and Saez 2003). 
However, Piketty et al. (2018) find that capital income plays an increasingly important 
role for income inequality.                                                                  
7 Rubolino and Waldenström (2017) also reach this conclusion. 
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In the case of Denmark, the largest income category is wages, and this category 
has more or less constantly made up 60 percent of total top incomes since 1980, as 
shown in Figure 7. The same was the case for Finland in the late 1980s, but since then 
the share of capital income (dividends + interest income) has grown considerably, so 
that the wage share in Finland in 2015 had dropped to around 35 percent. In Finland, 
capital income has therefore been the main driver of the increasing top income share.  
Sweden started the 1990s with wages constituting 80 percent of total top income 
compared to 70 percent in the 2010s. In Sweden capital income has therefore been a 
driver of the increasing top income share, but not to the same extent as in Finland. 
A comparable decomposition of the top income share for Norway is currently not 
available, but Aaberge et al. (forthcoming) provide some information. They show that 
the probability that top wage earners also are among the top half of capital income 
earners has increased since 1995, while the probability that they are among the top 
one percent of capital income earners has decreased. This evidence thus points to a 
minor decrease in the importance of capital income in the top income share in 
Norway. However, the conclusion is sensitive to the development of the aggregated 
share of capital income. If this has increased, capital income may still have contributed 
to the increase in the top income share in Norway over the last two or three decades.  
Figure 7: Composition of top one percent income share in Scandinavian countries 
 
Note: Income definitions vary slightly across countries. Residual income includes business income and 
(taxable) transfers for Denmark and Finland. For Sweden residual income only includes business 
income and transfers are instead included in wage income. For Finland and Sweden, interest 
income is net (interest income received minus interest expenditure paid). For Denmark, interest 
income is gross, while paid interest is included in the residual. Net interest income for Denmark has 
been between -0.25 and 0 percentage points over the period. 
Source: The data for Finland are from Riihelä et al. (2015). For Denmark, the data are constructed from 
Statistics Denmark’s register data by the author. For Sweden, the data are provided by Roine and 
Waldenström (2008, 2010). 
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At a more general level, the correlation between top income shares and capital income has 
been studied by Bengtsson and Waldenström (forthcoming). In their baseline setting, they 
regress the (log) top income share on the (log) capital share over various time periods and 
country groups. Overall, they find a positive link between capital shares and the top 
income share, but with heterogeneity across time and countries. Consistent with 
Bengtsson and Waldenström we see this result for the period 1980–2015 in Scandinavia by 
comparing the capital share in the total economy to the top income series in Figure 8. For 
Sweden, the capital share has been falling since the late 1990s despite a rising top income 
share, but for Denmark, Finland and Norway, the correlation is positive. For Denmark both 
the capital share and the top income share increased gradually over the period, while for 
Finland and Norway we first see a simultaneous increase in the capital share and the top 
income share around 2000 and then a subsequent drop. 
Figure 8: Capital shares and top one percent income shares in Scandinavian countries, 1980–2015 
 
Note: The graph to the left shows the net capital share in the total economy defined as capital income 
after consumption of fixed capital (K1MS1) relative to net national income (B5_NS1). Mixed income 
(B3) has been split between capital and labour income with 1/3 to capital and 2/3 to labour. For the 
years when mixed income is not reported in the National Accounts, the share of mixed income out 
of operating surplus and mixed income is kept constant from the nearest year. 
Source: National Accounts (OECD Database). 
 
Building on the analysis of Bengtsson and Waldenström (2017) I examine how changes 
in the composition of capital income are likely to affect the top income share. I already 
hinted at this effect by splitting the capital income for the top one percent income 
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earners in Denmark into interest income and dividends in Figure 7. This revealed a 
marked shift away from interest income and towards dividends.  
To more closely examine the role of different types of capital income I shift focus 
from the entire economy to the household sector, which creates a better match 
between the national accounts data and the inequality data used.8 
Capital income in a given sector comes from two sources: capital employed in that 
sector (net of depreciation) and income received from capital owned by the sector, 
but employed in other domestic sectors or abroad, minus capital income paid to other 
sectors. Capital in the household sector mainly consists of housing capital and – to a 
smaller degree – the capital employed by self-employed individuals. I therefore focus 
on the household capital income generated from capital employed in other sectors, 
which typically comes in the form of interest payments and dividends. 
Figure 9 shows the share of positive and negative capital income in the household 
sector for the Scandinavian countries over recent decades. The top of the dark (blue) 
area shows the amount of negative capital income (primarily interest paid by 
households) and the top of the light (blue) area the amount of positive capital income. 
The difference between the two surfaces (the visible light blue area) is therefore the 
net capital income of the household sector. For Denmark, Sweden and Norway net 
capital income as a share of total household income has increased by four to five 
percentage points over the available data period and in Finland the increase is just 
below one percentage point. 
In general the changes are not the result of an increase in positive capital income. 
Disregarding the year-to-year volatility, the share of positive capital income has fallen 
in Denmark, Finland and Norway. Instead, the increase in net capital income is 
primarily due to a fall in negative capital income driven by the reduction in the interest 
rates to historically low levels over the recent decades. 
Looking at the composition of positive capital income in Figure 10, we see a 
marked shift away from interest income – which again might be driven by the 
reduction in the interest rate level – and towards dividends. The diagrams show the 
stacked shares of dividends and positive interest income relative to total positive 
capital income. The missing contributions (up to 100 percent) are mainly made up of                                                                  
8 Ideally, one should adjust the inequality data to the income definitions that are consistent with national accounts as in 
Piketty et al. (2018). One advantage of their method is that retained earnings in companies are attributed to the owners of 
the companies. The effect of company earnings on top income shares in Norway is analysed by Alstadsæter et al. (2016). 
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the national account category “property income attributed to insurance policy 
holders”, which represents the capital income of pension and insurance companies 
that (eventually) is paid out to households. The trends observed in the figures do not 
change if the dividend and interest contents of this category are imputed and added 
to the household data. 
Figure 9: Capital income in the household sector 
 
Note: The graphs show positive (SD4R) and negative (SD4P) property income relative to household 
income defined as the sum of gross operating surplus and gross mixed income (SB2G_B3G), 
compensation to employees (D1) and net property income for the household sector. 
Source: National Accounts (OECD Database) and Statistics Sweden. 
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Figure 10: Composition of positive capital income in the household sector 
 
Note: The graphs show the share of positive capital income (NFD4R) coming from dividends (distributed 
income of corporations, NFD42R) and interest income (NFD41R). The missing contributions (up to 
100 percent) are mainly made up of the national accounts category “property income attributed to 
insurance policy holders”, which represents the capital income in pension and insurance companies 
paid out to households. The trends observed in the figures do not change if the dividend and 
interest contents of this category are imputed and added to the household data. 
Source: National Accounts (OECD Database) and Statistics Sweden. 
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How should we expect this shift from interest income to dividends to affect overall 
inequality? One way to examine this is to consider how interest income and 
dividends are distributed across the income distribution. I show this for Denmark in 
Figure 11, which reveals a striking difference between the distribution of interest 
income and dividends. While ten percent of all interest income goes to the top one 
percent of the population (only slightly more than their overall income share), the 
same is true for 2/3 of all dividends. A shift from interest income to dividends would, 
therefore, mechanically increase inequality even if the overall level of capital income 
was unchanged.  
Figure 11: Cumulative share of interest income and dividends in Denmark, average 2010–2015 
 
Note: Over the period 2010–2015 positive interest income, dividends, and negative interest income 
amount to 1.1, 2.3 and 6.7 percent of total income, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Statistics Denmark’s register data. 
 
Another piece of evidence, which points to the importance of dividends for the top 
income shares, is the correlation between top income shares and the share of dividends 
in the total income of the household sector shown in Figure 12. A proper time series 
analysis of these correlations is outside the scope of this paper, but a simple correlation 
calculated on the de-trended time series gives a coefficient of 0.8 for Finland and 0.9 for 
Norway. However, the correlations for Denmark and Sweden are considerably lower at 
0.25 and 0.10, respectively. For Sweden, the low de-trended correlation is driven by the 
beginning of the period. Starting in 1995, the de-trended correlation for Sweden is 0.82.  
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Figure 12: Correlation between dividends and the top one percent income share 
 
Note: The graphs show the top one percent income share excluding capital gains as defined in the 
individual country studies (as in Figure 1) and the share of dividends in household net income as 
defined in Figures 9 and 10. The spike in the dividends in Norway in 2005 can be attributed to a 
reaction to the 2006 tax reform that raised taxes on dividends and capital gains. 
Source: National Accounts (OECD Database) and WID data with additional sources (see Figure 1) 
 
My results are only simple correlations. They do not necessarily imply that dividends 
cause the changes in top income shares. Instead, it might be that changes in dividends 
correlate with other structural or business cycle related effects on top income shares. 
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Indeed, we saw in Figure 7 that wages also contributed to the increase in the top 
income shares in Denmark and Sweden. 
We also need to keep in mind the complexity of the changes in capital income 
that have occurred over the last 30 years. As mentioned, the reduction in interest rate 
levels has also reduced interest expenditure. This has an effect on the income 
distribution as well. Figure 11 showed that interest expenditure is slightly more equally 
distributed than total income. A reduction in overall interest expenditure would 
therefore mechanically reduce overall income inequality slightly.  
Conclusions  
This paper has highlighted a number of reasons for the apparently narrow focus on top 
income shares. A key reason is the ability to create long-run income inequality time 
series. This does not, however, mean that top income shares are irrelevant when we are 
interested in the more recent developments in income equality. Even today, changes in 
income shares appear to be particularly strong at the top of the income distribution and 
trends in the top income shares are important for the trend in overall inequality.  
Looking at the development in income shares instead of just broad measures of 
income inequality is important for at least two reasons. First, some overall inequality 
measures, such as the Gini coefficient, are notoriously difficult to decompose, and 
income shares are, therefore, useful when assessing which part of the income 
distribution is driving a change in the overall inequality. 
Second, changes in overall inequality might be more worrisome if they are driven 
by income changes in some part of the income distribution instead of others. A given 
increase in the Gini coefficient might be more problematic if it is caused by lower 
incomes in the bottom of the income distribution than by relative changes in incomes 
between groups in the middle of the distribution. Furthermore, some developments, 
such as so called “superstar effects” from globalization and technological change, or 
(as shown in this paper) the development of dividend income, may have large effects 
on a small fraction of top earners. To be able to asses such effects, it is important to 
track not just overall inequality but also what happens to incomes of small but 
potentially very important top groups.  
Taken together, changes in income shares, and especially top income shares, are 
likely to contain important information when designing appropriate policy responses. 
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At the same time, it might not be optimal to simply use the existing series on top 
income shares to analyse recent changes in inequality – particularly in Scandinavia. 
There are a number of issues with respect to the income definition and the population 
included in the calculation of the top income shares. Existing top income series 
typically measure inequality among the legal tax units: either the adult population 
(with individual taxation) or families (with joint taxation). The income definition is 
likewise based on the legal definition of taxable income. However, using modern 
register data we are able to compute income shares using more well-defined 
measures of income. 
Turning to the drivers of inequality, I have in this paper shed light on how changes 
in the composition of capital income are likely to affect income inequality. In the 
household sector there has been a marked shift from interest income to dividends, 
which might be driven by the reduction of the interest rate level over the past 
decades. Mechanically we should expect this shift to increase top income shares as 
ownership of stocks and hence dividend payments are much more concentrated in the 
top of the income distribution than interest income. Indeed, I find that the top one 
percent of the population in Denmark receives 2/3 of all dividend payments as 
opposed to ten percent of all interest income.  
Following this line of thought, I find strong correlations between changes in 
dividends as a share of total household income and changes in the top income share – 
especially in Finland and Norway (and in Sweden after 1995). If this correlation has a 
causal interpretation, then we need to better understand the observed increases in 
dividends in order to understand the increases in top income shares. We might also 
expect a reduction in inequality if and when interest rates return to higher levels. 
At the same time it should, however, be noted that clear identification of the 
effect of any one driver of inequality is difficult due to the fact that we are restricted to 
cross-country analyses. Each country is likely to be hit by a myriad of different shocks. 
It is therefore difficult to isolate the effect of each individual shock with the exception 
of the most salient ones.  
As a consequence, it is also difficult to provide clear policy recommendations to 
governments that wish to combat the relatively large increases in top incomes. 
Education is often highlighted as a means of reducing income inequality, but it seems 
unlikely that higher levels of education would be enough to reduce the differences in 
income growth between the top one percent and, e.g., the part of the population in 
the 90th–95th income percentiles. 
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Strengthening redistribution policies by increasing top marginal tax rates has a 
direct effect on the distribution of disposable income. Redistribution policies would 
therefore be a natural place to start given a political motive to reduce inequality. 
When designing redistribution policies targeting the top of the income distribution, it 
is also very important to take into account that top income earners earn a significant 
portion of their income from capital. This means that (marginal) tax rates on capital 
income are as important as the (marginal) tax rates on labour income. 
Policy makers should in particular be aware of this point, when pursuing a policy 
of lowering corporate tax rates, as the total tax on capital income is made up by both 
the corporate tax and the tax on dividends (and capital gains). Lowering the corporate 
tax rate without an offsetting increase in the dividend tax rate is therefore likely to 
implicitly reduce the progressivity of the tax system.9 
There are some evidence that point to an effect of progressive taxes on also the 
distribution of market income. However the extent to which increasing top marginal 
tax rates actually increases earnings of individuals further down the income 
distribution is still open for discussion. Standard economics explanations, such as 
labour supply effects, would say that higher top marginal tax rates only reduce 
inequality of market income by lowering the income of top income earners without 
affecting the income of lower income individuals. However such a link can exist in a 
situation, where top income earners has bargaining power over their own income (see 
Piketty et al. 2014). 
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Comment on J. Søgaard: Top Incomes in Scandinavia – Recent 
Developments and the Role of Capital Income 
David Domeij1 
 
 
The paper provides a very interesting overview of the top income literature, discussing 
why the literature has focused on top-income shares and the main factors explaining 
their evolution. Søgaard also presents new evidence on the role of capital income in 
explaining the rise in top-income shares in the Scandinavian countries since the late 
1980s. In particular, Søgaard documents a marked shift from interest income to 
dividend income. Since dividend income is more unequally distributed, this shift 
mechanically increases inequality. 
I will briefly discuss three issues raised in the paper. First, does the choice of income 
measure matter? Second, does income mobility matter? Third, what is the role of taxes? 
Choice of income measure 
The top-income literature typically focuses on taxable income (labor and capital 
income and taxable transfers), where the accounting unit is determined by the tax 
law. As Søgaard points out, for many questions this is not the measure of interest. 
Instead, we are usually interested in a measure of market outcomes (pre-tax labor 
income or pre-tax labor and capital income) or a measure of consumption 
opportunities (equivalized disposable income). If these measures move in tandem, 
this is of course not an issue. However, in a recent working paper, Domeij and Roine 
(2017) show that the choice of income measure matter for the interpretation of the 
evolution of top-income shares.  
Specifically, using Swedish register data for the period 1990–2012, Domeij and 
Roine classify individuals as belonging to the top-one percentile in terms of either (i) 
labor income, (ii) labor and capital income or (iii) equivalized disposable income. 
They then show that top-one-percentile individuals in terms of labor income have 
almost no capital income and that their labor (and capital) income share increased                                                                  
1 Department of economics, Stockholm School of Economics. 
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by about one percentage point over this period. For top-one-percentile individuals 
in terms of labor and capital income together, on the other hand, the labor and 
capital income share increased by more (two percentage points) and this increase is 
primarily driven by an increase in capital income. For both these classification of 
top-one-percentile individuals, the tax and transfer system mitigates the increase; 
their disposable income share is about half that of their labor and capital income 
share throughout the period. Finally, for top-one-percentile individuals in terms of 
equivalized disposable income, the labor and capital income share increased by 
even more (two and a half percentage points) and this increase is entirely driven by 
capital income. Furthermore, for this group the tax-transfer system had no 
mitigating effect. In fact, their disposable income share is essentially the same as 
their labor and capital income share.  
Income mobility 
The top-income literature typically focuses on an accounting period of one year. 
Inequality of single-year income may be of special interest, in particular if future 
income is highly uncertain and it is costly to transfer income across periods. However, 
if income mobility is high the documented increases in top-income shares may be less 
cause for concern. The Scandinavian countries are known for their relative high social 
mobility. Domeij and Roine (2017) show that indeed there is income mobility at the 
very top but that again the choice of income measure matters. In particular, they 
show that out of all top-one-percentile individuals in terms of single-year labor 
income during 1990–2012, 35 percent are top-one-percentile individuals only one 
year. Moreover, about three percent of all individuals are top-one-percentile 
individuals at least once. Considering labor and capital income or equivalized 
disposable income, there is even more turnover; 55 and 62 percent of top-one-
percentile individuals, respectively, are in the top-one percentile only once, and 4 and 
6 percent of individuals, respectively, are top-one-percentile individuals at least once.  
If top-one-percentile individuals remain in the top of the distribution also when 
they are not in the top percentile, then high turnover does not change the picture 
from single-year observations much. Domeij and Roine show, however, that while 
top-one-percentile individuals spend most years in the top-end of the distribution, 
they also have many single-year observations at the bottom end. This is in 
particularly true when considering disposable income. For this income measure, 
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top-one-percentile individuals spent approximately one third of their time in top-
five percentiles, 40 percent of the time in the three middle quintiles and close to ten 
percent of their time in the bottom quintile. Moreover, Domeij and Roine also show 
that persistence at the top has decreased during the period examined.  
The two above points suggest that the focus on pre-tax, post-transfer non-
equivalized income in the top-income literature gives an incomplete picture of 
changes in inequality, even at the top. 
The role of taxation 
As Søgaard notes, the marginal tax rate on labor income is usually the same in the 
entire top decile and therefore changes in marginal tax rates on labor income is 
probably not a key factor in explaining changes in top income shares. Changes in the 
effective marginal tax rate on labor and capital taxes jointly is, on the other hand, 
probably a more important factor. All four Scandinavian countries implemented dual 
tax systems around the time top-income shares started increasing, with progressive 
labor income taxation and a flat tax on capital income. This creates strong incentives 
to reclassify labor income as capital income in the form of dividends. The extent to 
which reclassification is possible varies across countries, but it usually requires running 
a small business. This involves fixed costs, which makes it a more attractive option at 
the top of the distribution. The quantitative importance of this channel remains an 
open question but work by Pirttilä and Selin (2011) and Alstadsæter and Jacob (2016) 
suggests a fair amount of income shifting. Moreover, the increase in dividend income 
since the mid-1990s documented by Søgaard is striking.  
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Comment on J. Søgaard: Top Incomes in Scandinavia – Recent 
Developments and the Role of Capital Income 
Niels Ploug1 
 
 
Jacob Søgaard has written yet another excellent analysis on income inequality, this 
time with a focus on the developments in the Scandinavian countries. The paper gives 
very good insight into what is going on in the odd cases that the Scandinavian 
countries often are when it comes to income distribution as well as social and 
economic mobility. 
Søgaard shows that the increasing income differentials seen at the global level are 
also seen in “the egalitarian Scandinavian countries”, as Thomas Piketty repeatedly 
refers to in his international bestseller (Piketty 2014), but to a lesser degree. 
The critical comments to Søgaard’s paper are therefore very few. They might not 
even be seen as critical taking into consideration that there are always limits to what 
can be treated in the limited space of a paper. I have two comments: a specific one 
and a more general one. 
The specific comment relates to the discussion on the measurement of inequality 
using either the Gini-coefficient or “the top one percent”. In the discussion on the Gini 
many things should be taken into account. And many of those are mentioned by 
Søgaard. But it is worth underlining that also that the Gini is very sensitive to 
demographic developments. Therefore, an increased Gini might not imply that 
increased income inequality is a social problem.  
For example, an increase in the share of the population on old-age pensions will 
increase inequality measured by the Gini. But such an increase is not necessarily a 
social problem. Most old-age pensioners in the Scandinavian countries have quite 
good incomes even though they are lower than the ones they had when they were 
working. This is pointed out by Aaberge et al. (2018), which is another contribution to 
this volume. 
A related issue concerns young people who take an education. If their share in the 
population increases – as it has done at least in Denmark – the Gini will also increase.                                                                  
1 Statistics Denmark. 
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This is because the incomes of a student are usually smaller than the incomes from 
paid work or social benefits. But having a low income as a student is not a poverty 
problem. It is part of an “investment” plan which will ultimately lead to higher lifetime 
income. So when we are looking at Ginis for the Scandinavian countries, one should 
be aware that substantial parts of recent increases can be explained by demographic 
developments that are not social problems, as explained by Pareliussen and Robling 
(2018) in their n 
The more general comment – which might be both unfair and difficult to deal with 
– is the relation between the title “Top incomes in Scandinavia” and some of what is 
actually going on in the paper. It is to some degree more a comparison between, on 
the one hand, the Scandinavian countries and, on the other hand, the US and France. 
Especially the comparison with France does not contribute that much to the 
understanding of what is going on, as the French case seems to be somewhat odd 
compared to the other countries included in the analysis. 
Also, after having read the paper, one remains quite curious about what is actually 
going on in Scandinavia. Is it still fair to call them “the egalitarian Scandinavian 
countries”, as Pikkety does, or are these countries truly moving in a non-egalitarian 
direction? And are the driving forces the same as elsewhere? These are the kinds of 
questions one is left with after reading Søgaard’s paper. Hopefully he will take on 
answering them in future analysis. 
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Gendered Trends in Income 
Inequality1 
Anne Boschini2 and Kristin Gunnarsson3 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the gender dimension of income inequality in the Nordic 
countries. While income inequality is commonly studied at the household level, we 
examine individual-level inequality in order to measure differences between genders 
and within genders. We estimate Gini coefficients for men’s and women’s disposable 
and labour incomes separately, and study the trends in gender gaps at different 
percentile levels. Our results emphasize that important gender differences in 
inequality are not captured by the commonly used household inequality measures, 
but need to be assessed employing individual-level inequality measures.  
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coefficients. 
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Introduction 
The Nordic countries are internationally known for their high levels of gender equality. 
They stand out consistently in rankings such as the World Economic Forum’s annual 
Global Gender Gap Report.4 They also share a common history of being progressive in 
removing the obstacles that hold women back. Finland was the first country to grant 
women the right to vote in 1906, followed by Norway in 1913, Denmark and Iceland in 
1915, and Sweden in 1919. Female labour force participation has been high in all 
Nordic countries for decades and the education gap in tertiary education has also 
been reversed to women’s advantage for quite some time by now. How do these 
achievements in gender equality translate into overall income equality in these 
countries? More precisely, what is the impact of gender inequality on overall income 
inequality? Thinking about these questions turns out to have many facets.  
A first, overarching issue, is the relation between gender differences and the unit of 
analysis in income inequality studies. For many issues, the natural focus is on the 
household and on (yearly) disposable income per person in a household. This approach 
assumes that household members divide their total incomes equally (after taxes and 
transfers) regardless of who earns them. Doing so has several appealing features: for 
example, the full population, including children and pensioners, is included, and the 
adjusted household income comes close(st) to measuring money available for 
consumption and therefore to individual utility. However, this approach has drawbacks 
when analysing the gender dimension of inequality. It may well be that many 
households do share incomes in the way assumed when calculating disposable income, 
but it is far from obvious. A large literature has studied how outcomes of within-
household bargaining depend on who earned the income in the first place and found 
that such a connection is typically present.5 Also, there are long-run consequences of 
differences in market earnings, for example for future pensions. This means that policies 
that affect life-cycle decisions may have inequality effects that only appear much later.6                                                                  
4 In the most recent report from 2016 the top four countries are Iceland, Finland, Norway and Sweden, with only Denmark 
lagging behind in place 19. 
5 Several alternatives to the unitary model of the family (typically associated with Gary Becker (1965, 1981) have been 
proposed. See Agrawal (1997) for an early overview. Chiappori and Meghir (2015) contain a more recent survey over this 
literature. 
6 Ongoing work by Chiappori, Costa-Dias and Meghir (2016) develops a framework to address lifetime consequences of 
educational choices and of labour market and marriage market outcomes. 
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An alternative is to start the analysis at the other extreme: to treat each individual 
as a separate unit, ignoring whatever connections in terms of resources and 
responsibilities that individuals may have. This is relatively close to how individuals 
typically are studied when looking at labour market outcomes and how individuals in 
the Nordic countries today are treated in terms of taxation.7 With this approach, it 
also becomes more meaningful to study gender differences since men and women are 
now observed as individuals rather than as members of a household. This, in turn, can 
be done in terms of total incomes from all sources or based on labour earnings. 
Alternatively, one can study actual incomes or full-time equivalents. One can also 
analyse the outcomes before or after taxes and transfers. 
Of course, one can also think about alternatives in-between such as keeping 
individual incomes from work separate but dividing some incomes received by the 
household equally. However, the main reason for why it is not obvious how to move 
from the distribution across individuals to the distribution across households is that 
the latter depends on which individuals form households. In principle, an increase in 
inequality between individuals can either be magnified, if high-income individuals 
increasingly form couples (so called assortative mating), or countered if such a 
tendency becomes less pronounced. 
As is evident from the above, there are many ways in which the gender dimension 
of inequality can be studied. Recent work of special relevance for our paper include, 
for instance, Gottschalk and Danzinger (2005), who compare hourly individual wage 
rates, annual individual earnings, annual family earnings and annual family-adjusted 
total incomes in U.S. data, making important observations about the need to look at 
outcomes at different levels (households and individuals, by income source as well as 
before or after taxes and transfers). One finding is that analysing inequality at the 
household level moderates growing earnings inequality in the labour market.  
Salverda and Haas (2014) show that labour earnings are crucial in determining 
income inequality in a European setting. Moreover, they study the relative importance 
of hours worked, hourly wage rates and part-time work in exacerbating or mitigating 
income inequality. Most recently, OECD (2015) provides an in-depth analysis of how 
men's and women's hours worked, employment and earnings impact aggregate                                                                  
7 The individual treatment of citizens with respect to taxation has varied between countries and over time. The Nordic 
countries historically taxed married couples as one unit and this is still the case in many other countries (e.g. in France and 
the U.S.). 
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inequality both at the individual and the household level for a number of OECD 
countries. Overall, women's increasing presence in the labour market (in terms of 
labour force participation and hours worked) tends to decrease individual earnings 
inequality, while increased wage dispersion tends to augment it. The effects of 
changing labour market characteristics for men and women have varying effects on 
household income depending on the specific country analysed. A policy conclusion in 
the OECD study is that one way of decreasing household income inequality is to 
enhance the share of households with women in paid work. 
Here, we limit ourselves to the gender dimension of a few issues regarding income 
inequality. We base our choice on what we see as issues relating to current debates 
about rising inequality in the Nordic countries. After mapping existing gender 
differences in family policies and in the labour market in the Nordics, we describe our 
data and the inequality measures used. We proceed to analyse the implications for 
overall inequality (in Gini coefficient terms), when transiting from measuring 
inequality at the household level to measuring it at the individual level. It is shown that 
individual disposable income inequality is considerably higher than household level 
inequality, regardless of inequality being calculated in terms of equivalent or non-
equivalent disposable income.  
Remaining in the realm of individual inequality, we then study the within-gender 
trends in inequality both in terms of disposable income and labour income to 
understand how women’s and men’s income distributions have changed over time. 
Have the income differences across men and women, respectively, developed in 
similar ways, or have they grown more among women than among men (or vice 
versa)? We then analyse the differences between men and women’s labour income 
and disposable income distributions. Is it the case that a woman at the median of the 
female distribution has a similar income level as a man at the median of the male 
distribution? Is the ratio between men´s and women’s incomes different in different 
parts of the distribution? Gender gaps in incomes at four different percentile levels are 
reported. They suggest that the levels and trends in between-genders differences in 
inequality depend on the income measure used. We also turn to an aspect of 
inequality that has received a lot of attention in recent years, but where the gender 
aspect has largely been neglected, that of the developments in the top of the 
distribution.  
Lastly, we discuss the insights from decomposing inequality within gender and 
between genders. Using a Theil decomposition, we show that the changes in the 
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shapes of men’s and women’s respective income distributions have affected overall 
inequality more than changes in men’s and women’s average incomes. This suggests 
that changes in incomes in the top and bottom of each gender's separate distribution 
have occurred, thus contributing to overall inequality in a way that would not be 
captured by simply looking at inequality measures at the household level. Therefore, 
it is important to consider not only household level inequality but also individual level 
inequality when assessing men's and women's economic standards. 
Gender gaps in the Nordic countries 
From an international perspective, the Nordic countries are not only positioned high in 
all rankings of gender equality, but are also considered very similar in terms of 
generous parental leave systems and high-quality childcare. These family policies, in 
turn, are often put forward as key reasons enabling women to participate in the labour 
market. This section reviews key measures of gender equality in Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden and show that, despite many similarities, important differences 
exist. Analysing these differences can guide our understanding of how gender 
differences might influence overall inequality.  
Labour force participation and education levels 
In an international (gender) context, the Nordics stand out because labour force 
participation has been almost as high for women as for men for decades. In Finland 
this was the case already during World War II as women filled jobs left vacant by men 
at war. In Denmark and Sweden, it was not until the 1960s that female labour force 
participation among women with children started to rise sharply. It happened 
somewhat later in Norway. At the beginning of the 1990s, the employment gender 
gap was around ten percentage points in Finland and Norway and below five 
percentage points in Denmark and Sweden. Today all four countries have 
employment gender gaps below five percentage points (OECD 2015).8                                                                  
8 The employment gender gap is defined as the difference in percentage points between male and female employment 
rates for persons aged 15-64. 
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Another important feature is that of education. Already in 1990 more women than 
men were university students in the Nordics (see e.g. Pekkarinen 2012) and the trend 
of women investing more in education has continued since then. Today 57 per cent in 
Denmark and Finland, 60 per cent in Norway, and 62 per cent in Sweden among first-
time tertiary graduates are women (OECD 2017). 
Wage gaps and glass ceilings  
Despite men's and women's almost equally high labour force participation and 
women’s, on average, higher education levels, the median gender wage gap among 
full-time employed has changed only marginally since 1991 in all four countries. It was 
7.8 per cent in Denmark (2012), 18.7 per cent in Finland (2012), 7.0 per cent in Norway 
(2013) and 15.1 per cent in Sweden (2012) according to OECD (2015).  
Furthermore, it has been shown that the gender wage gap is not constant over 
the wage distribution, but rather increases with higher wages. Albrecht et al. (2003) 
and Albrecht et al. (2015) find evidence of a glass ceiling in Sweden. There have been 
similar findings for Denmark and Finland (see e.g. Arulampalam et al. 2007 and Datta 
Gupta et al. 2006). According to Arulampalam et al. (2007), there is no evidence of the 
gender wage gap increasing towards the lower end of the wage distribution, which 
would point to the absence of so called sticky floors (i.e. limited possibilities to rise 
above the lowest wage levels). For Sweden, Boye et al. (2017) find that the gender 
wage gap has decreased significantly in less qualified occupations since the 1970s, 
while remaining virtually constant in more qualified occupations. 
The share of women employed as managers is still low in the Nordic countries. 
Less than 40 per cent of all employed as managers are women, ranging from 29 per 
cent in Denmark to 35 per cent in Sweden in 2013. The corresponding EU average is 33 
per cent, suggesting that this is a dimension of gender equality where the Nordic 
countries do not excel. 
Research, e.g. Johnsen and Løken (2016), has suggested that the generous family 
policies characterizing the Nordic countries might be favourable for enhancing female 
labour force participation, but may impede women from investing enough time in 
career development. In the following we review parental leave entitlements, cash for 
care, and child care services in the Nordics.  
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Parental leave and childcare 
The Nordic countries all have total fertility rates above the EU average, but parental 
leave systems and childcare provision vary across the four countries. According to 
Grönlund et al. (2017) each parent is entitled to the following parental leave with 
income-based benefits: 48 weeks in Denmark, 44 weeks in Finland, 49 weeks in 
Norway and 47 weeks in Sweden.9 Moreover, while fathers and mothers have the 
same rights to parental leave in Norway and Sweden, in Denmark and Finland the 
parental leave schemes are biased towards the mothers by reserving more parental 
leave days for mothers than fathers.  
In Denmark and Sweden parental leave can be extended by 14 and 13 weeks, 
respectively, (beyond the leave days with income-related compensation) by using 
leave days with low compensation levels. In Finland and Norway additional leave 
takes the form of cash-for-care schemes, which provide parents with a flat-rate 
compensation until the child is three years old in Finland and two years old in Norway. 
While in Norway the cash-for-care scheme has been less and less used over time, it is 
still popular among parents (mostly among mothers) in Finland. This is probably the 
main reason why Finland has the lowest enrolment rate in childcare among children 
below three years of age. 
While the right to maternity leave and job protection during parental leave are 
essential in enhancing women's labour force participation, long parental leave can 
theoretically have negative effects on female labour supply. Johnsen and Løken (2016) 
show, however, that there are no negative effects if mothers already are in the labour 
force, probably because the uptake of maternal leave is close to complete in the 
Nordic countries. Cash-for-care policies on the other hand may – because of their 
lower uptake - delay re-entry into the labour force.  
Summing up, although there are only minor differences in parental leave schemes 
among the Nordic countries when children are below the age of one, Finland's, and to 
a lesser extent Norway’s, generous cash-for-care scheme can have negative 
consequences for mothers’ re-entry into the labour force. 
                                                                 
9 This is under the assumption that fathers take out only the parental leave reserved for them. 
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Childcare 
Subsidized, publicly provided, high-quality childcare is available in all the Nordic 
countries. It has been considered an essential component in allowing mothers to 
return to paid work after parental leave. At the same time, its relative inflexibility in 
terms of opening hours has been suggested as contributing to women working less 
hours – both less overtime and a more part-time work – than men in the Nordics (see 
Plantega and Remery 2010). In the early 1990s, Finland and Norway only had 17.5 per 
cent and 21.6 per cent, respectively, of children aged 0–3 years enrolled in day care, 
while corresponding figures for Denmark and Sweden were 48.8 and 35.9 per cent, 
respectively. Two decades later, Norway has more than caught up with Denmark and 
Sweden in terms of children 0–3 years old enrolled in day care (54.7, 65.2 and 46.9 per 
cent, respectively), but Finland lags behind with only 27.9 per cent. This pattern 
continues to older pre-school children, where only 73.8 per cent of children in the age 
span 3–5 years are enrolled in childcare in Finland as opposed to around 95 per cent in 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden in 2014. 
The extent to which women work part-time in the Nordics mirrors childcare 
policies. In Denmark, Norway and Sweden, with a high share of enrolled children in 
childcare, women work more part-time than in Finland, but over time the trends are 
slightly converging. More specifically, in Finland the share of employed women 
working part-time increased from 15 per cent in 1995 to 19 per cent 2013. In Denmark, 
the share stayed constant over the time period at about 35 per cent of women, in 
Norway and Sweden the share decreased, from about 48 and 42 per cent, 
respectively, in 1995 to 41 and 38 per cent, respectively, in 2013 according to Nordic 
Co-operation (2015).  
Data and measures of income and inequality 
The LIS dataset 
Our main source of data is the Luxembourg Income Study Database (LIS). This 
database contains harmonized income micro data from many countries over a long 
time frame, which makes it attractive for cross-country comparisons. Data are 
provided both at household and individual levels and contain income variables such as 
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labour income, capital income, transfers and taxes. LIS also includes demographic 
variables and information on employment and consumption. We compare incomes 
from Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. Iceland has been excluded from our 
analysis due to data limitations for individual incomes.  
Data in LIS are provided by each country’s national statistical offices and have 
then been harmonized.10 In Finland, Norway11 and Sweden the data come from 
household surveys, whereas the Danish data are from their so called “Law Model”, 
which is a comprehensive individual-level database used by the Ministry of Finance. 
The sampling size differs among the countries and over the years. The size for 
Denmark is around 180,000 observations, whereas it is around 10,000 for Finland. The 
sampling size for Norway ranges between 8,000 and 200,000, and in Sweden the 
number is around 16,000.12 We restrict our time scope to starting in 1990 until the 
most recent year of observations.  
Data in LIS are provided in different waves produced in 1991/92, 1995, 2000, 2004, 
2007, 2010 and 2013. The Swedish data are only available until 2005 in LIS. Our 
analysis focuses on working-age individuals, 20–64 years old, in order to enable a 
cleaner comparison between individuals' labour market incomes and their disposable 
incomes, largely avoiding effects from pension reforms and cohort sizes. 
The variable coverage is not complete and makes the comparison difficult in the 
early waves. In particular, capital income is not available at the individual level before 
the 2007 wave. Since capital income in the Nordics contributes only marginally to 
individuals' incomes as long as they do not belong to the top one per cent of the 
income distribution, we consistently exclude capital income when using LIS data.  
It should be noted that LIS data are not primarily supplied for time series 
comparisons, but more for cross-section comparisons between countries. Changes in 
the data supplied by the countries may affect the results: e.g. for Norway the sample 
sizes increased markedly from 2004 to 2007. Moreover, Finland and to some extent 
Sweden report fairly small sample sizes leading to sensitivity in the results when 
studying only parts of the income distribution. When we perform comparisons on                                                                  
10 In Denmark, both the Danish National Centre for Social Research and Statistics Denmark were responsible for data in 
1991 and 1995. From 2000 both the Ministry of Finance and Statistics Denmark were responsible for data. 
11 From 2007 and onwards the data are from Household Income Statistics, which is a census-like register data source. 
12 From 2007, when data started to come from the Household Income Statistics, LIS received a 10% extraction of the total 
population, which considerably increased the sample size. 
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incomes around P20 in the lower end of the distribution, the variation in types and 
levels of incomes are large. Therefore, the results have to be interpreted with caution.  
Income measures 
We use disposable income and labour income when measuring inequality. Disposable 
income is usually defined as the sum of labour income, capital income and transfer 
income less taxes. As capital income data are not available for individuals before 2007 
in LIS, and as it is of minor economic significance for most of the population, we 
exclude capital income in our definition of disposable income so as to have a 
consistent data series over time.  
Labour income in LIS includes such incomes of both employed and self-employed. 
Labour income is income received by an individual before taxes and social security 
contributions and will hence not capture any redistribution effects of tax systems.  
Inequality measures 
We use two types of inequality measures: the Gini coefficient and percentile ratios 
between different parts of the distribution (see Björklund and Jäntti 2011 for a 
thorough description of the measures). Measuring inequality in incomes involves 
many difficulties. For example, one must decide how to treat observations of negative 
values, and also the typically large number of individuals recorded as having zero 
income. We follow the literature and include all individuals with positive disposable 
income and positive labour income, respectively, when calculating inequality 
measures. Employing equivalence scales to adjust for household circumstances is 
standard in the economic inequality literature, while in the labour economics 
literature it is not. There, instead, the focus is typically on wages (per hour or in full-
time equivalents) or individual income from work. We will use the latter, i.e. individual 
labour income. With respect to gender differences this means our measure 
incorporates differences coming both from differences in wages and hours worked.  
For the disposable income measures we follow the standard procedure (as in the 
LIS data) and calculate individual equivalent income as the total household income 
divided by the square root of the number of household members. But we also 
calculate an alternative at the individual level where, instead of dividing adjusted 
income equally in the household, we allocate it based on the individual contribution to 
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the household total. This gives a measure where the benefits of sharing costs within 
the household are taken into account, but the individual disposable income reflects 
differences in incomes within the household.13 Below, we report both individual-level 
inequality with equivalent income and unadjusted individual income. 
From household- to individual-level inequality 
Income inequality is typically measured at the household level using equivalent 
(disposable) income. As suggested in Lise and Seitz (2011) and Chiappori (2016), 
focusing on household level inequality leads to overlooking trends in inequality within 
households. Underlying the analysis of household inequality is the assumption that 
household resources are split equally between family members and hence between 
partners. However, research has shown that resource allocation within households is 
likely to be correlated with own earnings capacity (see Bennett 2013 for an overview 
of research on intra-household income distribution).  
To capture the difference in income inequality between genders, we therefore 
focus on individual income inequality. But, to illustrate the relative importance of the 
household size adjustment and the assumption that incomes are split equally within 
the household, we calculate the individual-level Gini using disposable incomes both in 
equivalent (i.e., household-size adjusted individual income, but keeping the within-
household distribution equal to the individual distribution) and without adjustments. 
The household-level measures use the standard procedure of splitting incomes 
equally within the household.14 The household Gini (in equivalent incomes) will, by 
definition, always be smaller than the individual Gini (in equivalent incomes) unless 
there is perfect assortative mating. However, it remains an á priori open question how 
                                                                 
13 This is not a standard approach and should be seen as a way of illustrating the relative impact of the two respective steps 
involved in moving from individual income to the household-based measure, namely (1) adjusting income for household 
size and (2) dividing all incomes equally within the household. What we label individual-level income (equivalence scale) 
only takes the household size into account, but does not divide incomes equally. Instead adjusted incomes are divided in 
proportion to how much each individual contributes to the household total. This is not the same as looking at the individual 
distribution since household sizes are different. 
14 We use the LIS approach here: equivalent income is calculated as the individual income divided by the square root of the 
number of household members. 
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much taking household size into account matters compared to the assumption of 
splitting incomes equally in the household. 
 
Figure 1: Gini coefficients in disposable income at the individual and household level by country and 
gender 
 
Source: Own calculations from LIS data. 
 
Figure 1 presents Gini coefficients of disposable income inequality (in both equivalent 
and non-equivalent terms) at the individual and at the household level for each of the 
Nordic countries. The diagram shows that the household-level Gini (in equivalent 
incomes) is smaller than the individual-level Gini (in equivalent incomes), indicating 
that there is not perfect assortative mating.15 Less assortative mating over time would 
result in a larger difference between the household Gini and the individual Gini. Since                                                                  
15 For an analysis of how to study trends in assortative mating, see Greenwood et al. (2014) and Hryshko et al. (2017). 
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1990, we see a trend consistent with less assortative mating in Finland and in Norway, 
but other changes could also account for this pattern. Demographic changes such as 
in the fraction of singles, as well as income variation over time among singles, 
influence the Gini levels regardless of whether they are measured at the individual of 
the household level. Measuring income inequality at the individual level leads to an 
increase of about 0.07–0.08 (that is 7–8 percentage points) in the Gini coefficient 
compared to the household Gini coefficient in 2013. 
Finally, Figure 1 also shows that the differences between the individual Gini 
coefficient in equivalent disposable income and the individual Gini coefficient in non-
equivalent disposable income are minor. This means that, in practice, when moving 
from inequality in household incomes to inequality in individual incomes it is the 
difference between household and individual, rather than the difference between 
equivalized and non-equivalized incomes, that matters the most. Therefore, we will 
only use inequality measures in non-equivalent incomes below. This also makes 
comparisons with previous research on gender differences easier as they typically are 
measured in non-equivalent income.  
According to Robling and Pareliussen (2018), the joint impact of demographic 
changes (including not only changes in population structure but also changes in 
household structure and in assortative mating) has led to an increase of 1–2 Gini 
percentage points in household disposable income inequality in the Nordics during 
the last decades. Even if individual income inequality measures do not incorporate all 
the above-mentioned demographic drivers of inequality, they avoid lumping together 
partnered men’s and women’s incomes, and enable gender-specific analyses.  
Within-gender inequality 
After having assessed how the Gini coefficient at the individual level differs from that 
at the household level, we now focus on how income inequality has developed over 
time in the Nordics for men and women, respectively. We study inequality in both 
disposable incomes and labour incomes. While disposable incomes are usually studied 
in inequality research, gender research tends to focus on differences in labour market 
and wage outcomes. 
The labour income distribution is the result not only of the distribution of wages, 
but also of the distribution of hours worked. Since women on average not only earn 
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lower wages than men, but also work fewer hours, the gender differences are more 
accentuated in the labour income distribution than in the wage distribution (when 
wages are measured per hour or as full-time equivalent wages). From an inequality 
perspective, it is sensible to focus on the labour income distribution rather than the 
wage distribution if the concern is the individuals’ economic standards. 
Figure 2 presents the trends in Gini coefficients in disposable and labour incomes 
between men and women separately. The Gini coefficient for labour income is 
consistently higher than the Gini coefficient for disposable income in all the Nordic 
countries and has slightly increased over the time period. Considering the within-
effect and comparing the development between the genders we see that in Denmark 
and Finland inequality between men has been larger than between women 
throughout the period, whereas in Norway and Sweden the data show no differences 
in the labour income Gini and only a slightly more unequal disposable income 
distribution between men since around year 2000. Denmark stands out in the sense 
that within-inequality has increased more for both women and men in recent years 
compared to the other countries, but starting from low levels.  
The recent increased divergence in levels of within-gender disposable income 
inequality is worth noting given the redistributive ambitions of the Nordic welfare 
states. Women’s within-inequality in disposable income is lower than men’s within-
inequality in all the Nordic countries after 2000. The mechanisms explaining these 
trends are beyond the scope of this paper, but warrants further research. As 
mentioned before, the results must be interpreted with caution, especially for Norway 
until 2000 but also for Finland and Sweden. As described, the small sample sizes risk 
affecting the results.  
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Figure 2: Gini coefficients for disposable income and labour income by country and by gender 
 
Source: Own calculations from LIS data. 
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Between-genders inequality 
After analysing within-gender inequality, we now turn to the differences in inequality 
between genders in the distributions of labour income and disposable income, 
respectively. To do so, we calculate women’s incomes in per cent of men’s incomes at 
four percentile levels in their respective distributions: P20, P50, P90 and P99. The 
levels are chosen to give information on the differences at the lower end of the 
distribution, the median and the upper part of the distribution. From the recent top-
income literature, we know that there are important differences in trends as well as 
income composition within the upper end of the distribution and we have therefore 
chosen to include the top P99 as well (see e.g. Roine and Waldenström 2015).  
Between-genders inequality in labour income 
Figure 3 presents the trends in women’s labour income in per cent of men’s labour 
income at different percentile levels. As expected, women earn consistently less than 
men. The trends are rather stable or slightly positive, indicating that women are 
slowly catching up with men in terms of labour incomes. The smallest between-
genders income difference, when comparing the four chosen percentile levels, is at 
median income where women earn around 70–80 per cent of men’s labour incomes in 
each of the Nordics.  
The gender difference in labour incomes typically increases both towards the 
bottom of the distribution (P20) and towards the higher end of the distribution (P99). 
Women’s labour incomes are about 50–60 per cent of men’s incomes at percentile P99 
in Denmark, Norway and Sweden (while about 60–70 per cent in Finland). Over time 
there seems to be a slight decrease in this difference, as shown by the positively 
sloping lines in all countries except Denmark (where the difference at P99 has been 
stable). Overall, the well-documented existence of a glass ceiling in wages for women 
in the Nordics is likely to be one important explanation of the between-gender gaps at 
the top of the wage distribution.  
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Figure 3: Women’s labour income in per cent of men’s labour income by percentile level and country 
 
Source: Own calculations from LIS data. 
 
At P20, it is more difficult to explain the income gaps. However, at P20, the 
differences fluctuate more than at the other percentiles. This may be because of small 
sample sizes. At P20, the character of the incomes exhibits large variability. In fact, 
the lower end includes part-time workers like students and women with a high degree 
of unpaid domestic work (allowing little time for paid work), but also individuals 
dependent on social security contributions. Because of small sample sizes, frequent 
changes in the composition of individuals with those kinds of incomes in the data, 
may result in a volatile shape of the gender income gaps at the P20 level.  
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Between-genders inequality in disposable income 
We now turn to the between-genders differences in disposable income. Figure 4 
presents the trends in women’s disposable incomes in per cent of men’s disposable 
incomes at P20, P50, P90 and P99.  
 
Figure 4: Women’s disposable income as per cent of men’s disposable income, by percentile level and 
country 
 
Source: Own calculations from LIS data. 
 
While these gender ratios in disposable income are similar to those in labour income 
in the sense that women have lower incomes than men at all the studied 
percentiles, the between-genders gaps in disposable incomes are consistently 
smaller. In addition, the between-genders disposable income inequality increases 
towards the top of the distribution, rendering the gender gap at P20 the smallest. 
The Nordic welfare states thus successfully redistribute resources at the lower end 
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of the income distribution. At P90 however women only earn 75–80 per cent of 
men’s disposable income, and even less at P99. 
Representation of women in top-income shares 
Another way of studying if gender differences increase when moving towards the 
upper end of the income distribution is by turning to the top-income literature and the 
recent studies on women’s representation in the top. When studying the top, men’s 
and women’s incomes are combined into a single distribution for all individuals, thus 
obtaining common income thresholds for women and men. This enables analysis of 
how the share of women has evolved at the top of the joint income distribution. In the 
top-income literature, total income (that is the taxable income from all sources) is the 
measure used. Including all incomes is especially important for this group since capital 
is an important income source for top earners. Over the recent decades the share of 
women in both the top ten per cent and top one per cent of the income distribution 
have increased in Sweden (Boschini et al. 2017) as well as in Denmark and Norway 
(Atkinson et al. 2016). A recent paper on Finnish data shows that the share of women 
in the top has increased in both the top-ten and top-one-per-cent groups over the 
years 1995–2012, but that the increase has been somewhat slower than in the other 
Nordic countries.16  
Summarizing the results from the recent studies on women in the top for the 
Nordic countries, we see that around 2013, the share of women in the top-ten group in 
Denmark was about 31 per cent, 28 per cent in Finland, 27 per cent in Sweden and 22 
per cent in Norway.17 In the top one per cent, Finland had the highest share with about 
19 per cent, whereas Sweden had 18, Denmark 16 and Norway close to 14 per cent.18 
According to Boschini et al. (2017), while the capital share of income has been larger 
for women, the recent trend of capital income becoming a more important income 
source, has led to men in the upper income brackets now having almost as large 
shares of capital incomes as women in the top.                                                                   
16 See Ravaska (2017) for preliminary evidence. 
17 The figure for Finland stems from Ravaska (2017), for Norway and Denmark from Atkinson et al (2016), and for Sweden 
from Boschini et al (2017). 
18 The figure for Finland stems from Ravaska (2017), for Norway and Denmark from Atkinson et al (2016), and for Sweden 
from Boschini et al (2017). 
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The results from the top income studies on women show a clear increase in 
women’s representation in the top, especially in the top one per cent. However, the 
share of men is still 80 per cent or more in the top one per cent and about 70 per cent 
or more in the top ten per cent. Again, it should be noted that the income measure is 
total income from all sources. The differences might be larger if only labour incomes 
would be studied, since capital income has been more important for women than for 
men in the top-income shares.  
The contribution of gender gaps to overall inequality 
From the analysis of trends within-gender and between-genders in income inequality, 
we learned that there is a tendency towards decreasing differences between the 
genders at the same time as dispersion is increasing within men’s and women’s 
income distributions, respectively. To measure and quantify these changes, we use 
the Theil index which enables us to decompose the total change in inequality into a 
between- and a within-genders part. Such a decomposition is not possible with the 
Gini coefficient. The Theil index takes on a positive value, with zero being the lower 
bound of complete equality and higher numbers indicate more inequality. Unlike the 
Gini coefficient, the Theil index is usually not normalized to being between zero and 
one. The Appendix gives more details about the Theil index.  
Table 1 presents the total change in the Theil index (referred to as Total in the 
table) as well as the changes in the between- and in the within-genders labour-income 
differences. The results are consistent across the Nordic countries and show that the 
income difference between men’s and women’s labour incomes has decreased, 
whereas the dispersion within each distribution has increased. It is also clear that the 
within-effect is noticeably larger than the between-effect (as seen by an increasing 
Theil index). This is in line with the results from previous sections, where we could see 
decreasing differences in percentile levels between women and men’s labour incomes, 
but increasing Gini coefficients for both women and men taken separately.  
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Table 1: Changes in the Theil index for labour income decomposed into changes in between- and 
within-genders distributions, 1991–2013 
 Between Within Total 
Denmark -0.005 0.067 0.063 
Finland -0.001 0.020 0.019 
Norway -0.008 0.029 0.022 
Sweden -0.004 0.042 0.038 
 
Note: Data refer to 1992–2013 for Finland and 1991–2005 for Sweden. 
Source: Own calculations from LIS data. 
 
When decomposing overall inequality in individual disposable income into between- 
and within- gender changes, the dominating effect is not as clear. Table 2 presents the 
Theil index and its additive components for disposable income. The change in the 
Theil index varies over the time period and across the Nordic countries in line with the 
results in Figure 1 on the Gini coefficient in disposable income. During the time period 
the Theil index has decreased in Finland and Norway and increased in Denmark and 
(slightly) in Sweden.  
Table 2: Changes in the Theil index for disposable income decomposed into changes in between- and 
within-genders distributions, 1991–2013 
 Between Within Total 
Denmark -0.007 0.021 0,014 
Finland -0.007 0.001 -0,006 
Norway -0.017 -0.034 -0,052 
Sweden -0.008 0.009 0,001 
 
Note: See Table 1. 
Source: Own calculations from LIS data. 
 
In all countries, the inequality between the genders’ distributions has decreased. In 
Denmark, the overall Theil index increased because the increase in the within-
component was larger than the decrease in the between-part. In Finland, the 
decrease in the between-part outweighed the small increase in within-inequality 
and resulted in a total decrease in the Theil index. The largest decrease in the index 
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happened in Norway where the decrease in within-gender distributions was even 
larger than the between-component decrease.19 In Sweden, the two effects almost 
balanced out (until 2005). Although the changes in the Theil index vary, we 
consistently observe a decrease in the between-component and an increase in the 
within-component, except for Norway.  
What reasons may explain the trends in increasing dispersion within the gender-
specific labour income distributions and the decreasing differences in the between-
components? In countries with low female labour force participation, women have 
faced a high dispersion in incomes as they slowly have entered the labour force. In the 
Nordic countries, where this shift mainly happened before the 1990s, the dispersion 
among women is comparatively low. As the fraction of women working full time 
increased and the fraction of highly educated women slowly increased their incomes, 
the result has been higher income dispersion among women. Regarding men, who 
already had a strong position in the labour market, the increasing dispersion may 
spring from an increasing share of men working part-time (true for all Nordics but this 
effect is relatively small in Sweden), more unskilled men with lower labour-force 
attachment, and high-skilled men experiencing sizeable wage increases due to skilled-
biased technological change.20 According to OECD (2015), the increase in the Theil 
index in Finland mainly springs from increasing differences within the male 
distribution and from more men working part-time. The increasing share of students 
taking on part-time jobs, but also young individuals taking on low-paid jobs affect the 
income dispersion for both women and men. 
The trend of slowly decreasing income differences between women and men 
seems to follow from the same reasons as above. Since the increasing inequality 
mainly appears to come from increasing dispersion within both women and men’s 
labour income distributions, more research should focus on the mechanisms behind 
these trends. The redistributions systems seem only partially to mitigate this 
development.  
                                                                 
19 Note that this result is driven by the development in the 1990s, when the sample size for Norway in LIS was very small. 
20 See Autor and Wasserman (2013) and Autor (2014) for corresponding US trends. 
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Conclusions 
Although the Nordic countries are similar in many respects, of which a high degree of 
gender equality is one of the more prominent, the results in this paper suggest that 
when it comes to income inequality not only are there still significant differences 
within-gender and between-genders in the respective countries, but also that these 
differences vary across the Nordics. 
We show that the Gini coefficient for disposable income at the household level is 
significantly lower than the Gini coefficient at the individual level (in the Nordic 
countries. This opens up for research on the exact mechanisms behind the changes in 
the relation between these two measures. If inequality at the household level 
increases more than at the individual level, this could be due to rising assortative 
mating for instance (see Robling and Pareliussen 2018 for an account of demographic 
drivers in the Nordics.) This warrants further research. 
Turning to within-gender income inequality, men’s income distribution is generally 
more unequal than women’s. Moreover, income inequality has – especially when 
measured in terms of disposable income – increased more for men than women during the 
last decade in Denmark, Finland and Norway. (For Sweden, LIS does not provide data after 
2005.) This implies that disregarding within-gender inequalities blurs our understanding of 
overall inequality and makes it harder to formulate efficient policies to reduce it. 
Between-genders differences depend on the income measure used. While the 
between-genders inequality in labour income is U-shaped over the income 
distribution (i.e. differences between women and men are largest at the bottom and 
at the top of the distribution), the between-genders disposable income inequality 
increases with income. Inequality in disposable income between genders is smaller 
than in labour income due to redistribution, especially at the lower end and at median 
incomes. At the higher end however, the redistribution is less pronounced and women 
earned about 75–80 per cent or less of men’s disposable income in 2013. Out of our 
four countries, Finland stands out in terms of women having a higher labour income in 
the 99th percentile in relation to men at the same percentile (about 70 per cent of 
men’s labour income in 2013) compared to the other three countries (where women 
earn about 50–60 per cent of men’s labour income). 
Finland also has a higher share of women in the top of the income distribution 
compared to Denmark, Norway and Sweden. This might seem counterintuitive as 
Finland has an extensive cash-for-care child policy that does not incentivize mothers 
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with small children to work (whereas the other Nordics have mothers back in the 
labour market earlier). This suggests that the impact of family policies on women's 
career patterns might be complex: a cash-for-care policy appears to lead mothers at 
the lower end of the income distribution to stay home longer with their children, while 
the effect seems to be smaller for high-income women. Exactly how countries’ 
different family and social insurance policies affect within-gender and between-
genders inequality, as well as overall inequality, needs further research. 
The gender differences illustrated in this paper are outcomes of both the high 
rates of female labour force participation in the Nordics and the presence of generous 
welfare states. For instance, OECD (2015) suggests that in countries with a relatively 
low level of female labour force participation, within-women inequality is likely to 
increase when more women enter the formal labour market. It would, therefore, be 
most interesting to extend our analysis to countries outside the Nordic region.  
Most importantly, we show that the standard way of analysing inequality at the 
household level fails to address the importance of both within-gender and between-
genders differences in inequality. Within-gender differences in inequality appear to be 
increasing, while between-genders inequality is slowly decreasing. Improved gender 
equality in one dimension does not imply that overall inequality has to decrease. It may 
even be that gender inequality in different dimensions move in opposite directions. The 
same can be said for gender inequality at different points of the income distribution. 
Differences between women and men may, for example, shrink at the median but 
increase at the tails of the distribution. These insights illustrate why it does not suffice to 
measure gender inequality in one dimension. The interaction of within-gender and 
between-genders inequality, as well as differences across the distribution, is essential to 
understand developments of gender inequality and overall inequality.  
Exactly how to assess the impact of gender inequality on overall inequality 
remains an open question. One way forward would be to provide counterfactual 
analysis, as in OECD (2015), estimating the level of overall inequality if there would be 
no between-genders inequality, or the same within-gender inequality. Another way 
would be to further decompose changes in overall inequality in changes due to gender 
differences within and between income quintiles, as suggested in Liao (2016). 
Our main message is that household level trends in inequality need to be 
complemented with analysis at the individual level to capture gendered trends and 
mechanisms. Otherwise we will continue to miss out on important driving forces of 
overall income inequality, and in particular on important parts of the gender dimension. 
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Appendix 
The Theil index is a commonly used measure of inequality and belongs to the family 
of inequality measures called the Generalized Entropy (GE) measures. The measure 
ranges between zero and infinity, where zero indicates perfect equality and values 
above zero indicate higher levels of inequality. An appealing feature of the index is 
that it can be decomposed into population subgroups or income sources, which 
distinguishes it from the more popular and more intuitively appealing Gini 
coefficient (UN 2015). More precisely, the Theil index is always the (weighted) sum 
of inequality within each subgroup considered plus the inequality between these 
groups. In the case considered here, a change in inequality can be decomposed into 
a change within the groups of women and men, respectively, plus the change in 
inequality between women and men.  
More formally, the Theil index, first proposed by Theil (1967), is used in this study 
to decompose gender income differences into a between-group and within-group 
part. Following Liao’s (2016) theoretical presentation the total amount of inequality 
measured by the Theil measure can be described as follows: 
 
𝑇𝑇 = 1
𝑁𝑁
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
?̅?𝑥
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
?̅?𝑥
𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1  ,  (1) 
 
where 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  is income of individual 𝑖𝑖, ?̅?𝑥 the overall mean income, and 𝑁𝑁 the sample size. 
The between-group component can be described by the following equation: 
 
𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏 = ∑ 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 ?̅?𝑥𝑘𝑘?̅?𝑥𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 ,  (2) 
 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘  is the 𝑘𝑘th group’s income share (i.e. group k income in relation to the 
population total income), and ?̅?𝑥𝑘𝑘  is the mean income of group 𝑘𝑘. Hence, the between-
component measures the differences between the mean incomes of the subgroups 
studied. The within-group component can be described by the following equation: 
 
𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤 = ∑ 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘 ∑ 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘?̅?𝑥𝑘𝑘𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 ,  (3) 
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where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘  is the 𝑖𝑖th individual’s income share within the 𝑘𝑘th group, and 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘  is the 𝑖𝑖th 
individual’s income within group 𝑘𝑘. It measures the weighted sum of all the subgroups 
inequality measures (measured by the Theil index of group 𝑘𝑘). 
The between and within components add up to the total Theil index in equation 
(1). The changes over years in the aggregate Theil can be expressed as (see OECD 
2015): 
 
∆𝑇𝑇 = ∑ ∆𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤𝑘𝑘 + ∑ ∆𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘    (4) 
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Comment on A. Boschini and K. Gunnarsson: Gendered Trends in 
Income Inequality1 
Karin Hederos2 and Anna Sandberg3 
 
 
This paper investigates gendered trends in income inequality in Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden, posing questions such as: Is the income dispersion higher or 
lower among men than among women? How do gender gaps in labor income and 
disposable income vary across time, countries and the income distribution? How do 
gender-specific aspects of income inequality contribute to the overall income 
inequality in a society?  
The questions examined are interesting and relevant. The results suggest that 
there are substantial differences both between and within genders. If we do not take 
these differences into account, we miss an important part of the picture. The paper 
also complements the prior literature on gender gaps which mainly concerns gender 
differences in hourly wages rather than income. We will divide our comments into two 
parts. The first part brings up a few measurement issues, and the second part 
discusses avenues for future research. 
Measurement issues 
We will first raise two issues that are particularly important when studying the gender 
aspect of income inequality: the choice of income measure and the role of hours 
worked. Then, we will briefly discuss the importance of estimating gender gaps over 
the entire distribution of incomes.  
The choice of income measure has been widely discussed in the literature on 
income inequality. In the context of this paper, one of the key questions is whether 
gender differences in income dispersion and gender income gaps should be measured 
using individual income or household income. The answer is not obvious, as both 
measures have appealing features. For example, although household income comes                                                                  
1 We thank Anders Björklund for useful comments. 
2 Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI), Stockholm University. 
3 Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI), Stockholm University. 
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closer to measuring living standards and consumption levels, we need to turn to 
measures of individual income to capture within-household bargaining power, labor 
market discrimination and inequality in future pensions.  
While the authors discuss this issue to some extent in the introduction, it would 
have been useful with even more guidance on the pros and cons of the different 
income measures and when to turn to which measure. Since individual income and 
household income capture different aspects of inequality, they could be seen as 
complementary. Thus, it would have been informative to estimate all income 
dispersions and gender gaps using both income measures. There is a risk that the 
current focus on individual income may conceal important aspects of gender 
inequality, such as the situation of lone mothers. Compared to women, men are 
significantly less likely to live alone with children, and, as illustrated by e.g. Björklund 
and Jäntti (2011), lone mothers face a higher than average risk of poverty. Household 
income, adjusted for household size, may come closer to capturing the difference in 
living standards between, for example, lone mothers and mothers living together with 
a partner.  
A second important issue when studying the gender dimension of inequality is the 
prevalence of part-time work. The gender difference in labor income consists of two 
parts: (i) gender differences in hourly wages and (ii) gender differences in hours 
worked. Since men are substantially more likely than women to work full-time, 
considering hours worked is fundamental to explain the gender income gaps.  
The authors acknowledge that the gender gap in hours worked is likely to be an 
important mechanism behind many findings in the paper. However, it would have 
been useful to see an approximation of how important hours worked are compared to 
hourly wages. For example, Figure 2 shows that the Gini coefficient of labor income is 
similar for men and women in Norway and Sweden, but higher for men than for 
women in Denmark and Finland. Is this pattern primarily driven by variations in hours 
worked, variations in hourly wages, or both? 
Another example is Figure 3, illustrating the gender gap in labor income at 
different percentiles in the income distribution. Previous studies from the Nordic 
countries show that the gender wage gap is largest at the top of the distribution (see 
e.g. Albrecht et al. 2003, Datta Gupta et al. 2006 and Arulampalam et al. 2007). In 
contrast, Figure 3 suggests that the gender gap in labor income is relatively high both 
at the top (the 99th percentile) and at the bottom (the 20th percentile) of the income 
distribution. Why do we see this relatively large gender gap at the bottom of the 
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distribution for labor income, but not for wages? Is the explanation that the gender 
wage gap is relatively low at the bottom of the distribution, while the gender gap in 
part-time work is high? 
Relatedly, while the results of the paper suggest that gender gaps in labor income 
and disposable income vary across the distribution of incomes, these gender gaps are 
only estimated at four different percentiles (P20, P50, P90 and P99). While this gives 
us some idea of how the gender income gaps vary across the distribution, it would 
have been even more informative to plot the gender income gaps across the entire 
distribution (i.e. at all percentiles). This exercise would have facilitated a more direct 
comparison between the findings of this paper and the literature on the glass ceiling. 
Moreover, showing the gender gaps across the entire distribution for several years 
might increase our understanding of the mechanisms behind observed time trends in 
the average gender income gap.  
Looking ahead  
The authors mention that it would be interesting to extend the analysis to countries 
outside the Nordic region. When comparing the gender gap in labor income across 
countries, it will be important to take differences in female labor force participation 
into account. While the gender employment gap is below five percentage points in the 
Nordic countries, it is considerably higher elsewhere and the selection of women into 
the labor force is non-random. Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) show that in countries 
where fewer women work, e.g. in Southern Europe, the gender wage gap is often 
relatively low due to the positive selection of women into the labor force. Thus, 
international comparisons of the gender wage gap that do not adjust for differences in 
female labor force participation may provide a misleading picture of the level of 
gender equality across countries. Albrecht et al. (2009) propose a way to address 
selection issues in analyses of the gender wage gap and illustrate their approach using 
data from the Netherlands. One interesting avenue for future research would be to 
further investigate how the selection of women into work is related to differences 
across countries in the overall level of income inequality, the glass ceiling and the 
occupational segregation by gender.  
The paper highlights the importance of quantifying how income inequalities 
within and between genders vary across time and countries. In the Nordic countries, 
female labor force participation has been relatively high for several decades. As time 
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passes, this feature of our labor markets provides us with increasing opportunities to 
include women also in studies of intergenerational mobility. Including mothers in 
these analyses is key since intergenerational associations may to some extent be 
gender-specific. For instance, children are more prone to inherit the occupation of the 
same-gender rather than the opposite-gender parent (see e.g. Stevens 1986). In 
addition, the association between the outcomes of children and both their parents 
may be larger than that between children and only their father. Thus, including only 
the father we risk to underestimate the degree of intergenerational persistence.  
Relatedly, when studying socioeconomic mobility, economists often use proxies 
for individuals’ lifetime income (Jäntti and Jenkins 2009). Finding good proxies for 
women’s lifetime income has proven to be difficult since income is often observed at a 
point in life when many women are on parental leave or work part-time. The income 
differences in these years are not necessarily the same as differences in lifetime 
income, giving rise to so-called life-cycle bias. While this source of bias is present for 
men as well, it is considerably larger for women (Böhlmark and Lindquist 2006).  
Learning more about how to best approximate women’s lifetime income is an 
important task for future research. One way to address the measurement issues 
raised by parental leave and part-time work may be to combine multiple proxy 
measures for socioeconomic status. In a recent paper, Vosters and Nybom (2017) find 
that combining income, education and occupation substantially improves the 
measure of socioeconomic status for women, but not for men. This approach thus 
proves highly useful when estimating associations between mothers and their 
children. Finding ways to incorporate women’s socioeconomic status in studies of 
intergenerational mobility appears particularly important when examining trends. As 
the role of mothers may have changed over time, omitting mothers from these 
analyses may provide us with a biased picture of the evolution of intergenerational 
mobility.  
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Comment on A. Boschini and K. Gunnarsson: Gendered Trends in 
Income Inequality 
Lars Haagen Petersen1 
 
 
The paper contains a number of interesting considerations on the calculation of 
income differences within and between genders. Two different approaches on 
measuring differences in income are compared. One is the traditional approach, 
where the household disposable income is used, while the other introduces a new 
measure of income: the individual labor income. 
A new income measure 
It is relevant to supplement the traditional approach, where the household disposable 
income is used, with other approaches. However, it is not given that the supplemental 
approaches are more accurate than the traditional approaches. It depends on the 
objective. For example, in the estimates of differences in consumption opportunities, 
as the traditional distribution analyses aims at measuring, it is not important who in 
the family earns the income as long as the consumption decision is shared. 
When analyzing equal pay, it is important to consider individual income. However, 
such analyses should include a number of other parameters in order to be accurate 
since income differences measured by individual income may partly reflect individual 
choices. For example, the household may have chosen that one member works part-
time and the other full-time, or that the woman takes most of the maternity leave and 
to a larger extent than the man takes a day off when the children are sick. Kleven et al. 
(2015) show that a large fraction of the observed differences in income between 
genders can be explained by differences in behavior with respect to children. 
Another reason for supplementing the traditional approach may be to get a better 
understanding of the underlying causes and developments in the overall income 
inequality measured the traditional way. In this regard the analysis provides an 
interesting contribution.                                                                  
1 Danish Ministry of Finance. 
 
 
134 Increasing Income Inequality in the Nordics 
 
It appears from the article that income inequality is greater when it is measured 
using individual labor incomes than when household disposable income is used. To 
address this further, it could be interesting to expand the analysis to see whether the 
differences in income inequality using these two approaches are due to differences in 
men’s and women’s education, age, spouse's age, maternity leave, other family 
relationships, employment relationships, working hours, job function, sector 
association etc.  
Differences in income between and within genders and the consequences for overall 
inequality 
It appears from the article that women in general earn less than men, though there is 
a slight tendency towards women catching up. This is in line with the traditional 
indicators for income inequality between men and women, such as can be found on 
the Nordic Council of Ministers website. 
It is mentioned that differences in income between genders may be due to the 
fact that a larger fraction of women work part-time relative to men, and that women 
to a larger extent than men are employed in the public sector, where wages in general 
are lower and more homogeneous than in the private sector.  
Another result appearing in the article is that differences in income (measured by 
both individual income and household disposable income) within genders have 
contributed to increasing income inequality measured by the Theil index in the period 
from 1991 to 2013 for most countries. On the other hand, income differences between 
genders have lowered income inequality. 
The article does not contain an actual analysis of the reasons for this 
development. Among possible reasons, it is emphasized that more women may 
have moved from part-time jobs to full-time jobs, and that an increasing level of 
education among women will be reflected in higher wages. For men, the increased 
income differences can stem from a higher proportion of men working part-time, 
and that there are more men without an education and more with a high level of 
education in the labour force. In addition, it is mentioned that an increasing 
proportion of students can be a possible reason for the increased differences in 
income for both men and women. 
The development in income inequality must be seen in conjunction with the 
causes of the development. Higher income inequality cannot in advance be expressed 
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as a negative development. For example, it is positive for society when more young 
people take an education, even though it contributes to a larger income gap when 
income inequality is measured at a given point of time. 
Therefore, it is also important to get a deeper understanding of the underlying 
causes of income inequality developments. Only thereby it can be determined to what 
extent it constitutes a societal problem. The article delivers a contribution in that 
direction, but it would be desirable to take it a step further and investigate what drives 
the differences in income within the genders. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the level of income must be seen in the 
context of the scope of public services. It applies to cross-country analysis where the 
size of the public sector varies, but also across groups within the country, as public 
services may be more targeted to some groups than others. 
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Demographic Change and Inequality 
Trends in the Nordic Countries1 
Jon Kristian Pareliussen2 and Per Olof Robling3 
Abstract 
We compare how ageing, assortative mating, an increasing share of students, a shift 
towards more single and childless couple households, and immigrant inflows have 
influenced inequality in the Nordics from 1995 to 2013 by re-weighing subgroups of 
the population by their population shares in 1995 to construct counterfactual income 
distributions. We find that these factors combined have increased disposable income 
inequality in all the Nordic countries, but to a different extent and through different 
mechanisms. The strength and direction of demographic change, within- and 
between-group inequality and the responsiveness of redistribution all play a role.  
 
Keywords: Inequality, demographic trends, redistribution. 
JEL classification: J10, D63, 015. 
                                                                 
1 The authors are grateful for valuable comments from the editors, Christophe André, Anna Sandberg, Tobias Andersen, 
Thorvaldur Gylfason, Arent Skjæveland, two anonymous referees and participants at the 2017 NEPR conference in 
Copenhagen. This article builds on previous OECD work by Robling and Pareliussen (2017). 
2 OECD Economics Department. 
3 Institute for Social Research, Stockholm University. The author gratefully acknowledges financial support from the 
Swedish Research Council for Health, Working Life and Welfare (FORTE). 
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Introduction 
Rising disposable income inequality over the past few decades (OECD 2015) has been 
more pronounced in the Nordic countries than in the OECD on average, but with 
substantial differences between the countries. The largest increase in inequality was 
observed in Sweden, where the Gini coefficient increased by seven percentage points 
between 1995 and 2013, followed by Finland and Denmark, where the coefficient 
increased by four and three points respectively. By contrast, in Norway the Gini 
coefficient ended up only one point higher, after a temporary increase in the mid-
2000s.4 However, the Nordic countries all started from low inequality levels, and 
remain among the most equal OECD countries measured by the Gini coefficient of 
disposable income (Figure 1, Panel A). This outcome reflects both low market income 
inequality and strong redistribution (Panel B).  
The distribution of income at a given point in time is a complex outcome formed 
by the interaction of markets, policies and demography (Pareliussen et al. 2018). 
Market trends, such as skill-biased technological change, globalisation and capital 
accumulation influence the distribution of wages and capital income (Förster and Tóth 
2015, and Piketty 2014). Redistribution through taxes and transfers, on the other 
hand, directly alters the distribution of disposable income, but may have secondary 
effects on peoples’ choices, and hence affect market incomes (Andersen and Maibom 
2016). Finally, demographic trends, such as the age structure of the population, 
immigration, educational attainment, assortative mating and household structure, 
can significantly impact inequality. As an example, the level and variation of earnings 
increase over the working age, while pensions generally are lower than earnings. 
Moreover, immigrants tend to have lower and more unequal incomes than natives, 
and increasing immigration will hence tend to increase inequality. All of these factors 
have been found to affect inequality, also in the Nordics (Robling and Pareliussen 
2017, Danish Economic Council 2016, NOU 2009, Eika et. al. 2017 and OECD 2011).  
                                                                 
4 The temporary spike of the Gini coefficient in Norway in 2004 and 2005 is to a large extent reflecting extraordinary high 
dividends following the announcement of a major capital taxation reform taking effect in 2006 (NOU 2009). The 
development for Norway should be taken as a rough indication given the limited number of observations prior to 2008. 
National sources report an increase of around four Gini points from 1990 to 2014 (Statistics Norway), but the applied 
household income definition is not fully comparable with the one used for OECD figures (see Causa et al. 2016 for a 
comparison of inequality figures between different sources in the case of Denmark). 
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Figure 1: Inequality has been widening, but remains low in the Nordics 
 
Note: The Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income deviates from a perfectly 
equal distribution. A Gini index of zero represents perfect equality and 100 represents perfect 
inequality. The income measures are constructed as follows: incomes from work and capital are 
summed within the household to obtain household market income. Public transfers are added and 
taxes deducted to obtain household disposable income. The household market and disposable 
incomes are respectively divided by the square root of the number of household members (the 
equivalence scale) to obtain the equivalised disposable and market income, which is in turn 
assigned to each member of the household. 
Source: OECD Income Distribution and Poverty Database. 
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The aim of this analysis is to isolate and quantify the importance of demography by 
holding policy and market forces constant in a decomposition exercise. Such 
decompositions are often conducted to answer research questions applied to specific 
trends in a one-country setting, and they usually find a significant demographic 
impact on inequality (Robling and Pareliussen 2017, Danish Economic Council 2016, 
NOU 2009 and OECD 2011). However, these studies are usually not comparable 
between countries because of the context-specific choice of factors, different 
methodological approaches and the need for rich micro data, which are usually found 
only in national sources.5 To address this shortfall for the Nordics, we analyse the 
inequality impact from ageing, changing household structure, assortative mating, 
immigration and a changing number of students from 1995 to 2013 in Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden, using harmonised data from the Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS) Database and the Swedish Survey of Household Finances (HEK). We have 
chosen a broad set of factors representing demographic trends shown previously to 
affect inequality considerably. This should allow us to capture a large part of the 
variation in inequality due to demographics, and thus provide comparable estimates 
of the inequality effect not only of the individual factors, but also an approximation of 
the combined inequality effect of demographics.6 
We measure the influence of demographic trends on the Gini coefficient, relative 
poverty and the top ten percent income share. We find a pronounced effect in all the 
countries. However, the strength and main mechanisms behind demographic 
contributions to increasing disposable income inequality differ considerably between 
the countries. Household structure has increased inequality in all countries, but most 
so in Norway. Stronger ageing trends in Finland than in the other countries result in a 
large share of increasing inequality coming from the population getting older. An 
increasing student population has impacted inequality Denmark in particular, while 
having only limited effects in Norway and Sweden. Assortative mating has limited 
effects but has decreased inequality somewhat in Finland and Norway. Overall, 
                                                                 
5 OECD (2011) provides cross-country evidence, but results are displayed for market income for some countries (including 
the Nordics) and disposable income for others. The results are sensitive to the ordering of factors. Eika et al. (2017) look at 
several countries, but only analyse the impact of assortative mating. 
6 The full variation due to demographics will however not be captured, as our data are not detailed enough, and our 
methodology sets some limitations as explained for the case of immigration later in the article. 
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demographics have affected market income inequality considerably, increasing 
inequality in Denmark, Finland and Norway, while reducing it in Sweden.  
We decompose redistribution into demography-related and residual market-
related redistribution and find that redistribution has been quite responsive to 
demographic trends in all the countries, notably ageing, and especially in Denmark 
and Finland. Redistribution responding to non-demographic forces, on the other 
hand, weakened in all the countries except Norway. Immigration has increased 
inequality, particularly in Norway, but also in Sweden and Denmark. However, we 
show that our main decomposition only partially captures the contribution of 
immigration to inequality. The contribution from immigration, taking into account not 
only the increasing foreign-born population share, but also the changing composition 
and characteristics of new immigrants may be between two (Denmark) and three 
(Sweden) times higher than our main results. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows: The second section contains a 
description of the data. The third section describes the methodology. Demographic 
trends are presented and discussed in the fourth section. Results are presented in the 
fifth section. The final section summarises and concludes. 
Data 
Quantifying the contributions of demographic trends to increasing inequality in the 
Nordics requires high quality data. In order to correctly assess trends in the most 
commonly used inequality measures, we need a representative sample of micro data 
with comparable definitions of incomes, households, transfers and taxes, consistent 
over time and harmonised between countries. Such data are not abundant, even at 
the national level. The natural starting point is the LIS Database, which contains 
harmonized micro data from about 50 countries. The data originate from national 
surveys and registries, and are provided by national sources, typically ministries and 
statistics agencies. Data availability and detail, as well as the original source, vary 
depending on country and time period (Table 1).  
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Table 1: Data availability for the Nordic countries in the LIS database 
Country First year 
available in LIS 
Latest year 
available in LIS 
Data provider  Name of national 
survey/source 
Denmark 1987 2013 Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
the Interior, Statistics Denmark 
and Ministry of Taxation 
 
Law Model (register based) 
Finland 1987 2013 Statistics Finland Income Distribution Survey 
(IDS) / Survey on Income and 
Living Conditions (SILC)  
 
Norway 1979 2013 Statistics Norway Income Distribution Survey, 
1979–2004 Household Income 
Statistics (register based) 2005- 
 
Sweden 1967 2005 Statistics Sweden Level of Living Survey (1967), 
Survey of Households’ Finances 
(HINK/HEK) 1975 – 2005 
 
Income measure 
The purpose of LIS is to provide comparable income data for as many countries as 
possible. For this reason, great effort is put in harmonizing income concepts. The main 
income concept used is equivalised disposable income, which is constructed by 
summing incomes from work, capital and public transfers and deducting taxes. 
Importantly, the LIS definition of disposable income does not include realised capital 
gains from sales of assets such as stocks and real estate or other income which can be 
classified as windfalls, such as severance pay, inheritance, lottery winnings and 
insurance compensations. Conversely, current income from capital, such as interests 
and dividends, is included. Individual incomes are summed within the household to 
form household disposable income. To allow for economies of scale, the household 
disposable income is divided by the square root of the number of household members 
(the equivalence scale)7 making it possible to compare the economic positions of 
households of different sizes. This equivalised disposable income is then assigned to                                                                  
7 See Robling and Pareliussen (2017) for an example of the use of different equivalence scales in demographic 
decompositions of inequality. 
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each member of the household. Market income is constructed in the same way, but 
without including public transfers and taxes. 
Data choices 
Data for Iceland are only available for a short, recent time period (2004–2010), and 
Iceland is therefore excluded from the analysis. Based on data availability for the 
remaining countries, we use data from 1987 (1986 for Norway) to 2013. We check the 
robustness of the data by comparing it with the OECD Income Distribution and 
Poverty Database (IDD) in Figure 2. This comparison reveals a number of issues. For 
Denmark, the inequality levels in 1986 and 1992 are much higher than in IDD and all 
other sources. We suspect that this is at least partly due to a time-inconsistent 
household definition in early vintages of the LIS data. This problem is likely present in 
the Swedish data as well.8 An additional issue regarding Sweden is that the latest 
observation in LIS is 2005. To analyse the Sweden-specific issues, we use data directly 
from the Survey of Households’ Finances, the source of this country’s LIS data from 
1975 to 2005, available from Statistics Sweden up until 2013. We harmonise the data 
according to LIS harmonisation guidelines.9 The LIS and IDD series match much more 
closely for Finland and Norway, even though there is a difference in 1986 in the case of 
Norway. Some differences are also observed for Denmark in observations from 1995 
to 2013. Such differences do not necessarily matter for inference as long as key 
definitions are applied relatively consistently over time. 
To minimise these data issues, we choose 1995 as the start year for our main 
analysis. Another advantage of this choice is that all the Nordics lowered tax rates and 
broadened tax bases in the early 1990s in sweeping tax reforms implementing dual 
income-tax systems. The broadening of the tax base implies a change in the income 
definition that mechanically increases measured inequality. As an example, this new 
income definition increased the Gini coefficient by about two points in Sweden 
(Björklund et al. 1995). Choosing 1995 as the base year avoids this issue and allows 
including immigration and an indicator for the relative size of the student population 
in the analysis, variables not available in early LIS vintages. Except for Norway, Figure 
2 shows that most of the inequality increase took place after 1995.                                                                  
8 This is, however, not clear from the LIS documentation. 
9 http://www.lisdatacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/our-lis-documentation-harmonisation-guidelines.pdf 
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Figure 2: Income inequality in different data sources 
 
Source: OECD Income Distribution and Poverty Database (IDD), Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database 
and the Survey of Households’ Finances (HEK, Statistics Sweden). 
Variable definitions 
We consider five factors that could have contributed to inequality trends between 
1995 and 2013. These factors are measured using the variables and definitions shown 
in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Variable definitions 
Variable 
name  
Definition 
Age Individuals are categorised into the following five age groups: 0–17, 18–34, 35–49, 50–64, and 65+. 
 
Household 
types 
Individuals are grouped in five household types: singles with and without children, couples with and 
without children and an “other” group for households that do not fit any of the other categories. 
 
Assortative 
mating 
Assortative mating is measured based on earnings. Adults aged 20–64 in couple households are ranked 
according to their quintile in the gender specific distribution of individual earnings. Couple households 
are then grouped in five groups depending on the within-household difference in partners’ earnings 
quintiles. This is similar to the treatment of assortative mating in OECD (2011). 
 
Student 
households 
There is no individual level information on enrolment or participation in higher education available for 
the countries and time period in question. Instead we make use of information about student aid 
transfers to the household. The student aid variable in LIS is the sum of student aid paid to the 
household for participation in higher education (beyond high school). For the purpose of our study, this 
means that all members of the household are classified as students if the household receives student 
aid. We restrict the age of the oldest household member to at most 55.  
 
Immigrants In our main analysis an immigrant is defined as being foreign-born, and we use these two terms 
interchangeably throughout the article. Information on country of birth is available from 1995 for 
Denmark and Sweden, and from 2000 for Norway. We account for immigration by a simple dummy for 
being foreign born in our main analysis because this is the only variable available for all three countries. 
However, information about country of birth is available for Norway and Sweden and the year of 
immigration is available for Denmark and Sweden. We use this extra detail in alternative 
specifications. For Finland there is no information on immigrant status. 
 
Methodology 
Decomposition by re-weighting 
We follow the methodology outlined in Robling and Pareliussen (2017) to estimate the 
static contribution of the demographic factors described above to changes in the Gini 
coefficient, relative poverty (the share of the population with equivalised disposable 
income below 60 percent of the median), and the share of total income of the top ten 
percent of the income distribution. 
The traditional method for exploring how compositional changes in a society 
contribute to changes in income inequality is to apply additively decomposable 
inequality indices (Mookherjee and Shorrocks 1982 and Foster et al. 1984). The 
 
 
Nordic Economic Policy Review 145 
 
drawbacks of this approach are that they confine research to only a few inequality 
measures and that the analysis becomes difficult when the number of combinations of 
population characteristics is large (Jenkins and Van Kerm 2009).  
DiNardo et al. (1996) propose a more general method in which an observation, or 
a group of observations, is re-weighted according to whether it is under- or over- 
represented in a counterfactual scenario. This allows the use of any summary measure 
of the income distribution and facilitates the analysis of multiple population 
characteristics.  
The methodology is well-suited to answer questions such as “What would the 
distribution of income in the Nordic countries look like if the household structure had 
been the same as it was in 1995, but everything else was as in 2013?”. Notice that 
“everything else” implies that relative incomes as well as the distribution of income 
within each household type is fixed to its 2013 level and changes in the relative 
population size is the only effect that is captured in the decomposition. We estimate the 
contribution to inequality for our selection of demographic factors by using income data 
for the Nordic countries in 2013 and then re-weighting the sample for each factor to 
match the distribution of that factor in 1995. Summary measures for this counterfactual 
income distribution are then calculated using standard methods.10 The contribution of a 
single factor is the difference between the inequality calculated with the original 2013 
distribution of income and inequality calculated with the counterfactual income 
distribution adjusted for this one factor (see Annex 1 for details).  
The factors we consider are interdependent. For example, household type 
depends on age. As a consequence, it is not possible to consider one variable at a time 
and add the resulting individual contributions to inequality up to an aggregate 
contribution. Such an approach would count any interaction effect between variables 
twice. To resolve this issue, we apply the Shapley algorithm, where factors are 
included in sequence and the marginal contribution of the individual factor, 
conditional on all the other factors, is its mean contribution from all possible 
sequences (Shorrocks 2013).  
The decomposition rests on the assumption that the distribution of the factor in 
question is independent of the distribution of income conditional on the factor. This 
assumption is not likely to hold exactly. First, if the within-group composition changes                                                                  
10 See Fortin et al. (2011) for a more complete discussion. 
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as a direct consequence of the demographic trend, we will only capture partially the 
inequality change associated with this trend. This caveat may have particular 
importance with regards to immigration, as discussed below. Second, changes in 
population characteristics would entail dynamic effects. Ageing can, for example, 
induce changes to the retirement age and pension levels, and immigration can change 
the relative supply of skills in the labour market and therefore affect natives’ wages. 
These limitations are not unique to this specific decomposition technique, but for 
these reasons our results should, as other decompositions, be interpreted as 
correlations, indicating directions for further research, rather than causal effects.  
Quantifying redistribution 
Our decomposition allows us to measure the strength of redistribution associated 
with demographic trends. The redistributive effect of personal income taxes and 
social cash transfers is often quantified as the difference between the inequality of 
household market incomes (i.e. inequality before taxes and transfers) and the 
inequality of disposable incomes (i.e. inequality after taxes and transfers) and 
expressed in percent of market income inequality (Reynolds and Smolensky 1977). 
Changes in the strength of redistribution are quantified by comparing how market and 
disposable income inequality change over time. The demographic part of the change 
in redistribution can be obtained by subtracting the demographic part of market 
income inequality change from the demographic part of disposable income inequality 
change. The part of redistribution change associated with the non-demographic 
residual is obtained in the same way, by subtracting the residual part of market 
income inequality change from the residual part of disposable income inequality 
change (see Annex 2 for details).  
The residual part of market income inequality change will reflect changes to the 
earnings and capital income distributions over the 1995 to 2013 period, adjusted for 
demographic change. It will also include any demographic factors not explicitly 
accounted for in our analysis.  
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Quantifying the contribution of immigration 
As mentioned above, inequality within and between populations subgroups are 
assumed to be independent of the demographic trends we study, and thus held fixed 
to their 2013 level in the decomposition. This assumption may be problematic when it 
comes to analysing immigration, since the effect of immigration is not limited to 
increasing the size of the foreign-born population. New immigrants have different 
characteristics from existing ones, and directly alter the composition of the foreign-
born population and thus also its distribution of income. To address this issue, we 
complement the decomposition analysis with a simulation approach in the spirit of 
Burtless (2009). The idea is to use the information on immigration year in the 2013 
data and exclude immigrants arriving after a given base year (e.g. 1995). We construct 
new sample weights equal to one minus the fraction of adults in the household having 
immigrated post 1995. In a household where 100 percent of the adults are post-1995 
immigrants all individuals are given zero weight (excluded from the inequality 
estimations), individuals in households where 50 percent of the adults are post-1995 
immigrants are given weight 0.5, etc. Inequality calculated with these new weights 
can then be compared to the baseline inequality level in 2013 in order to assess the 
contribution of immigration 1995–2013. For the rest of the article we refer to this 
approach as “simulation”. 
Demographic trends  
Population shares for the different population sub-groups and their changes over time 
are presented in Table 3. All countries have experienced ageing, but to different 
degrees. In Finland, population shares of all age groups below 50 have declined, while 
age groups 50+ have increased substantially. A somewhat similar, but less 
pronounced, picture emerges in Denmark. Here the largest decline is for the 18–34 
age group. Ageing has been more benign in Norway and Sweden. In the former 
country shares have fallen for cohorts below 35 and above 64, whereas there has been 
a strong increase in the age group 50–64. In Sweden there have been rather limited 
changes across all age groups. 
Household structure also mostly follows similar patterns in the Nordic countries, 
with increasing shares of single person households and couples without children, and 
decreasing shares of couples with children. Again, these developments are much 
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more pronounced in Finland than in Norway and Denmark. Sweden differs from the 
others with falling shares of singles and couples without children, a pattern which is 
likely related to a benign ageing trend.  
Assortative mating, with more couples within the same earnings quintile, has 
increased in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Finland, on the other hand, has seen the 
share of couples with earnings in the same quintile decreasing. All countries except 
Sweden have seen a pronounced decline in the share of couples with one earner in the 
top quintile and one in the bottom. 
The share of student households has increased in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, 
while it has fallen somewhat in Finland. Denmark, Norway and Sweden have all seen a 
strong increase in the foreign-born share of the population. 
 
Table 3 Demographic trends – Population shares 1995 and changes until 2013 
 Denmark Finland Norway Sweden 
 1995 Change 
1995–2013 
1995 Change 
1995–2013 
1995 Change 
1995–2013 
1995 Change 
1995–2013 
Age 0 –17 22.2 -0.1 24.4 -3.2 24.5 -0.9 22.9 -1.0 
Age 18–34 25.2 -4.9 22.8 -1.6 25.3 -2.8 21.1 -0.4 
Age 35–49 22.1 -0.9 24.2 -5.3 21.4 0.1 20.9 -0.9 
Age 50–64 16.3 3.0 15.5 5.4 13.8 4.2 17.4 1.4 
Age 65+ 14.2 2.9 13.0 4.7 15.0 -0.7 17.7 0.9 
One person households 17.2 1.6 16.7 3.3 18.0 0.8 38.9 -0.3 
Couples without children 24.5 0.9 23.4 6.7 20.1 0.9 26.8 -2.0 
Couples with children 42.7 -3.3 47.8 -7.0 50.2 -4.8 7.3 0.0 
Single parents 6.7 1.5 6.7 -0.5 8.9 -0.5 25.4 0.1 
Other 9.0 -0.6 5.4 -2.4 2.9 3.5 1.5 2.3 
Same earnings quintile 28.2 2.1 30.3 -2.1 25.8 1.8 31.1 0.5 
One quintile difference 35.3 1.3 32.9 1.0 35.2 -0.1 32.7 2.0 
Two quintiles difference 21.5 -1.7 20.0 1.5 20.6 1.0 21.9 -2.3 
Three quintiles difference 10.7 -1.0 10.9 0.9 12.5 -1.5 10.2 0.3 
Four quintiles difference 4.3 -0.7 6.0 -1.3 5.9 -1.2 4.1 -0.4 
No student aid 91.1 -6.6 85.1 2.3 87.5 -4.9 82.3 -1.7 
Receiving student aid 8.9 6.6 14.9 -2.3 12.5 4.9 17.7 1.7 
Natives 94.8 -5.0 n.a. n.a. 93.51 -5.5 89.5 -3.4 
Immigrants 5.2 5.0 n.a. n.a. 6.51 5.5 10.5 3.4 
 
Note: Population shares in 1995 are expressed in percent of total population. Population changes from 
1995 to 2013 are expressed in percentage points. All variables are measured at the household level 
except age and immigration status which are measured at the individual level. 1. Start year 2000. 
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Results 
This section presents decomposition results for changes in inequality of disposable 
income from 1995 to 2013. We discuss some mechanisms behind the results, including 
changes in characteristics of population sub-groups, decompositions of changes in 
market income and the responsiveness of redistribution to demographic change. We 
discuss contributions from immigration in a separate sub-section. 
Inequality of disposable income 
Results for the decomposition of changes in disposable income inequality are 
presented in Table 4. The top three rows in both panels contain the baseline inequality 
estimates as well as the absolute change in inequality for each country and inequality 
measure. The fourth row show the total contribution of all the included factors in 
percentage (Gini) points as well as the total contribution as a percentage of total 
inequality change from 1995 to 2013 for reference. The subsequent rows present the 
individual contributions of each factor.  
Demographic trends have caused significant inequality increases in all countries, 
but the trends have affected the countries differently. Ageing has increased the Gini 
coefficient and the top income share in Finland substantially, as should be expected 
given the strong ageing trend. It has also had an impact in Norway. Ageing has had 
small effects on Gini inequality in Sweden and Denmark but has reduced relative 
poverty in Denmark and increased it in Sweden. The latter result is contrary to Robling 
and Pareliussen (2017), likely a result of different time periods. These authors study 
the time period 1987–2013: Sweden experienced significant ageing up until the early 
1990s, while ageing has not been pronounced since 1995.   
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Table 4: Decomposition results (1995–2013) 
Inequality measure Gini Relative poverty (60% of median) Top ten percent share 
Finland 
   
2013 26.09 13.99 21.48 
1995 21.74 9.14 19.17 
Change: 4.36 4.86 2.31 
of which demographic 0.85 0.35 0.60 
 (19.42) (7.31) (26.12) 
Ageing 0.44 -0.01 0.35 
 (10.00) (-0.23) (15.33) 
Household structure 0.65 0.62 0.32 
 (14.81) (12.73) (13.89) 
Assortative mating -0.17 -0.21 -0.09 
 (-3.89) (-4.26) (-3.73) 
Student households -0.07 -0.05 0.01 
 (-1.50) (-0.94) (0.62) 
Norway 
   
2013 25.19 13.59 20.63 
1995 24.23 13.29 20.28 
Change: 0.96 0.30 0.35 
of which demographic 1.42 2.40 0.32 
 (147.60) (788.96) (89.24) 
Ageing 0.15 0.10 0.06 
 (15.23) (33.80) (18.26) 
Household structure 1.36 2.14 0.39 
 (142.07) (705.29) (109.56) 
Assortative mating -0.14 0.04 -0.14 
 (-14.09) (13.33) (-38.95) 
Student households 0.04 0.11 0.00 
 (4.39) (36.54) (0.37) 
Denmark 
   
2013 25.39 12.40 20.86 
1995 22.38 12.02 18.90 
Change: 3.01 0.38 1.96 
of which demographic 1.09 0.50 0.50 
 (36.28) (132.71) (25.41) 
Ageing 0.09 -0.44 0.15 
 (3.01) (-114.8) (7.85) 
Household structure 0.26 -0.11 0.12 
 (8.59) (-28.50) (6.36) 
Assortative mating 0.06 0.01 0.01 
 (1.83) (3.79) (0.42) 
Student households 0.32 0.71 0.06 
 (10.73) (185.79) (3.14) 
Immigration 0.37 0.33 0.15 
 (12.12) (86.43) (7.64) 
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Inequality measure Gini Relative poverty (60% of median) Top ten percent share 
Sweden 
   
2013 28.23 16.44 22.67 
1995 21.50 8.32 18.70 
Change: 6.72 8.32 3.98 
of which demographic 0.62 1.22 0.06 
 (9.27) (14.70) (1.57) 
Ageing 0.01 0.46 -0.02 
 (0.21) (5.48) (-0.61) 
Household structure 0.41 0.56 0.07 
 (6.09) (6.69) (1.79) 
Assortative mating 0.03 0.04 0.01 
 (0.41) (0.46) (0.19) 
Student households 0.00 0.13 -0.06 
 (-0.02) (1.59) (-1.51) 
Immigration 0.21 0.35 0.07 
 (3.12) (4.15) (1.76) 
 
Note: Contributions to inequality increase are Shapley values expressed in percentage (Gini) points. 
Percent of 1995–2013 inequality change in parenthesis for reference. 
 
Changes in household structure have increased the Gini coefficient and the top 
income share in all countries. These changes have increased poverty in Finland, 
Norway and Sweden, but reduced it in Denmark. Assortative mating has had an 
equalising effect in Finland and Norway and a close to neutral effect in Denmark and 
Sweden.  
The student share has strongly increased inequality in Denmark and has had 
particularly large effects on relative poverty. The increasing share of foreign-born 
individuals has increased inequality by one fifth of a Gini point in Sweden and one 
third of a Gini point in Denmark. It has increased the poverty rate by one third of a 
percentage point in both countries. 
To better understand through which channels the demographic trends affect the 
Gini coefficient, and also why some qualitatively similar trends lead to different 
outcomes between the countries, it is useful to reason in terms of income differences 
between population sub-groups and inequality within these sub-groups. Changes in 
population shares as well as between- and within-group inequality are displayed in 
Table 9 in Annex 3.11 
                                                                 
11 It is possible to decompose the change in some inequality indicators into changes in inequality within and between sub-
groups and changes in population shares. However, this is not case for the Gini coefficient. Furthermore, such 
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Changing population shares affect overall inequality by changing the weights 
given to the different sub-groups. Generally, if the size of a population sub-group 
increases strongly, the income within this group differs from the population average, 
and the within-group Gini coefficient is higher than in the overall population, this 
demographic change will widen inequality. Such population change will not affect 
inequality if both the sub-group income level and inequality are close to the 
population average income level and inequality. In some cases, the within-group 
inequality and the sub-group income level can pull in opposite directions. In the 65+ 
age group for example, incomes are low but the Gini coefficient for this group is also 
low. Hence the total effect of an increase in this group’s population share is an 
empirical question.  
Ageing has had a strong inequality-increasing effect in Finland, but only relatively 
subdued effects in the other countries. Comparing the age group 18–34 in Finland and 
Norway can illustrate why this is the case. The population share of this group has 
declined in both countries. However, the relative income in this age group is far from 
the population average and the within-group Gini coefficient is high in Norway, while 
income is closer to average and the Gini coefficient is slightly below the population 
average in Finland. The declining population share of the 18–34 age group thus had a 
clear-cut equalising effect in Norway, while the similar decline in Finland had a limited 
effect. The absence of this equalising effect in Finland contributed to a larger age 
contribution to inequality than in Norway.  
The share of students is another interesting case. Despite a strong increase in the 
student population share in Norway and Denmark, a neutral effect in Norway 
contrasts a pronounced inequality-increasing effect in Denmark. Within-group income 
is somewhat below the population average in both countries (somewhat closer to 
average in Norway), but the within-group Gini is significantly higher in Denmark.  
Household composition has changed in a qualitatively similar way in all the 
countries except Sweden. However, the scale of the change differs, with notably large 
shifts towards childless singles with low incomes and childless couples with high 
incomes in Finland. Shifts in household structure have a marked effect on all three 
inequality measures in Finland, but the effect on the Gini coefficient and relative 
poverty are nonetheless more pronounced in Norway despite smaller shifts in the                                                                                                                                                               
decompositions assume a linear relationship between changes in population shares and change in inequality (Peichl et. al. 
2012). 
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household structure. A partial explanation may be that changes in household 
structure are driven to a greater extent by ageing in Finland: the inequality effect may 
thus be partially captured be the change in the age structure.  
Market income, demographics and redistribution 
Quantifying demographic contributions to market income inequality, and how these 
trends have been countered by redistribution, is a further key to understanding why 
demographics result in different disposable income inequality trajectories in the 
various Nordic countries. 
As shown in Table 5, demographic factors were the main contributors to widening 
market income inequality in Denmark, Finland and Norway. However, cash transfer 
systems have been responsive to changes in demography. Therefore, the increased 
market income inequality is only reflected in increasing disposable income inequality 
to a very limited extent. Sweden differs from the other countries, as demographic 
factors reduced market income inequality over the period.12 Demographic 
redistribution therefore weakened.  
Looking at the individual factors, as shown in Figure 3, it is clear that ageing has 
affected the distribution of market income strongly in all the countries, but 
redistribution has also been particularly responsive to ageing. Hence, the contribution 
to disposable income inequality growth is only minor except in Finland (see also 
Annex 3, Table 10). 
                                                                 
12 Robling and Pareliussen (2017) found that market income inequality increased strongly from 1987 to 2013, and that 
demographic trends were behind about two thirds of this increase. The difference to the current study can be traced to the 
fact that market income inequality increased strongly between 1987 and 1995 in Sweden. The overall market income 
inequality increase was hence positive from 1987 to 2013, while it was slightly negative from 1995 to 2013. 
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Figure 3: Redistribution associated with individual demographic trends (1995–2013) 
 
Note: Contributions to inequality are shown in Gini points. Positive values imply increasing inequality. 
 
Table 5 shows that the non-demographic residual factors, largely representing market 
forces, reduced market income inequality strongly in Finland and Norway, but cash 
transfers connected to these factors weakened in Finland, thus increasing disposable 
income inequality. These factors increased inequality in Sweden, a development 
which was accentuated by weakening associated redistribution. This finding is 
consistent with OECD (2017), which points to slow up-rating of working age benefits 
as a main culprit. A market-driven increase in the poverty rate in Denmark was fully 
offset by redistribution, while an increase of top share of market incomes was 
amplified by weaker redistribution at the top, which accentuated an overall increase in 
the market income Gini coefficient.  
Since the non-demographic residual largely represents market forces, it will be 
strongly affected by the economic cycle, as higher employment and lower 
unemployment reduce market inequality and therefore also redistribution. The strong 
inequality-increasing effect of residual redistribution should therefore be seen in the 
context of strong employment gains from 1995 to 2013 in Finland (9.7 percentage 
points) and, to a lesser extent, in Norway (4.4) and Sweden (4.3). Employment in 
Denmark only increased by 0.2 percentage points, since employment losses during 
the 1990s crisis were relatively moderate compared to the other Nordics and 
employment losses following the 2008 financial crisis were large. 
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Table 5: Demographic and residual (market) redistribution 
Change 1995-2013 Gini Relative poverty Top ten percent share 
Denmark 
   
Total    
Market income 3.42 1.48 2.54 
Disposable income 3.01 0.38 1.96 
Redistribution -0.41 -1.10 -0.58 
of which: Demographic    
Market income 3.36 2.72 1.58 
Disposable income 1.09 0.50 0.50 
Redistribution -2.26 -2.22 -1.08 
Residual (market)    
Market income 0.07 -1.24 0.96 
Disposable income 1.92 -0.12 1.46 
Redistribution 1.85 1.12 0.50 
Finland 
   
Total    
Market income 1.29 0.88 1.22 
Disposable income 4.36 4.86 2.31 
Redistribution 3.07 3.97 1.09 
of which: Demographic    
Market income 6.53 5.49 2.80 
Disposable income 0.85 0.35 0.60 
Redistribution -5.68 -5.13 -2.20 
Residual (market)    
Market income -5.24 -4.60 -1.58 
Disposable income 3.51 4.50 1.71 
Redistribution 8.75 9.10 3.29 
Norway 
   
Total    
Market income 2.22 0.13 2.07 
Disposable income 0.96 0.30 0.35 
Redistribution -1.26 0.17 -1.71 
of which: Demographic    
Market income 4.15 4.23 1.42 
Disposable income 1.42 2.40 0.32 
Redistribution -2.73 -1.83 -1.10 
Residual (market)    
Market income -1.93 -4.09 0.65 
Disposable income -0.46 -2.09 0.04 
Redistribution 1.47 2.00 -0.61 
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Change 1995-2013 Gini Relative poverty Top ten percent share 
Sweden 
   
Total    
Market income -1.03 -2.39 1.09 
Disposable income 6.72 8.32 3.98 
Redistribution 7.75 10.72 2.89 
of which: Demographic    
Market income -3.01 -3.00 -1.36 
Disposable income 0.62 1.22 0.06 
Redistribution 3.63 4.23 1.42 
Residual (market)    
Market income 1.98 0.61 2.45 
Disposable income 6.10 7.10 3.91 
Redistribution 4.12 6.49 1.47 
 1.98 0.61 2.45 
 
Note: Contributions to inequality increase are expressed in percentage (Gini) points. 
Immigration 
In order to include Norway in the analysis of immigration we redo the decomposition 
using 2000 as starting year. The results are presented in Table 6, and show a 
considerable effect from immigration in Norway, almost a half Gini point and a 0.7 
percentage point increase in the poverty rate. Results for Sweden and Denmark are 
consistent with those found for the 1995–2013 period, and relatively modest. In 
Denmark the contribution from immigration accounts for about 9 percent of the 
increase in the Gini coefficient in disposable income between 2000 and 2013 and in 
Sweden it accounts for 5 percent. The immigration-related contribution to market 
income inequality is relatively similar to the contribution to disposable income 
inequality, except in Norway, where weakening redistribution to immigrants has 
accentuated the immigration-related increase of relative poverty.  
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Table 6: Contributions from immigration (2000–2013), main methodology 
 Gini Relative poverty Top ten percent share 
Disposable income 
   
Denmark 0.23 0.20 0.10 
Norway 0.45 0.75 0.12 
Sweden 0.18 0.25 0.06 
Market income 
   
Denmark 0.30 0.22 0.18 
Norway 0.38 0.39 0.17 
Sweden 0.32 0.27 0.17 
 
Note: Contributions to inequality increase are Shapley values controlling for changes to age, household 
structure, assortative mating and the student share, expressed in percentage (Gini) points. 
 
Table 7 show the results for Denmark and Sweden from our alternative simulation 
approach using 2000 as starting year. The estimated contribution from immigration is 
larger both for Denmark and Sweden using this method. For the Gini coefficient and 
the poverty rate the contribution is twice the contribution in the original 
decomposition in Denmark and three times the decomposition result in Sweden.  
Table 7: Contributions from immigration (2000–2013), simulation methodology 
 Gini Relative poverty Top ten percent share 
Disposable income 
   
Denmark 0.45 0.47 0.16 
Sweden 0.60 0.72 0.17 
 
Note: Contributions to inequality increase are expressed in percentage (Gini) points. 
 
The key to understanding why the two methodologies yield widely different results 
is that in the simulation exercise, the counterfactual situation is one where 
immigration came to a complete halt after 2000. This means that the composition 
of the immigrant population in 2013 under this scenario resembles the 2000 
population, but older and better integrated. The difference between the simulation 
scenario and actual 2013 values will hence represent the contribution from 
immigration taking into account not only the increasing foreign-born population 
share, but also the changing composition and characteristics of new immigrants 
since the base year. This contrasts our main methodology, where the relative size of 
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the immigrant population is as in 2000 but the immigrant population’s 
characteristics and distribution of income is as in 2013. 
These differences are shown explicitly in Table 8. The relative size of the immigrant 
population is somewhat smaller in the simulation scenario than in the decomposition for 
both Denmark and Sweden, without this being decisive for our results.13 The difference 
is instead driven by the immigrant population’s income distributions under the two 
scenarios. As shown in the table, the incomes of the immigrant population are 
distributed very differently under the simulation scenario than in the actual 2013 
distribution and the decomposition scenario (The two have identical within-group 
income distributions by definition). In both countries the gap in mean disposable income 
and the relative difference in inequality levels between immigrants and native are much 
smaller than in 2013. This leads to lower overall inequality in the counterfactual scenario, 
and hence a larger contribution to inequality.  
Table 8: Immigrant population size and income distribution relative to natives 
  2013 Decomposition 
scenario 
Simulation 
scenario 
Denmark Gini coefficient 25.39 25.16 24.94 
 Immigrant population share 10.20 6.95 6.05 
 Disposable income relative to natives 84.23 84.23 89.63 
 Relative Gini coefficient 123.33 123.33 113.54 
 
Sweden Gini coefficient 28.23 28.05 27.63 
 Immigrant population share 13.92 10.79 9.38 
 Disposable income relative to natives 78.90 78.90 86.99 
 Relative Gini coefficient 110.44 110.44 106.17 
 
Note: Numbers are expressed in percentage (Gini) points. The relative Gini coefficient is calculated as the 
Gini coefficient within the immigrant group as a percentage of the Gini coefficient within the native 
group. 
                                                                 
13 The immigrant population share declines over the period because of native population growth and some immigrants re-
emigrating in the simulation methodology. 
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Summary and conclusions 
The distribution of income at a given point in time is a complex outcome shaped by 
the interaction of market trends, demographics and redistribution. We isolate the 
inequality effect of demographic trends, and find that these trends combined have 
increased disposable income inequality from 1995 to 2013 by approximately 1.4 Gini 
points in Norway, 1.1 in Denmark, 0.9 in Finland, and 0.6 in Sweden. Demographic 
trends also contributed strongly to increased relative poverty in Norway and Sweden. 
Household structure has affected disposable income inequality in all the 
countries, but most so in Norway. Finland has seen considerable ageing since the 
1990s, and this has increased the Gini coefficient markedly. Contributions from ageing 
are relatively limited in the other countries. An increasing population share of 
students has had a large effect in Denmark, notably increasing relative poverty. An 
increasing share of foreign-born has widened inequality in Denmark, Sweden and 
Norway, but our main methodology only captures parts of the inequality effect of 
immigration. The contribution from immigration, taking into account not only the 
increasing foreign-born population share, but also the changing composition and 
characteristics of new immigrants may be between two (Denmark) and three 
(Sweden) times higher than our main results. 
Demographic factors were the main contributors to widening market income 
inequality in Denmark, Finland and Norway. However, taxes and cash transfers have 
been particularly responsive to changes in demography and strongly dampened the 
extent to which increased market income inequality due to these factors have 
affected disposable income inequality. Sweden differs from the other countries, as 
demographic factors reduced market income inequality over the period. 
Redistribution related to demographics therefore weakened.  
Having established that demographics have influenced the development of 
inequality in the Nordics, it is pertinent to ask whether policy should react. First, 
demographics is only one of several forces affecting inequality, and the big increases 
in inequality in Sweden, Denmark and Finland are for the most part not driven by 
demographics. Second, policy normally does not aim to change demographic trends 
as such,14 so the question is rather whether policy should respond to the distributional                                                                  
14 There are, however, ample examples of policy enabling and even purposefully altering such trends. Migration is one 
example where policy has a direct, although partial, effect. Policies towards contraception and tax-transfer policies may 
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consequences of demographic trends. This is not obvious in principle, since the 
inequality changes measured by our methodology do not reflect any new problems, 
they simply reflect that a higher share of the population end up in an existing situation 
of low or high income. To the extent this is an undesirable situation, policies should be 
put in place regardless of the increasing population share.  
However, a more pragmatic view is that associating inequality increases with 
particular demographic trends can help understand why inequality changes over time 
and hence inform decisions about what to do about it. Such decisions will inevitably be 
value-based. If policy is guided by inequality of life-time income there will for example 
be little need to counteract the effects of ageing and an increasing share of students 
who invest in higher future incomes. If policy aims to prevent intergenerational 
transmission of low incomes, a focus on the income standards of households with 
children and trends of assortative mating, which might polarise inequality of 
opportunity, would be warranted. Furthermore, immigration raises a host of issues 
related to labour market and social integration and intergenerational mobility.  
In addition, our estimates can help describe and understand the strength and direction 
of redistribution policies over the period we study. As an example, ageing trends are 
almost perfectly cancelled out by redistribution, except in Finland, while redistribution is 
less responsive to other demographic trends. This is probably at least partially a reflection 
of sharper trade-offs between inequality and work incentives for working-age taxes and 
benefits than for age-related redistribution, but might also reflect political economy, as 
ageing increases the political sway of pensioners and older workers.  
Our results can offer better understanding of inequality trends and thus help 
getting the existing set of policies right. We see several possible extensions for future 
studies. Identifying the main demographic drivers of inequality still leaves open many 
questions regarding the exact mechanisms at play. A better understanding of the 
extent to which inequality trends reflect intra-generational or intergenerational 
inequality should be of interest to national administrations. Our study may help 
identify relevant areas for further research to this end. Better knowledge of how 
demographic trends affect inequality can be used to construct future scenarios which 
could guide policy. Finally, LIS data covers a number of countries, and expanding 
country coverage would allow better benchmarking and broader insights.                                                                                                                                                               
enable and incentivise certain household patterns, or taken to the extreme; the Chinese one-child policy has altered the 
whole family-age structure of a country (and the world). 
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Annex 1 Decomposition by re-weighting  
The distribution of income in period 1 (2013) can be expressed as the integral of the 
density of incomes conditional on some characteristics X of the population over the 
distribution of X in period 1: 
 
(1) 1 1 1 1( ) ( ; 1) ( | ) ( )X Xf Y f Y t f Y X dF X= = = ∫   
 
If the distribution of X is independent from the conditional distribution of income, 
then the hypothetical distribution of income that would have prevailed in period 1if X 
had been distributed as in period 0 (mid-1980s), can be written as 
 
(2) 0
1 1 0 1 1
1
( )( ; 0) ( | ) ( ) ( | ) ( )
( )X X X
dF Xf Y t f Y X dF X f Y X dF X
dF X
= = =∫ ∫
  
 
The right-hand side of (2) is identical to (1) except for the ratio 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑0(𝑋𝑋)/𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑1(𝑋𝑋). Thus, 
multiplying the original income distribution in period 1 by the ratio between the 
distribution of X in period 0 and the distribution of in period 1 result in an adjusted 
distribution that is the distribution of income in period 1 weighted by the distribution 
of X in period 0.  
For any measure of inequality I , the relative contribution of characteristics X to 
the change in I is calculated as  
 
(3) 1 1
1 0
( ( )) ( ( ; 0))
( ( )) ( ( ))
XI f Y I f Y t
I f Y I f Y
− =
−
 
 
The numerator in (3) is the absolute contribution.  
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Annex 2 Decomposing redistribution 
We start by the identity established by Reynolds and Smolensky (1977), that the 
redistribution, R, equals the difference between inequality, I, of disposable income 
(superscript D) and market income (superscript M): 
 
 𝑅𝑅 = 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷 − 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀  
 
The change in redistribution from period 0 to period 1 then equals: 
 
(1) ∆𝑅𝑅 = 𝑅𝑅1 − 𝑅𝑅0 = (𝐼𝐼1𝐷𝐷 − 𝐼𝐼1𝑀𝑀) − (𝐼𝐼0𝐷𝐷 − 𝐼𝐼0𝑀𝑀) 
 
With an additive decomposition of inequality in period 1, where the demographic 
contribution to inequality change and the residual (market) contribution sum up to 
total change in inequality, we can establish the following identities, where superscript 
d denotes the demographic contribution, and superscript r denotes the residual 
contribution to disposable (2) and market (3) income inequality: 
 
(2) 𝐼𝐼1𝐷𝐷 = 𝐼𝐼0𝐷𝐷 + ∆𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷.𝑑𝑑 + ∆𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷.𝑟𝑟  
 
(3) 𝐼𝐼1𝑀𝑀 = 𝐼𝐼0𝑀𝑀 + ∆𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀.𝑑𝑑 + ∆𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀.𝑟𝑟  
 
Inserting (2) and (3) in (1) yields: 
 
 ∆𝑅𝑅 = �𝐼𝐼0𝐷𝐷 + ∆𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷.𝑑𝑑 + ∆𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷.𝑟𝑟 − 𝐼𝐼0𝑀𝑀 − ∆𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀.𝑑𝑑 − ∆𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀.𝑟𝑟� − (𝐼𝐼0𝐷𝐷 − 𝐼𝐼0𝑀𝑀) 
 
This simplifies to: 
 
(4) ∆𝑅𝑅 = ∆𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷.𝑑𝑑−∆𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀.𝑑𝑑 + ∆𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷.𝑟𝑟 − ∆𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀.𝑟𝑟  
 
The change in redistribution related to demographic factors can be written as: 
 
(5) ∆𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑 = ∆𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷.𝑑𝑑−∆𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀.𝑑𝑑 
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The change in redistribution related to residual (market) factors can be written as: 
 
(6) ∆𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟 = ∆𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷.𝑟𝑟−∆𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀.𝑟𝑟  
 
Since the individual contributions from the different demographic factors sum up to 
the total demographic contribution, equation 5 can be further decomposed to account 
for redistribution associated with each of the demographic trends, x: 
 
(7) ∆𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑 = ∑ ∆𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 = ∑ (∆𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷.𝑥𝑥−∆𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀.𝑥𝑥)𝑥𝑥  
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Table 10: Changes to market income, disposable income and redistribution associated with individual 
factors 
  Market income Disposable income Redistribution 
Denmark Ageing 1.63 0.09 -1.54 
 Household structure 1.20 0.26 -0.94 
 Assortative mating 0.19 0.06 -0.14 
 Student households -0.12 0.32 0.44 
 Immigration 0.46 0.37 -0.09 
 
Finland Ageing 4.12 0.44 -3.69 
 Household structure 2.54 0.65 -1.89 
 Assortative mating -0.28 -0.17 0.11 
 Student households 0.15 -0.07 -0.21 
 
Norway Ageing 0.51 0.15 -0.37 
 Household structure 3.82 1.36 -2.46 
 Assortative mating -0.03 -0.14 -0.10 
 Student households -0.15 0.04 0.20 
 
Sweden Ageing -2.30 -0.02 2.28 
 Household structure -0.65 0.41 1.05 
 Assortative mating 0.06 0.03 -0.04 
 Student households -0.49 -0.01 0.49 
 Immigration 0.37 0.22 -0.16 
 
Note: Contributions to inequality increase are Shapley values, expressed in Gini points. 
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Comment on P.O. Robling and J.K. Parelliusen: Demographic 
Change and Inequality Trends in the Nordic Countries 
Arent Skjæveland1 
 
 
The Pareliussen and Robling paper is a valuable contribution to the analysis of 
developments in income inequality in the Nordic countries. An even income 
distribution is at the core of the Nordic welfare model, and increased income 
dispersion tends to create strong political tensions in our societies. Therefore, 
understanding the drivers for increased income dispersion is crucial in order to identify 
a relevant political answer. 
I guess the reason why I have been chosen as a discussant relates to my closeness 
to the finance minister. I will therefore discuss the paper in light of its policy relevance 
and will do so by asking three questions. 
Do we have a problem?  
The answer is clearly yes! The strong increase in inequality, especially in Sweden and 
Finland, but also in Denmark, may challenge a cornerstone of our welfare models. The 
magnitude of the changes is alarming. When it comes to the widening of the disposal 
income distribution the development compares poorly even to the US, although from 
a much more compressed starting-level.  
Increased inequality in the Nordics was recently discussed at a meeting in 
Working Party 1 in OECD, giving cause to the following statement from the OECD 
secretariat:  
“It is noteworthy that Finland and Sweden, experiencing marked declines in redistribution, also 
displayed among the strongest economic performance for the period under consideration. It may 
well be that these countries, and the Nordics in general, which started from very high levels of 
redistribution, indeed faced a binding equity-efficiency trade-off and opted for less redistribution in 
exchange for more economic growth.”                                                                   
1 Norwegian Ministry of Finance. Thanks to Kristin Solberg-Watle and Vibeke Øi for good remarks on earlier drafts of this 
comment. However, remaining shortcuts and possible mistakes are solely my responsibility. 
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The statement is strong, making me extremely curious about what is actually going 
on. Up until now, we thought there was no trade-off between equity and growth in 
the Nordics, but rather a “trade-in”, as discussed by Hopkin and Blyth (2012).2 
Barth and Moene (2016) emphasize complementarity between wage setting and 
welfare spending across countries when explaining why almost equally rich countries 
differ so much in economic and social equality among their citizens, introducing the 
concept of an “equality multiplier”. They argue that more wage equality fuels the 
generosity of the welfare state, via political competition in elections, while a more 
generous welfare state fuels wage equality via empowerment of weak groups in the 
society. Together, the two mechanisms may generate a cumulative process that 
explains how equality – and inequality – multiplies. 
Thus, are we witnessing the beginning of the end of the Nordic welfare model? Or 
could there be several steady states here, implying there are a number of 
corresponding levels of equality and growth? 
Is demography the main driver?  
The answer is clearly no! At least it is not the case for the countries with the largest 
changes in inequality, which can be seen from Table 5 in the paper. The main driver 
behind the changes in disposal income distribution in all countries, except Norway, is 
clearly market changes, represented by the residual effect in the table. 
Even more interesting from a political point of view – it seems like less 
redistributive policies is the major driver, as stated in Pareliussen et al. (2018) also in 
this volume. Even though redistribution is not the topic of the present study, let me 
add one point on this. At an earlier OECD meeting, a Danish colleague, Peter Eibye 
Bache, was lead speaker in our discussion on redistribution. His main comment 
underlined the strong endogeneity in the explaining factors here. Since an important 
driver of the reduced redistribution is lower unemployment and successful “make 
work pay” reforms, it could be questioned whether the findings are good or bad news.                                                                  
2 In the wording of Hopkin and Blyth: ”…as our empirical analysis (below) demonstrates, there is a world where equality 
trades off against efficiency; primarily Anglo-America. Yet to identify that world, econometrically speaking, you need to 
leave every OECD country with greater level of market regulation than Germany out of the equation. There is also a world 
of trade-ins, primarily the Scandinavian and Northern European states, that stand in contrast to Okun’s thesis. Finally, 
there is everyone else, from Mexico to Italy to Turkey, that neither trades off nor trades in, and where inequality and 
inefficiency have unfortunately, a positive and reinforcing relationship.” 
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Lower unemployment (both cyclical and structural), as witnessed in Denmark and 
Sweden, reduces the need for redistributive policies. Reforms seeking to increase 
employment among seniors, also imply reduced transfers (at least in the short run) – 
and thus less redistributive policies. The same is the case when the number of 
students increases if we assume the alternative to be higher unemployment transfers. 
In the case of Denmark, the decline in redistributive polices is almost eliminated if one 
corrects for intended policy changes. 
Does this study still have something interesting to offer?  
In my view – yes! We need to know what drives changes in inequality to draw relevant 
policy conclusions and understand the relative importance of the different factors. 
Thus, the distinction between different demographic factors is helpful:  
 
• More students 
An increase in the number of students represents no problem from a policy point 
of view. More education produces long-term gains, both to society and 
individuals. The students will get their reward when they leave school.  
• More elderly people 
An aging population challenges the welfare state, since fewer contributes to 
government revenues, while there is an increasing number of recipients of 
pension and health and care services, pushing public expenditures upwards. How 
to deal with these long-term consequences for government budgets is a major 
policy challenge. However, from an income distribution point of view, aging 
should not represent a problem. There are good reasons why pensions should not 
match earlier work income completely, and, consequently, a widening income 
distribution due to a higher fraction of elderly people should not be regarded as a 
poverty problem. 
• More immigrants 
The study would have benefited from drawing a distinction between non-western 
and western immigrants, the latter referring mainly to the inflow of workers from 
EU countries and other advanced economies. An increasing number of 
immigrants from non-western countries, as experienced in the Nordic countries in 
2015 when the bulk of the inflow was asylum seekers, raises a range of policy 
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challenges. However, the main challenge is probably not inequality – at least not 
in the short run. It is simply not feasible to give all newly arrived immigrants an 
average income. Rather, non-western immigration is a challenge for integration. 
It is also worth noting that since data in the study are presented only up until 2013, 
the effect of non-western immigration as a driver for increased inequality is not 
very pronounced in the study – it does not cover the most interesting years. 
Labour immigration from the EU countries represents another type of 
immigration, which also may pose challenges. Such effects can be seen in a 
tendency of increased divergence in wage developments between industry 
sectors. In several countries, this has translated into a discussion around “social 
dumping”. To address this concern, a generalisation of collective tariff 
agreements has been introduced by law for some sectors in Norway. 
• More singles 
If a main demographic driver is an increase in the number of singles, it may pose a 
policy challenge. More single households may affect optimal housing policies, 
optimal tax policies and maybe the design of the benefit system. 
• Assortative mating 
Assortative mating may also represent a policy challenge. It could fortify poverty 
challenges if for instance the low-paid find spouses in the same group.  
 
To sum up, if more singles and more assortative mating prove to be important drivers 
of the changes in income distribution, policy measures might be relevant and 
necessary, but less so if the main drivers are more students, more immigrants or more 
elderly people. 
A final point on in-kind benefits 
I will conclude by making a final point on the importance of in-kind benefits (e.g. 
provision of public services to improve living standards for individuals, such as health 
care services and school). In-kind transfers are double the size of cash transfers. While 
cash transfers have gone down, in-kind transfers have gone up over the period 
studied.  
In-kind benefits are at the core of the Nordic welfare model, as discussed in 
Aaberge et al (2018). In-kind transfers are often less problematic from a labour supply 
perspective than taxes and cash transfers. To analyse distribution without taking them 
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into account, might give misleading results. In fact, increased in-kind benefits could 
possibly have counteracted the increased inequality in disposal income.  
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Comment on P.O. Robling and J.K. Parelliusen: Demographic 
Change and Inequality Trends in the Nordic Countries 
Thorvaldur Gylfason1 
 
 
This is a nice and clear and useful paper. It is especially useful to have for the first time 
a decomposition of Nordic Gini indices of inequality to help us understand the 
contribution of demographic change to increased inequality and how these 
demographic effects vary from one country to another. The presumption must be that 
the effects ascribed to demographic change cannot be the result of, e.g., regressive 
fiscal policies.  
This having been said, it is a bit surprising to be shown a decomposition of 
inequality measures based on Gini indices rather than Theil indices. This is because a 
well-known drawback of the Gini index is that it is non-additive and thus cannot be 
easily decomposed if at all. On the other hand, an important advantage of the less 
intuitive and less widely used Theil index is that it is additive and, therefore, 
decomposable. For example, income distribution as measured by the Theil index can 
be assessed across, as well as within, groups and regions as emphasized by income 
distribution researchers such as James Galbraith (see, e.g., Galbraith 2012).  
The authors are clearly constrained by existing data sources from the OECD and 
the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) which, thus far, have offered only Gini indices. 
Even so, it would have been helpful to have a discussion of these issues, what might 
change were Theil indices available and what it would take to make such indices 
available and applicable. 
The deficient treatment of capital income and especially capital gains in existing 
statistical sources needs to be addressed up front and not as a technical detail 
midstream because it is crucial. A serious problem with available internationally 
comparable data from the OECD and the LIS is that they leave out capital gains on the 
grounds that they can be viewed as windfalls, like, say, lottery winnings. But this is not 
correct. Capital gains have in many cases been shown to be the result of self-dealing 
                                                                 
1 University of Iceland. 
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through stock options that members of economic elites bestow on each other, for 
example – a phenomenon that is very different from unexpected windfalls.  
Exposures of sundry financial misconduct by self-dealing elites in recent years 
make it imperative to acknowledge the limitation of looking at the distribution across 
households of disposable wage income from labor and underestimated interest 
income from capital alone, underestimated because of the huge sums of money 
stashed away in secret tax havens as shown by Zucman (2015) among others. What is 
needed is comprehensive measures of the distribution of total income, properly 
defined, before and after tax, as well as the distribution of wealth and of health. 
Wealth distribution measures were until recently difficult to come by except in a 
handful of countries, and such measures as are available may not be easily 
comparable across countries. Hidden wealth in tax havens exacerbates the problem. 
The distribution of health, and of life expectancy in particular, a more recent concern, 
is, however, easier to gauge. A brief acknowledgment of the burgeoning literature on 
those issues would have been welcome, with references to, e.g., the seminal work of 
Anne Case and Angus Deaton (see, e.g., Case and Deaton 2015) as well as Hederos et 
al. (2017), to suggest one relevant Nordic reference. These discussions, admittedly a 
bit outside the box, would have placed this useful paper in a clear context of the 
broader, burning issues at stake.  
At last, as the authors acknowledge, Iceland is left out of much of the discussion in 
the paper for lack of data. But Iceland provides, nonetheless, a good illustration of 
some of the difficulties described above because this country’s Gini coefficient, based 
on total disposable income, rose by one point a year from 1993 to 2008, a unique 
event that statistical and political authorities pretended not to notice, as described in 
Gylfason et al. (2010).2 Ólafsson and Kristjánsson (2013, 2017) document these 
developments and their background in detail. In their path-breaking 2017 book, they 
present new information on the distribution of wealth, showing Iceland´s wealth 
distribution to be the third least equal in a group of 29 countries based on the assets 
held by the richest ten percent of households. By this measure, only the United States 
and Switzerland have a less equal wealth distribution than Iceland. Further, Ólafsson 
and Kristjánsson (2017) show Iceland´s wealth distribution to be the sixth least equal 
in the same group of countries based on the assets held by the richest one percent of                                                                  
2 See Chapter 7, Figure 7.5. 
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households.3 By this narrower measure, only the United States, Switzerland, 
Denmark, Sweden, and Indonesia have a less equal wealth distribution than Iceland. 
These findings strengthen the afore-mentioned suspicion that something is amiss in 
the income distribution statistics that suggest that Iceland has the most equal 
distribution of disposable income among the OCED countries as reported by 
Pareliussen and Robling (2018).4 Among their sources, Ólafsson and Kristjánsson 
(2017) cite the Global Wealth Report from the Credit Suisse Research Institute. The 
OECD and other international organizations need to start gathering and reporting 
internationally comparable statistics on the distribution of wealth. This is important 
because inequality has suddenly become one of the most pressing political and moral 
issues of our time.  
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Accounting for Public In-Kind 
Transfers in Comparisons of Income 
Inequality between the Nordic 
Countries 
Rolf Aaberge, Audun Langørgen and Petter Y. Lindgren1 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of publicly provided health care, long-
term care, education and child care services on estimates of income inequality and 
poverty in the Nordic countries. The valuation and allocation of public services to 
target groups rely on accounting data and recipient age profiles for each country. 
Because the entitlement to public services like education, health care and care for the 
elderly is associated with particular needs, we replace the conventional EU scale for 
cash income with a theory-based needs-adjusted EU scale (the NA scale). The 
empirical results show that inclusion of public in-kind transfers has a significant effect 
on measurement of inequality and reduces poverty estimates by around 50 per cent. 
 
Keywords: Income distribution, poverty, needs adjustment, equivalence scales, public in-kind 
transfers. 
JEL classification: D31, I10, I20, I32. 
                                                                  
1 Research Department, Statistics Norway. We are grateful to Tuulia Hakola, Jukka Pirttilä, Terje Skjerpen, the editors, and 
one anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions.  
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Introduction 
Most analyses of income distribution rely on household data on cash income after tax 
and ignore the distributional impact of public services, despite the fact that the tax 
burden levied on households is justified by in-kind as well as cash transfers financed by 
income taxes. Moreover, differences in the size and composition of public services 
weaken the comparability between countries when public in-kind transfers are not 
accounted for. Inclusion of public welfare services contributes therefore to a more 
complete picture of the income distribution and the redistribution mechanisms of 
modern welfare states, not least because publicly funded welfare services constitute 
around half of the welfare states’ transfers to individuals and households (Atkinson et al. 
2002 and Garfinkel et al. 2006). During the recent years a number of studies have, 
however, included public welfare services to produce a more accurate comparison of 
people’s material well-being.2  
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the impact of public in-kind transfers on the 
distribution of income in the Nordic countries, where public services are either free or 
heavily subsidised. To this end, we will rely on results from Aaberge et al. (2013, 2017). 
These studies provide estimates of income inequality and poverty for distributions of 
extended income in European countries, where extended income was defined as the 
sum of cash income after tax and public in-kind transfers. Specifically, Aaberge et al. 
include four main public service provisions: child care, education, health care and long-
term care. Since such services are part of the social security systems of the welfare 
states, it is of particular interest to evaluate the effects of the Great Recession on 
distributions of cash and extended income and compare the outcomes for the Nordic 
countries with the outcomes for other European countries in 2006 and 2009.  
Assessing the value of public services enjoyed by different households cannot be 
achieved without relying on various basic assumptions. First, since most public services 
are produced by public institutions we only observe expenditures and not prices. Thus, 
this study draws on standard practice by assuming that the total value of these services                                                                  
2 For previous studies on the impact of in-kind benefits on the income distribution, see O’Higgins and Ruggles (1981), 
Gemmell (1985), Smeeding (1986), Smeeding et al. (1993), Evandrou et al. (1993), Ruggeri et al. (1994), Slesnick (1996), 
Antoninis and Tsakloglou (2001), Aaberge and Langørgen (2006), Garfinkel et al. (2006), Callan et al. (2008), Paulus et al. 
(2010), Aaberge, Bhuller, Langørgen and Mogstad (2010), Aaberge, Langørgen and Lindgren (2010, 2013, 2017), Vaalavuo 
(2011), Verbist et al. (2012), and Koutsampelas and Tsakloglou (2013). 
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is equal to the total costs of producing them. Secondly, again in accord with standard 
practice we allocate the average costs of producing services to beneficiaries. We have 
hence used the national spending data on child care, education, health care and long-
term care provided by the OECD. The recipients are classified by gender and age group, 
and individuals are assumed to receive the average benefit of their respective groups for 
each public service, while the average benefit is allowed to vary across countries. The 
value of public services received by a given household is the aggregate of the values 
received by the household members. 
The importance of accounting for needs and economies of scale in households 
when analysing the distributional impact of public services is universally acknowledged. 
However, since equivalence scales designed to account for needs and economies of 
scale in cash income are not necessarily appropriate for public services, it is required to 
relax the assumption that the relative needs of different subgroups remain unchanged 
when the definition of income is extended to include the value of public services. To this 
end, Aaberge, Bhuller, Langørgen and Mogstad (2010) and Aaberge, Langørgen and 
Lindgren (2013, 2017, 2018) introduce theory-based equivalence scales for extended 
income denoted needs-adjusted (NA) scales. The NA scale is defined as a weighted 
average of the EU scale and a non-cash income (NC) scale for public in-kind transfers. 
The NA scale assigns higher weights to children and the elderly compared to the EU 
scale, because children and the elderly have greater needs for basic public welfare 
services like education and health care. 
Using the EU scale rather than the NA scale creates a different picture of poverty in 
a society. In particular, poverty rates appear to be underestimated among single adults 
with children when using the EU scale for adjusting extended income, because that scale 
ignores that such households have great needs for public services. Similarly, poverty 
rates among single adults (below 75 years) without children are overestimated when 
adjusting extended income by the EU scale rather than by the NA scale. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The second section provides a 
brief discussion of the theoretical foundation for needs-adjusted (NA) equivalence scales 
and presents common equivalence scales of public services and extended income for 
European countries. In the third section, empirical results on income inequality and 
poverty for the Nordic countries and a selection of Eastern and Western European 
countries are shown. A brief conclusion is presented in the final section. For more 
detailed information on data and empirical methods we refer to Aaberge et al. (2013). 
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Needs for public services and equivalence scales 
Equivalence scales play an important role in analyses of income inequality and 
financial poverty as a method to account for different needs of people living in 
different types of households. For example, couples without children need more 
income than a single individual, but since they can share some expenses they need 
less than twice the income of single individuals to attain the same standard of living. 
The equivalence scale assigns values to each household in proportion to their needs. 
The couple will be assigned a value between 1 and 2, when the single household is 
used as a reference household. One way to derive theoretically justified equivalence 
scales is to exploit the cost functions of households with different demographic 
characteristics. This method requires in-depth information about the consumption 
patterns of households. Because of the lack of such data, most empirical analyses 
typically use more pragmatic scales adjusting crudely for differences in household size 
and composition (see e.g. Coulter et al. 1992). The standard practice in applied work is 
to use the so-called EU scale (modified OECD scale) to account for heterogeneity in 
needs for cash income. The EU scale assigns weight 1 to the household head, 0.5 to 
each additional member aged 14 and above and 0.3 to each member aged below 14. 
When adding public services to cash income into an extended income concept, a 
new methodological issue is introduced: how can we compare the income of 
individuals when needs not only differ for cash income but also for public services? As 
argued by Radner (1997), equivalence scales designed to account for needs and 
economies of scale in cash income are not necessarily appropriate when analysing an 
income concept that includes the value of public services. For instance, the elderly 
tend to utilise health services more frequently than younger people due to differences 
in health status, whereas children have a genuine need for education.3 As a 
consequence, studies using equivalence scales designed for cash income overstate the 
equivalent incomes of groups with relatively great needs for public services. 
Scale economies in consumption are used as justification for assigning a larger 
weight to the first adult of the household (as discussed above). The relatively low 
weight that is given to children in the EU scale is due to the fact that children generally 
consume small quantities of basic goods, such as food and beverages. Thus, it is                                                                  
3 For references to equivalence scales that introduce needs adjustment, see Jones and O'Donnell (1995) and Zaidi and 
Burchardt (2005). They show that the disabled have relatively high needs for non-cash as well as cash income. 
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implicitly assumed that children have smaller needs for private consumption goods 
than adults. Even if this assumption is correct for consumption of goods financed by 
cash income, the picture may change when we extend the needs concept to include 
needs for public education services. Thus, if the weight 0.3 is considered appropriate 
for children when analysing the distribution of cash income, it makes sense to increase 
the weight for children when income is extended to include public child care and 
education expenditures. This proposition is based on the assumption that children are 
in need of child care and education, and that the children and the associated 
household members should not suffer economically when they belong to a household 
with large needs for child care and education services. Similarly, larger needs for 
health care and long-term care among the elderly mean that the equivalence scale 
should differentiate between adults in different age groups when the income 
definition includes public health care and care for the elderly. Finally, the consumption 
of health services differs between genders, and thus, estimates of needs for such 
public services should be gender-specific. 
Needs-adjusted equivalence scale 
This section provides a brief presentation of the common needs-adjusted EU 
equivalence scale for European countries proposed by Aaberge et al. (2013, 2017). The 
common needs-adjusted EU equivalence scale (NA) is designed to deal with situations 
where the income concept is extended to include public in-kind transfers. The first 
step of designing a common needs-adjusted EU scale consists of estimating needs-
adjusted scales for each of the European countries included in this study. Next, the 
common scale is determined by the average of the country-specific needs-adjusted 
equivalence scales for every household in all countries.4 A theoretical discussion of the 
NA scale is given in Aaberge et al. (2018). 
The purpose of an equivalence scale is to convert household incomes into 
comparable individual-specific incomes (equivalent incomes). Equivalence scales may 
be absolute or relative. Applying an absolute scale to translate household income to                                                                  
4 In comparisons of inequality and poverty across countries, the standard practice is to apply the same equivalence scale to 
different countries. We use a weighted average of country-specific NA scales (where countries are weighted by population 
size). This means that relatively extensive public service provision allows a country to meet recipient needs better and is not 
interpreted as being due to recipients having larger needs for a given age. 
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individual equivalent income involves subtracting a fixed sum per household member 
from the household income. The underlying assumption is then that each person 
needs a certain amount of income to survive and partake in society. A relative scale, 
on the other hand, provides the rate at which one Euro for one household translates 
into the Euro amount that will produce the same well-being for another household. 
Thus, if household h enjoys income 𝑦𝑦ℎ, and 𝑚𝑚ℎ is the conversion rate from the 
reference household to household h, then the reference household needs income 
𝑦𝑦ℎ  / 𝑚𝑚ℎ to obtain the same level of well-being as (members of) household h enjoys. 
Consequently, 𝑦𝑦ℎ  / 𝑚𝑚ℎ is defined as the equivalent income of household h, and it 
follows that the relative scale is given by the ratio of income to equivalent income. 
When applying a relative equivalence scale, one assumes that the need for income 
is independent of the income level. This assumption might be considered to be fairly 
strong since it implies that the degree of economies of scale in consumption in a 
household is independent of the level of income. However, for reasons of simplicity 
and due to lack of detailed data on consumption patterns, income-independent scales 
like the EU scale are the ones commonly used. 
Table 1: Equivalence scales for cash income (EU) and extended income (NA) 
Type Age EU NA 
Single males 18–24 1.00 0.99 
  25–34 1.00 0.99 
  35–44 1.00 1.00 
  45–54 1.00 1.03 
  55–64 1.00 1.07 
  65–74 1.00 1.16 
  75+ 1.00 1.31 
Single females 18–24 1.00 0.99 
  25–34 1.00 1.01 
  35–44 1.00 1.01 
  45–54 1.00 1.03 
  55–64 1.00 1.06 
  65–74 1.00 1.14 
  75+ 1.00 1.33 
Couples 18–24 1.50 1.51 
  25–34 1.50 1.53 
  35–44 1.50 1.54 
  45–54 1.50 1.59 
  55–64 1.50 1.66 
  65–74 1.50 1.83 
  75+ 1.50 2.18 
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Type Age EU NA 
Couples with one child 0 1.80 1.92 
  1–2 1.80 1.99 
  3 – education age 1.80 2.12 
  Primary education 1.80 2.21 
  Lower secondary education 1.80 2.26 
  Upper secondary education 2.00 2.49 
Couples with two children 0 2.10 2.30 
  1–2 2.10 2.43 
  3 – education age 2.10 2.70 
  Primary education 2.10 2.88 
  Lower secondary education 2.10 2.98 
  Upper secondary education 2.50 3.44 
Single mothers with one child 0 1.30 1.39 
  1–2 1.30 1.45 
  3 – education age 1.30 1.59 
  Primary education 1.30 1.68 
  Lower secondary education 1.30 1.73 
  Upper secondary education 1.50 1.96 
Single mothers with two children 0 1.60 1.77 
  1–2 1.60 1.90 
  3 – education age 1.60 2.17 
  Primary education 1.60 2.35 
  Lower secondary education 1.60 2.45 
  Upper secondary education 2.00 2.91 
 
Note: Household types with children in lower secondary education level include only children below 14 
years of age. The age group 18–24 years includes only persons above secondary education age. 
 
The use of an income-independent equivalence scale for extended income means that 
the need for public services constitutes a share of extended income that is depending 
on household type, but not on the level of income. Except for the Nordic countries, 
detailed municipal accounting data are in general not available. Thus, in order to 
estimate needs parameters for 22 European countries we have to rely on less 
informative data like the mean public spending targeted to different population 
subgroups defined by age and gender. Average spending per person received by the 
different target groups of public services, such as children and the elderly, is used as 
indicators of the population groups’ need for child care, education, health care and 
long-term care. The mean in-kind transfers received by different target groups are 
assumed to reflect the relative needs of the target groups. Since the estimated need 
parameters for public services are referring to individuals, household specific need 
parameters are obtained by simply aggregating the need parameters of the 
individuals in each household. 
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The equivalence scale for extended income (the NA scale) is defined as a weighted 
average of the equivalence scales for public in-kind transfers and cash income. As 
explained in Appendix A, the needs parameters for public services and cash income 
form the basis for estimating the NA scale. The needs parameter of the reference 
household for cash income is defined by the median of equivalent cash income within 
each country.5 For households that are not of the reference type, we assume that the 
EU scale identifies the ratio of the needs parameters for cash income of a given 
household and the reference household. Hence, we follow much of the previous 
literature in using the EU scale to account for differences in the needs for cash income 
across households who differ in size and composition. 
Table 1 displays the EU and NA scales by household types when including all four 
public services in the definition of extended income. While the EU scale takes into 
consideration economies of scale and give different weights to children and adults in 
the household, the NA scale accounts for the needs of child care, education, health 
care and long-term care as well as for the needs of cash income. Thus, the NA scale is 
relatively high for households with elderly people or with children. 
Empirical implementation 
This section presents the empirical implementation of the methods for allocating the value 
of public services to individuals, and the methods used for evaluating the income 
distribution. First we describe the population of study, the data and methods for valuation 
of public services, and the allocation of the value of public services to individuals. Then, we 
report the estimates for the adjusted equivalence scale, discuss the different income 
definitions, and define the inequality measures and poverty thresholds. 
Population of study 
This study relies on the EU-SILC 2007 and 2010 cross-sectional data, which are 
survey data on income and living conditions assembled by EUROSTAT. The data 
sets refer to the year the data were collected (2007, 2010), although the incomes                                                                  
5 In this study the reference household type is defined by childless single male adults of age 35-44 years. 
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were earned in 2006 and 2009. However, the demographic information refers to 
2007 and 2010. We assume that the household composition was the same in 2006 
(2009) as in 2007 (2010). The results in this study concern the five Nordic countries 
and 17 other European countries. 
Table 2: Population of study by household type and country, percent of individuals, 2009 
 Household type 
Age of adults 18–64 18–64 65–74 75+ 18+ Other 
Number of adults 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 3+ 3+ 0–2 
Children No No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes No/Yes 
Denmark 15 17 6 34 3 4 4 2 3 6 5 
Finland 11 19 4 34 3 4 4 3 6 7 6 
Iceland 8 12 7 38 2 3 3 2 10 12 4 
Norway 12 16 8 36 2 4 4 2 4 6 5 
Sweden 11 17 5 35 3 5 5 3 5 6 6 
            
Austria 10 13 3 28 3 4 3 2 17 12 5 
Belgium 9 16 5 30 2 4 4 2 12 10 5 
Czech Republic 5 14 3 30 2 3 3 2 21 11 6 
Estonia 8 14 3 29 3 3 4 1 16 12 6 
France 10 17 5 32 2 3 4 3 9 8 5 
Germany 13 17 4 27 4 7 2 2 11 6 7 
Greece 3 9 1 33 1 2 2 2 29 8 9 
Hungary 5 13 3 26 2 3 2 1 21 18 7 
Ireland 4 12 8 39 2 3 2 1 12 12 5 
Italy 7 10 3 28 2 3 4 3 22 12 7 
Netherlands 10 18 3 36 2 4 3 2 9 7 5 
Poland 4 10 1 23 2 2 3 1 24 26 4 
Portugal 2 10 2 29 2 3 3 3 24 15 6 
Slovakia 4 9 1 21 3 2 2 1 31 21 5 
Slovenia 5 10 2 29 2 3 3 2 23 14 6 
Spain 4 12 1 31 1 3 2 3 26 12 6 
UK 7 16 6 33 3 3 4 2 11 10 5 
 
Note: Children are defined as aged below 18 years. EU-SILC cross-sectional weighting is used to produce 
estimates for the population. Students are omitted from the population. 
Source: : EU-SILC, EUROSTAT. 
 
To provide some basic information of demographic characteristics of the countries in 
question, Table 2 shows the population composition for each country by household 
types. Since children and the elderly are important recipients of public services, we 
have classified households in the following way: 
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• We distinguish between households with adults in the age groups 18–64, 65–74 
and 75 years and above. 
• We distinguish between households with 1, 2 or 3 or more adult household 
members (18 years and above). 
• We distinguish between households with or without children (at least one child 
below 18 years of age). 
 
For households with adults in the age group 18–64 years we specify households with 
one or two adults combined with households with or without children to form the 
following four household types: Single adult without children, couple without 
children, single adult with children and couple with children. For the two elderly age 
groups we specify single and couple households without children. For households with 
three or more adults we do not specify the age of the adults, but we distinguish 
between households with or without children. The residual type “Other households” 
includes households with two adults that belong to different age groups, or with one 
or two elderly adults in households with children. 
Table 2 shows the country-specific distributions of individuals by household. A 
fairly large share of the households is constituted by two adults below 65 years of age 
with one or more children. In particular, this household type is rather common in the 
Nordic countries as well as in Ireland and the Netherlands. Households with three or 
more adults are rather common in Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Slovakia and Spain. Denmark, and Norway have relatively high shares of 
single adults aged 18–64 with and without children. 
The value of public services 
Analyses of extended income normally assume that the value of public services is equal 
to the cost of providing them (O’Higgins and Ruggles 1981, Gemmell 1985, Smeeding et 
al. 1993, Evandrou et al. 1993, Ruggeri et al. 1994 and Paulus et al. 2010). Aaberge and 
Langørgen (2006) question this assumption by demonstrating that local governments 
provide public services at different costs. Furthermore, the production cost approach 
disregards differences in quality and efficiency in the service production, and does not 
account for the possible welfare losses when the government imposes quantity 
constraints in the consumption of public services. Estimating the real value of public 
services to the beneficiaries’ demands, however, in-depth data on efficiency, quality and 
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cost differences across and within 22 countries. This is beyond the objective of this 
paper. Nevertheless, the production cost approach provides a useful benchmark by 
offering an estimate of the value of public services, whereas the standard approach 
simply ignores the impact of public services on welfare. 
This study includes four publicly financed services: health services, long-term 
care, education and early childhood education and care (ECEC). While Aaberge, 
Langørgen and Lindgren (2010) focused on the distributional impact of education 
and health services, we extend the analysis by also including long-term care and 
ECEC services based on OECD data. The data are net public expenditure, and thus 
the households’ out-of-pocket payments and other financial sources beyond 
government sources are excluded. 
The OECD System of Health Accounts provides expenditure data on health and 
long-term care. In the System of Health Accounts, long-term care spending comprises 
both health and social support services to people suffering from chronic conditions 
and disabilities who need care on an ongoing basis. Since the reporting practices of 
the allocation of long-term care spending between the health and social components 
may differ between countries, we have chosen to include total spending on both 
components to facilitate comparability across countries. 
Education expenditure is available from the Education Database at OECD 
Statistics.6 The data are separated into primary, lower secondary and upper 
secondary education. This enables us to identify the value of three levels of basic 
education in European countries. The data also include information on pre-primary 
education, but we have instead included pre-primary education as part of the 
kindergarten services. 
The OECD Family Database provides public expenditure on child care and pre-
primary education as a share of each country’s gross domestic product (GDP). As 
the OECD also offers GDP data, these data are combined to calculate the value of 
ECEC services in millions of the national currency. A limitation is that the Family 
Database does not provide a separation between different types of public 
financial support for ECEC services. Consequently, in-kind transfers are mixed 
with cash transfers and support through the tax system in the data for public 
spending on ECEC services. In some countries this may lead to double counting of                                                                  
6 UNESCO-OECD-Eurostat (UOE) data collection on education statistics, compiled on the basis of national administrative 
sources, reported by Ministries of Education or National Statistical Offices. 
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benefits, for instance in the UK where many parents pay for private child care and 
are partly reimbursed through the tax system.  
Allocation of public services 
Who receives what of public services is an outcome of both central and local 
government decisions. The governments are assumed to target public services to 
specific subpopulations based on evaluation of relative needs for public services 
associated with different demographic characteristics. Children are provided 
education services because they need to develop their skills, while the elderly need 
health-care and long-term care due to their high likelihood of becoming ill or disabled. 
Since both the selection of recipients and the amount of public services are decided by 
the government, it is important to account for the targeting policies of the Nordic and 
other European governments. Different welfare regimes may have consequences for 
economic inequality when countries provide different levels of public services. 
Education and child care services – the actual consumption approach 
Two methods are used to assess the value of public services per receiver. Either the 
value is based on actual consumption or on the probability to use the services. In the 
former case (the ex post perspective) the value consumed by each individual forms the 
basic measurement unit. This method is applied for the value of education and 
kindergarten services. Enrolment numbers in each education level (primary, lower 
secondary and upper secondary) is accessible from the OECD. Total expenditure 
divided by the enrolment number provides an estimate of the value received per pupil. 
We assume that participants at a given education level and country receive an equal 
share of the value. In the EU-SILC data, actual participation in education institutions is 
only known for people aged 16 years or above. For younger children, however, 
education participation is largely compulsory and we therefore assume 100 percent 
participation rates for these children. All three education levels are seen as necessary 
for attaining the required skills to participate actively in a developed society. Thus, 
people that are in the age-group for which education is targeted but do not participate 
thus have a need for education that is not fulfilled. Older persons that do in fact 
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participate in one of the education levels acquire a value that they do not seem to 
need at the time.7  
A limitation of the data is that information on participation in public or private 
education is not accessible. Thus, it is assumed that every pupil in a certain education 
level receives the same amount of government funding, irrespective of whether or not 
the person actually participates in publicly funded schooling.  
Our method assumes that the value of child care and pre-primary education is 
allocated to users only. The calculation from total public expenditure to per hour value 
is based on actual participation. Since there are no reliable data on children’s total use 
of kindergartens in European countries, we have assumed that the total use in a 
country equals a weighted sum of the individual participation rates in the EU-SILC 
data. The EU-SILC data include variables that provide information about the average 
hours of participation per week in child care and pre-primary schooling. We estimate 
the public expenditure per hour per week given to children in each country, and 
allocate this value multiplied by the number of hours attended in kindergarten to the 
actual recipients registered in the EU-SILC. The EU-SILC data do not distinguish 
between children in private and public ECEC institutions, which means that we 
allocate benefits to all children receiving ECEC services, irrespective of whether or not 
the child actually participates in publicly funded child care or pre-primary education. 
Probability to use health and long-term care services – the insurance approach 
Health and long-term care services are treated as insurance arrangements, i.e. the 
value is assessed on an ex ante basis. This means that it is the probability to consume 
rather than the actual use of the service that matters. Such a view has been applied by 
Smeeding (1986), Smeeding et al. (1993), Aaberge and Langørgen (2006), Paulus et al. 
(2010) and Aaberge et al. (2010, 2017). The probability of receiving health and long-
term care services depends on demographic characteristics – age and gender. The 
European Commission has established user profiles by age and gender for both health 
and long-term care services.8, 9 By combining these user profiles with population data,                                                                  
7 Several of these data challenges are rooted in the methodological choice of analysing only one year. By applying a 
perspective of such a short time span as a year, we are not able to account for intertemporal planning and adjustment. In a 
life-cycle perspective the understanding of income, needs, and public services can be tackled in a less rigid manner. 
8 See European Commission (2010: 111-112). 
9 Iceland, however, lacks a long-term care profile, so we assume that the provision is similar to its Nordic neighbours. 
Hence, we calculate the long-term care user profile for Iceland as the average of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. 
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the relative provision to each citizen is established. Multiplication with the total 
expenditure gives the individual health and long-term care insurance. Since the 
probability of using health and long-term care services differs across individuals by 
age and gender, the allocation procedure is carried out separately for health services 
and long-term care. It is important to note that the probability of using health and 
long-term care is solely determined by demographics. For instance, we assume that 
the value of the health premium is unaffected by the individuals’ position in the 
income distribution.10 
Heterogeneous population 
Since individuals’ needs of education, kindergarten, health care and long-term care 
depend on age and gender, we classify the population into target groups defined by 
age and gender. The following age groups are employed by EU-SILC: 0–17 years, 18–
24 years, 25–34 years, 35–44 years, 45–54 years, 55–64 years, 65–74 years and 75 years 
and above. We find it required to introduce a more detailed classification for children 
and infants. The reason is that government expenditures to different levels of 
education (primary, lower secondary and upper secondary) vary. Moreover, the 
participation rate in kindergarten varies by age. Children in pre-education age are 
divided into three target groups: 0 year, 1–2 years and 3 years to primary education 
age. Since the age intervals for attending different education levels vary between 
countries, the age group classification is allowed to vary between countries to take 
into account the features of different education systems. Table 3 shows the 14 age 
groups used. When the age groups are combined with gender (males and females), 
the classification includes 28 different target groups.  
                                                                 
10 We rely on this simplification despite the fact that empirical evidence from European countries suggests that there is a 
positive relationship between the health conditions and the income levels of individuals. 
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Table 3: Target groups by gender and age 
Category Age group 
1 0 year 
2 1–2 years 
3 3 years – education age 
4 Primary education age 
5 Lower secondary education age 
6 Upper secondary education age (17 years and below) 
7 Upper secondary education age (18 years and above) 
8 18–24 years, but not in upper secondary education age 
9 25–34 years 
10 35–44 years 
11 45–54 years 
12 55–64 years 
13 65–74 years 
14 75 years and above 
 
Income definitions 
We consider two different combinations of income definitions and equivalence scales. 
First, we use the standard approach combining cash income and the EU equivalence 
scale. Next, our measure of extended income (cash income plus in-kind transfers) is 
converted by the NA equivalence scale. Table 4 displays the combinations of income 
definitions and equivalence scales used in this study. 
Table 4: Equivalent income definitions 
Income definition Equivalence scale Equivalent income definition 
Cash income EU scale Cash income (EU) 
Extended income NA scale Extended income (NA) 
 
 
The EU-SILC variable disposable income (HY020) is used as a measure of cash 
income.11 The disposable income variable is defined by the sum of earnings, self-
employment income, capital income, public cash transfers, imputed rent and                                                                  
11 Disposable income in national currency is defined by HY020 (disposable income in Euros) * HX010 (Exchange rate) * 
HY025 (Inflation factor). 
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subtracted income taxes. Note that this variable also includes non-cash components, 
such as non-cash employee income, imputed rent12 and value of home produced 
goods for household consumption. Table 5 presents country-specific relative 
distributions of extended income by income components. The results show that while 
cash income is by far the most important income component in all countries, there are 
significant differences in relative cash income. Note also that health insurance and 
education account for a major share of in-kind transfers from the government to the 
households. 
Table 5: Mean extended income (NA) shares by income components and country, percent, 2009 
Country Cash income ECEC Education Health care Long-term care 
Denmark 72.4 3.3 8.5 12.2 3.7 
Finland 77.7 2.3 7.0 9.8 3.2 
Iceland 76.0 2.2 9.6 10.1 2.2 
Norway 74.6 2.2 10.0 9.8 3.4 
Sweden 72.5 3.1 7.4 12.1 4.9 
      
Austria 77.4 0.8 7.5 12.4 1.9 
Belgium 76.4 2.0 7.1 11.7 2.8 
Czech Republic 77.8 1.1 7.0 13.6 0.6 
Estonia 78.0 1.0 9.1 11.3 0.5 
France 76.6 2.1 6.6 12.3 2.5 
Germany 78.4 1.0 5.9 13.5 1.2 
Greece 79.6 0.3 6.4 13.2 0.5 
Hungary 77.5 1.9 8.4 11.7 0.6 
Ireland 73.2 0.7 11.6 13.3 1.2 
Italy 77.0 1.6 7.5 12.1 1.8 
Netherlands 72.9 1.6 8.0 12.2 5.2 
Poland 78.9 1.1 8.1 11.0 0.9 
Portugal 75.7 0.9 8.0 15.1 0.3 
Slovakia 77.4 1.1 7.1 14.3 0.1 
Slovenia 79.4 1.2 7.7 10.1 1.6 
Spain 74.5 1.4 7.5 15.0 1.6 
UK 75.5 2.3 8.4 12.5 1.3 
 
Source: EU-SILC, OECD. 
 
 
 
                                                                  
12 Imputed rent is defined as the value of owning your dwelling or having access to below-market or free-of-rent dwelling 
and is estimated at the market rent. 
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Measuring inequality and poverty 
This section discusses and presents the methods for measuring inequality and 
poverty. Moreover, the role of household weights is discussed.  
Inequality 
Empirical analyses of inequality in income distributions are normally based on the 
Lorenz curve. To construct this curve, the population is ranked according to the 
(equivalent) income per individual, from lowest to highest income, and then the 
individuals’ shares of income are aggregated across the individuals. The Lorenz curve 
then represents the cumulative income shares for proportions of the population.  
In Figure 1, two examples of Lorenz curves are displayed. The black straight line is 
the equality reference, which illustrates the situation where all individuals enjoy the 
same amount of income (complete equality). To summarise the information content 
of the Lorenz curves and to achieve rankings of intersecting Lorenz curves the 
standard approach is to employ the Gini coefficient, which is equal to twice the area 
between the Lorenz curve and its equality reference. The Gini coefficient takes values 
between 0 and 1, where 0 is attained when the Lorenz curve coincides with the 
equality reference. A Gini coefficient of 1, on the other hand, represents complete 
inequality and is attained if one individual receives the total income.  
In Figure 1, the area between Lorenz A and the equality reference curve is 
smaller than the area between Lorenz B and the equality reference curve. Hence the 
Gini coefficient is smallest in the case of Lorenz A. The Gini coefficient is a relative 
measure of inequality. This means that if all incomes increase by the same 
percentage, for instance a doubling of all incomes, the Gini coefficient will be the 
same, despite the fact that the richest person will receive much more than the 
poorest person, in absolute terms. 
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Figure 1: The Lorenz curve 
 
Poverty thresholds 
In most studies of income distribution in developed countries, poverty is regarded as a 
relative phenomenon. This perspective is based on the observation that people 
usually compare their material situation with other citizens. They consequently adjust 
their expectations and demands for material well-being relative to other individuals in 
the same society. The alternative to a relative poverty threshold is to agree on a 
certain level of income that is needed in order to not be considered poor. This is the 
norm when assessing poverty in the developing world, such as in analyses of people 
living for under 1 or 2 USD per day.  
This paper follows the standard reasoning in assessments of poverty in developed 
countries, and applies a relative poverty threshold to measure whether or not people 
are classified as poor. The relative poverty threshold is normally calculated as a certain 
percentage of the median income in a country. The median income means the income 
of the individual who is located exactly in the middle of the income distribution. 
According to the EU method, 60 percent of the median equivalent income is the 
poverty line (see Atkinson et al. 2002). Each country has its own poverty line. As an 
aggregate measure of the poverty rate in different countries we use the head-count 
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ratio defined by the share of individuals who live in a household with income below the 
poverty line. 
Household weights 
In this paper statistics on income distribution are generally calculated on the basis of 
equivalent incomes allocated to individuals, using cross-sectional sampling weights 
available in the EU-SILC data set. The purpose of weighting is to reduce biases in the 
estimation in order to draw inference from the EU-SILC sample to the whole 
population. For obtaining population estimates, respondents are given weights which 
are inversely proportional to the probability of being selected. Moreover, the sample 
weights are adjusted to counterbalance non-response. However, we do not have full 
information on how these weights are constructed in each country, because the 
national statistical institutions are not obliged to provide full details. 
Empirical results 
This section examines the impact on income inequality and poverty estimates of 
accounting for non-cash income from public services. For more detailed results by 
country and year, see Appendix B. 
Income inequality 
Figure 2 shows relative low inequality in the distribution of cash income (after tax) in 
the Nordic countries, whereas it is rather high in Estonia, Greece, Italy, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain and the UK – the Gini coefficient shows a difference of around ten 
percentage points. By replacing cash income (EU) with extended income (NA), the 
inequality is significantly reduced for all countries. However, the ranking of European 
countries by estimates of overall inequality is only slightly affected by the change in 
income definition. 
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Figure 2: Gini coefficient by income definition and country, percent, 2009 
 
Poverty 
Figure 2 displays the poverty rates in European countries according to two different 
income definitions. A person is defined as income poor if he or she has lower income 
than 60 percent of the median equivalent income.13 In general, poverty rates are low 
in the Nordic countries in comparison to most other European countries. By replacing 
cash income (EU) with extended income (NA), the estimated proportion of poor is 
reduced by approximately 50 per cent in most countries. 
The ranking of countries by the poverty headcount is rather insensitive to changes 
in the income measure. For both definitions the Czech Republic, Iceland, Netherlands 
and Norway display a low poverty rate, while Estonia, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, 
Spain and UK have relatively high poverty rates. Table 7 in Appendix B shows that 
most countries experience a rise in poverty from 2006 to 2009, irrespective of the 
income definition that is used. 
                                                                  
13 Note that the poverty threshold differs between income definitions and is higher for extended income because median 
extended income is higher than median cash income. By using 60 percent of the median income (within each country) as 
poverty threshold, the interpretation of poverty as a relative concept is retained. 
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Figure 3: Poverty rate by income definition and country, percent, 2009 
 
 
Tables 8 and 9 in Appendix B display estimated poverty rates for individuals belonging 
to different household types according to cash and extended income. For cash income 
adjusted by EU scale, we find that the poverty rates in most countries are rather high 
for single adults. This is the case for all age groups and in particular for single adults 
with children. However, Figures 4–6 (and Tables 8–9) show that the changes in 
poverty estimates when accounting for in-kind transfers vary significantly across 
family types. Specifically, for families with a single household head, we find that the 
changes in poverty estimates due to the change in income definition are as follows: 
 
• For childless single adults, the poverty reduction is relatively small. 
• For single parents, there is a strong poverty reduction. 
• For single elderly, the poverty reduction is even stronger. 
 
Hence, in most countries the overestimation of poverty based on the cash income 
measure is rather large for single adults with children and for elderly single adults. In 
general, we find that poverty estimates for households with children and elderly 
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households are significantly overestimated by ignoring public in-kind transfers in the 
analysis of income distribution. 
Figure 4: Poverty rate among childless single adults (aged 18–64) by income definition and country, 
percent, 2009 
 
 
By accounting for the distributional impact of publicly provided services, the Nordic 
countries exhibit low poverty estimates among the elderly, except for single elderly in 
the age group 65–74 years. In the latter group, poverty in Finland is high and poverty 
in Iceland is low compared to the remaining Nordic countries (see Appendix B). 
Couples living in Nordic countries are exposed to low poverty rates regardless of age 
and whether or not they are childless. Among Nordic countries, Finland has a high 
poverty rate in the group of childless single adults, whilst Iceland and Sweden show 
high poverty rates for single parents. 
 
15
28
20
18
21
13
25
16
18
19
DENMARK FINLAND ICELAND NORWAY SWEDEN
Cash income Extended income
 
 
Nordic Economic Policy Review 197 
 
Figure 5: Poverty rate among single parents by income definition and country, percent, 2009 
 
Figure 6: Poverty rate among single elderly (aged 75 and above) by income definition and country, 
percent, 2009 
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Conclusions 
This paper studies the distributional impact of public welfare services in the Nordic 
countries and compares the prevalence of income inequality and poverty with other 
European countries by applying an extended income concept. In order to obtain 
unbiased estimates of inequality and poverty, however, it was necessary to go beyond 
the standard approach of applying the EU equivalence scale to extended income, 
because the needs of public services differ between individuals and households. We 
make extended incomes comparable across household types by adjusting the 
commonly used EU scale to include needs for public services. 
The most common income definitions for analysing income inequality and 
poverty are disposable cash income and extended income, normally adjusted by the 
EU scale. However, both income definitions prove to be biased as measures of 
economic living standards in a community where the welfare state provides 
substantial transfers in-kind to the households. These biases arise because cash 
income is obtained by subtracting direct taxes used to finance public welfare services 
but without including the value of received services, while using the EU scale equates 
needs for public services and needs for cash income. An important aim of this study is 
to account for heterogeneity in needs for publicly funded services by using a 
theoretically justified needs-adjusted equivalence scale (NA scale). The NA scale 
reflects the fact that elderly have relatively large needs for health care and long-term 
care, whereas children have large needs for child care and education. 
The empirical results show that households with childless single adults below 65 
years are exposed to relatively high risk of poverty in all Nordic countries even if we 
account for public in-kind transfers. When estimates rely on the extended income 
concept, poverty rates for single adults with children are particularly high in Iceland 
and Sweden. By contrast, for couples at all ages (with or without children) and for 
single elderly above 75 years, relatively few Nordic households will be classified as 
poor when extended income forms the basis of the poverty estimates. 
Taken together, our findings may have implications for policies aimed at fighting 
inequality and poverty. By accounting for public in-kind transfers, poverty among the 
elderly and families with children appears to be rather low compared to standard 
estimates based on cash income. Conversely, public in-kind transfers like subsidized 
education and health care are not very effective policy instruments for alleviating 
poverty among childless single adults aged under 65. As a consequence, it might be 
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necessary to address poverty in this latter group through other policy tools 
complementary to major public in-kind transfer programmes. 
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Appendix A Needs for cash income 
We use the EU scale to account for differences in needs of cash income for households 
who differ in size and age composition and the median of the distribution of 
equivalent income in a given country as a basis for determining the needs parameter 
for the reference group. Thus, the needs parameter of cash income for the reference 
household in country k is defined by: 
 
𝛾𝛾0𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙 (𝑥𝑥𝑂𝑂𝑘𝑘𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸) 
 
Where 𝑥𝑥𝑂𝑂𝑘𝑘
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸  is the vector of equivalent cash incomes in country k using the EU scale to 
make cash incomes comparable across heterogeneous households. Note that the 
vector 𝑥𝑥𝑂𝑂𝑘𝑘
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸  includes one component for each individual in country k. This means that 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙 (𝑥𝑥𝑂𝑂𝑘𝑘𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸)  is the median equivalent cash income in country k. 
For households that are not of the reference type we use the chosen EU scale to 
assess the need for cash income in the following way: 
 
𝛾𝛾0𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘 = 𝛾𝛾0𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ’   
 
where 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ  is the EU scale for cash income pertaining to household h. Thus, the size of 
the needs for cash income for household h relative to the reference household r is 
equal to the EU scale. The country-specific needs parameters of cash income and non-
cash income are used as a basis for weighting cash income versus non-cash income by 
construction of the NA scale. 
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Appendix B Inequality and poverty estimates 
Table 6: Gini coefficient for the distribution of income by income definition, country and year 
Country Cash income (EU) Extended income (NA) 
  2006 2009 2006 2009 
Denmark 0.240 0.248 0.184 0.191 
Finland 0.259 0.252 0.213 0.206 
Iceland 0.278 0.255 0.221 0.206 
Norway 0.232 0.228 0.180 0.177 
Sweden 0.232 0.238 0.173 0.181 
     
Austria 0.261 0.260 0.213 0.211 
Belgium 0.262 0.261 0.213 0.210 
Czech Republic 0.252 0.248 0.208 0.205 
Estonia 0.328 0.312 0.283 0.264 
France 0.263 0.295 0.207 0.241 
Germany 0.298 0.289 0.254 0.243 
Greece 0.343 0.328 0.289 0.281 
Hungary 0.255 0.240 0.203 0.196 
Ireland 0.313 0.328 0.257 0.261 
Italy 0.321 0.310 0.264 0.258 
Netherlands 0.271 0.252 0.213 0.196 
Poland 0.320 0.311 0.269 0.265 
Portugal 0.366 0.335 0.298 0.272 
Slovakia 0.246 0.260 0.204 0.218 
Slovenia 0.226 0.238 0.188 0.198 
Spain 0.312 0.332 0.259 0.269 
UK 0.328 0.328 0.276 0.266 
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Table 7: Poverty rate by income definition, country and year, percent 
Country Cash income (EU) Extended income (NA) 
  2006 2009 2006 2009 
Denmark 10.5 12.4 5.2 6.8 
Finland 12.5 12.8 5.9 6.6 
Iceland 9.5 9.0 3.7 5.0 
Norway 11.2 10.0 6.6 5.2 
Sweden 10.1 12.5 5.3 6.4 
     
Austria 11.8 11.9 5.6 5.3 
Belgium 15.1 14.6 7.3 7.4 
Czech Republic 9.5 8.9 4.8 4.8 
Estonia 19.6 15.7 14.1 11.1 
France 13.0 12.8 5.2 6.5 
Germany 14.7 15.5 9.3 8.8 
Greece 20.5 20.0 12.5 13.1 
Hungary 12.2 12.1 5.6 5.0 
Ireland 16.5 15.2 7.0 6.6 
Italy 19.7 18.1 11.5 11.0 
Netherlands 9.8 9.6 4.2 4.3 
Poland 17.3 17.4 10.3 10.9 
Portugal 18.2 18.0 9.4 9.3 
Slovakia 10.5 12.0 5.9 7.6 
Slovenia 10.8 12.7 6.2 7.8 
Spain 19.7 20.6 11.8 12.8 
UK 18.8 17.1 10.6 9.3 
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Table 8: Poverty rate for cash income measure (EU scale) by household type and country, percent, 2009 
 Household type 
Age of adults 18-64 18-64 65-74 75+ 18+ 
Number of adults 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 3+ 3+ 
Children No No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes 
Denmark 15.4 3.5 17.1 6.1 20.1 9.5 29.7 33.6 3.4 7.6 
Finland 28.4 7.4 27.7 9.1 30.8 4.3 40.9 8.5 7.7 13.1 
Iceland 20.3 4.7 31.8 10.5 5.5 0.9 21.6 0.0 2.3 2.8 
Norway 18.1 3.1 33.2 5.4 18.0 0.8 35.3 0.8 3.3 7.1 
Sweden 21.0 6.6 39.3 8.3 28.8 4.3 34.8 9.9 5.1 13.5 
           
Austria 18.5 7.3 28.0 10.4 24.7 7.2 22.7 16.3 3.9 12.7 
Belgium 17.7 10.4 37.3 14.9 17.5 19.9 22.8 26.3 8.2 17.3 
Czech Republic 16.9 4.0 45.1 9.6 19.6 0.0 18.8 0.5 2.8 9.5 
Estonia 33.0 14.1 52.0 18.4 30.3 0.5 27.3 0.0 11.6 20.5 
France 14.3 6.4 38.9 12.7 11.9 3.8 16.8 10.3 8.3 20.6 
Germany 27.1 9.5 43.4 11.7 23.0 9.4 15.8 7.7 5.2 11.6 
Greece 21.7 21.0 30.0 25.5 25.7 14.4 35.7 27.8 15.0 33.2 
Hungary 17.6 9.8 29.4 17.9 9.8 2.5 6.2 1.4 6.0 23.0 
Ireland 31.2 12.1 30.9 15.3 9.6 5.8 12.6 6.7 6.3 16.1 
Italy 19.4 11.8 37.4 19.4 29.8 8.5 25.9 12.7 10.2 24.8 
Netherlands 7.6 3.1 19.9 5.4 5.3 2.4 5.1 3.3 2.3 6.4 
Poland 30.4 14.1 42.5 25.4 27.9 7.8 18.5 3.5 13.5 25.7 
Portugal 25.6 17.5 51.0 21.0 28.6 13.7 38.7 29.8 10.7 25.1 
Slovakia 20.7 7.2 36.3 17.1 13.3 1.8 16.2 1.6 4.7 19.2 
Slovenia 36.6 9.2 46.7 10.9 43.7 8.0 50.2 10.9 5.2 7.4 
Spain 23.9 15.1 48.3 27.7 25.9 23.3 30.9 29.4 14.5 30.1 
UK 26.9 11.7 34.3 15.7 27.5 20.6 30.7 24.3 10.3 19.4 
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Table 9: Poverty rate for extended income measure (NA scale) by household type and country, percent, 
2009 
 Household type 
Age of adults 18-64 18-64 65-74 75+ 18+ 
Number of adults 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 3+ 3+ 
Children No No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes 
Denmark 13.4 3.0 3.4 2.1 7.5 1.1 1.2 0.0 2.4 4.4 
Finland 24.9 5.4 7.6 4.5 15.6 1.1 0.5 0.0 5.1 4.0 
Iceland 16.0 4.7 16.4 4.3 1.4 0.0 1.0 0.0 2.0 1.1 
Norway 17.6 2.4 9.3 2.6 4.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 2.3 1.2 
Sweden 19.2 5.7 16.9 3.4 8.2 1.6 0.0 0.0 2.8 5.8 
           
Austria 14.7 5.4 8.6 3.2 10.1 1.8 2.2 0.0 1.2 4.2 
Belgium 14.0 7.7 11.5 7.9 5.7 4.3 2.1 0.6 6.5 8.8 
Czech Republic 9.2 2.5 20.3 4.7 2.8 0.0 6.7 0.0 1.5 3.9 
Estonia 30.0 10.9 12.3 5.9 24.7 0.5 56.2 0.0 7.2 6.1 
France 11.6 4.4 11.5 4.9 6.8 1.3 3.8 0.8 6.1 6.9 
Germany 22.8 6.6 17.6 4.7 12.8 3.1 5.2 0.4 2.4 3.3 
Greece 17.6 16.8 20.8 15.0 16.6 2.5 29.5 8.0 11.4 16.9 
Hungary 13.4 7.3 5.0 4.2 3.7 1.0 4.4 0.0 4.2 5.8 
Ireland 20.6 8.4 5.3 6.0 6.1 3.2 5.8 5.6 3.4 2.0 
Italy 17.1 8.9 23.0 8.7 19.2 3.9 19.2 4.4 7.1 14.3 
Netherlands 6.3 2.1 4.6 1.6 2.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 1.0 2.5 
Poland 25.7 10.2 15.6 11.5 20.4 0.9 22.7 3.5 9.6 13.0 
Portugal 20.6 14.3 9.0 6.9 20.9 2.5 28.2 3.0 7.2 12.7 
Slovakia 13.2 5.2 25.5 8.6 2.0 0.0 13.8 1.6 3.1 11.8 
Slovenia 31.4 6.9 8.9 3.0 34.3 4.8 41.0 7.6 3.2 3.5 
Spain 20.4 12.8 27.1 15.5 10.4 5.6 13.2 5.8 10.1 19.6 
UK 26.5 11.6 8.6 6.2 15.6 9.2 3.4 0.0 7.2 9.3 
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Comment on R. Aaberge, A. Langørgen and P.Y. Lindgren: 
Accounting for Public In-Kind Transfers in Comparisons of Income 
Inequality between the Nordic Countries 
Tuulia Hakola1 
 
 
Measuring income inequality and comparing it across countries can be very tricky. 
One notable open issue is the accounting of public in-kind transfers such as free (or 
heavily subsidised) education and health care. As the potential value of these transfers 
can be large relative to the cash income of many low-income households, this 
accounting choice has immediate implications for the measurement of income 
inequality, and for any policymaker who attempts to deal with economic inequality. 
The implications are particularly large for the Nordic countries, where widely available 
and comprehensive public services are a substantial component of the economy (see 
e.g. OECD 2015). 
The authors take on the ambitious task of measuring income inequality and 
poverty in a cross-country comparable way that also takes into account publicly 
funded welfare services. Drawing on their previous work, the authors’ measure of in-
kind transfers consists of health care, long-term care, education and child care 
services, thus covering the most significant in-kind services fairly comprehensively. 
Combining the total value of these services with household cash income, the authors 
then recalculate income inequality and poverty indices for 22 European countries, 
including the Nordics. 
Using this approach, the authors arrive at an intuitive conclusion, which is 
consistent also with earlier research (e.g. Paulus et al. 2010), that the measures of 
poverty and income inequality are generally lower when services are taken into 
account. A particularly dramatic finding is that relative poverty rates are almost 
halved in most countries (including the Nordics) when in-kind transfers are included. 
                                                                 
1 Ministry of Finance. Finland. 
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Recalculated equivalence scales and income distributions 
The authors approach the issue on several different levels and obtain results of 
different types. First, they introduce a needs-adjusted equivalence scale to extend the 
traditional household income equivalence scale, and calculate the scale values for 
different demographic groups. Then, the authors combine households’ cash income 
with their in-kind transfers, and use this extended income to measure income 
inequality within the countries studied. And finally, the authors recalculate poverty 
rates using the same definition of extended income, and compare the results across 
countries. Each of these steps produces results that are interesting on their own for 
both academic and policy purposes, and therefore each of them warrants a separate 
discussion. 
The needs-adjusted equivalence scale, first introduced (to the best of my 
knowledge) in Aaberge and Langørgen (2006), extends the traditional income 
equivalence scales by acknowledging that different demographic groups have 
different needs for public services such as health care and education. The scale gives 
people different weights based on their estimated need of services, which in turn is 
based on the observed expenditure on the aggregate level. The weights calculated 
this way draw particular attention to older people (age bracket 75+) and children in 
upper secondary education, both of whom use a large amount of public services in the 
forms of health care and education respectively. 
The new scale expands the concept of income equivalence in a meaningful way by 
explicitly taking into account that the needs of different demographic groups can 
differ. However, when it comes to policymaking, the definition of a new equivalence 
scale brings back into light the old question of how to compare incomes across 
households of different types and sizes. In this case, the scale used by the authors 
requires us to assume that the needs of different demographic groups are reflected 
well in the amount of services they are currently receiving. However, it is not clear that 
this is the case, and the authors also remain fairly agnostic about how reasonable this 
assumption is. When compared to Aaberge et al. (2010), where the authors use 
detailed local government spending to identify minimum expenditures for different 
groups, the potential shortcomings of this very aggregate approach become even 
clearer. As the authors point out, this choice is mostly driven by the lack of more 
detailed data in most EU countries, and therefore the issue is definitely worth a revisit 
if better data becomes available in the future. 
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The second set of results is about the distribution of income after in-kind transfers 
are taken into account. The general impression from the results is that the Nordic 
countries are doing great, with relatively low measures of income inequality being 
even lower after public services are taken into account. As the drop of the Gini 
coefficients can be quite large (a drop of five percentage points being fairly common), 
the results suggest that policymakers should take a closer look at in-kind transfers 
when addressing income inequality.  
Implications of the recalculated poverty rates 
Finally, the authors recalculate poverty rates at the national level and within 
demographic groups. As for the inequality indices, a general result is that the poverty 
rates are notably reduced for every country after public services are taken into 
account. The effects on different demographic groups, however, are more 
heterogeneous. In the case of the Nordic countries, the biggest winner seems to be 
the 75+ age group. Based on the results, poverty in this group is almost non-existent 
after extended income is taken into account. Another group of winners is single 
parents, whose poverty rates are also notably reduced, although the rates in Iceland 
and Sweden remain comparatively high. Similarly, with the exception of Finland, the 
poverty rates are reduced for older single households (65–74). 
On the side of the losers, working age (18–64) single households have relatively 
high poverty rates in all Nordic countries even after public services are included. As 
the age group is fairly wide, we cannot be certain about the driving cause, but 
potential groups include the unemployed and students. Obtaining more information 
about the composition of this groups would offer policy makers more information. 
Beyond changing the poverty rankings of different demographic groups, the 
recalculated poverty rates also raise a deeper question: who do we consider to be 
poor? On the surface, the authors use a typical income-based criterion (income below 
60 per cent of the median income), but as their definition of income takes into 
account both the utilisation of public services and the estimated need for the, the 
resulting definition of poverty and its implications are also different. This raises 
interesting and important questions. For example, should we think that the cash 
income poverty of old people is not a major problem in the Nordic countries, as their 
extended income is heavily supplemented by health care and long-term care services? 
The answer to questions like these is far from clear. One particular challenge also 
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comes from the data, where the use of health care and long-term care is averaged 
within demographic groups, thus hiding individual variation in need and actual usage. 
A further look at this distribution could be a fruitful direction for future research. 
Conclusions 
Even if the complete implications of the results remain unclear, the authors have 
advanced an important area of research. Income inequality and poverty are clearly 
questions where just looking at cash incomes will only tell us a part of the story. In 
their research, the authors have explicitly taken into account several non-cash 
transfers, and measured their effect in a way that acknowledges the fact that different 
demographic groups have different needs for these services. Additionally, they have 
done this for a large group of countries in a way that allows cross-country 
comparisons, thus making a valuable overview of an area where our understanding is 
still very limited. 
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Comment on R. Aaberge, A. Langørgen and P.Y. Lindgren: 
Accounting for Public In-Kind Transfers in Comparisons of Income 
Inequality between the Nordic Countries 
Jukka Pirttilä1 
 
 
This is an extremely valuable study, since one key characteristic of the Nordic model is 
the extensive provision of public services. As the authors point out, this can also 
motivate the heavy tax burden in these countries. Also, public service provision can 
help in reaching the redistributive goals of the government without necessarily 
imposing very progressive tax schedules; and indeed, many Nordic countries rely 
heavily on flat taxes, such as the VAT, in raising revenue, and redistribute more using 
expenditure-side instruments.  
The authors are among the leading researchers in the field, and the high-quality 
level of the current study duly reflects their knowledge. Their work and application of 
the needs-adjusted equivalence scales is certainly of great importance for examining 
the role of publicly provided services.  
Some qualifications 
One conceptual, or philosophical, question that may be asked is whether it is entirely 
legitimate to only examine the role of public services by turning them into monetary 
equivalents. Recent years have seen an increase in the interest in multidimensional 
poverty measurement, and some studies (see Alkire and Apablaza 2016) have been 
conducted using the EU-SILC data the authors of the current paper also rely on. 
Health and education have also intrinsic value themselves, and it is not clear that the 
“exchange rate” in valuing them is one-to-one with cash income. But of course, since 
the objective of the present study is to examine the redistributive effect of public 
services, the route taken here, and in other similar studies, is the only feasible one: it 
would be almost impossible to back out the health and education status of individuals 
had they not been subject to public intervention.                                                                   
1 University of Tampere. 
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A second complication in the exercise is that we often only observe the producer 
prices of these services, and hence cannot really know much about their quality. The 
authors have done some work on this in a one-country context, and the reference to 
such a study is useful. It is also expected that the use of public services varies by the 
socio-economic background of people so that those with less education and lower 
incomes seek care less, for example. In this study, the authors acknowledge that they 
cannot really address this issue with the data at hand. This is a caveat to bear in mind 
when interpreting the results.  
Are the Nordics different? 
The authors could perhaps have pushed a bit further when commenting on the cross-
country differences in the results. Based on the data behind Figure 2, it is interesting 
to note that, while the absolute reduction in the Gini coefficient when one moves from 
cash income to extended income is not greater in Nordic countries than elsewhere, 
the relative reduction (as a share of the cash-income Gini) is in fact among the largest 
in Sweden, Norway and Denmark. Moving on to poverty reduction (Figure 3), the 
same observation does not hold. The greatest relative poverty reduction appears to 
take place in countries such as Hungary, Ireland, and Austria. The large reduction in 
inequality due to public services is hence in line with the view of the Nordic countries 
redistributing a lot via service provision, but the poverty reduction is not. Perhaps this 
could be linked with the fairly universal way of service provision in the Nordic 
countries? 
Old-age poverty still remains an issue 
I am a bit uncertain about what to conclude from the results related to the almost 
complete (or complete) disappearance of poverty among the old-aged when taking 
into account public service provision (See Table 9 and Figure 6). This also happens in 
countries such as Estonia, where one would expect to come across some very poor old 
people. I understand from where this finding stems: the poverty line is based on 
median extended income, but the service use is so extensive among the old-aged, 
that therefore their public-service-value augmented extended income climbs above 
the poverty line. Perhaps the poverty line should rather be based on needs-adjusted 
values calculated differently for people in different age groups – in a similar way as the 
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equivalence scales are needs-adjusted, or there should be some minimum level of 
cash income that all households need to have. The latter observation, especially, goes 
clearly beyond measuring poverty in the conventional relative way. Within the scope 
of a brief study, these issues are also hard to take into account analytically. For this 
reason, I would be more cautious in drawing the conclusion that poverty at old age is 
very much below the cash-based measured one when taking into account the role of 
public services.  
Reference  
Alkire, S. and Apablaza, M. (2016), Multidimensional Poverty in Europe 2006–2012: Illustrating 
a Methodology’, OPHI Working Paper No. 74. 
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